Sixty Days That Could Decide the Region’s Future: Why Should We Be Concerned About a US–Iran Agreement?

Dr Mohamed Yousif Hassan
On 20 June 2026, Washington and Tehran may sign in Switzerland what they describe as a “Memorandum of Understanding”. The name is diplomatic, but the reality is that we may be looking at nothing more than a 60-day truce. This truce would not mark the end of a war; rather, it would constitute a temporary pause imposed by circumstances. The problem is that the fate of the region and its neighbouring states could well depend on whether this pause succeeds or fails.
What Is in the Agreement, and Why Is It Fragile?
According to the announced provisions, the agreement rests on four pillars: an immediate cessation of hostilities, including in Lebanon; the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; the release of US$25 billion to Iran; and the commencement of nuclear negotiations.
Yet the agreement’s fragility stems from three fundamental weaknesses. First, it is temporary. Sixty days are insufficient to resolve a conflict that has endured for forty-five years. Secondly, it remains ambiguous, with many crucial details left undefined. Thirdly, it is incomplete, as Israel is not formally part of the arrangement despite Lebanon being explicitly included in its provisions.
In essence, the agreement buys time for all parties involved. The critical question is: how will regional actors and their neighbours use that time?
If the Truce Holds: Who Breathes Easier and Who Feels the Pressure?
In the Gulf, economies would be among the immediate beneficiaries. A 10 per cent decline in oil prices would reduce subsidy burdens, while lower insurance costs would encourage shipping traffic to return to ports in Dubai and Doha. Politically, however, the picture may be more complicated. Iran’s reintegration into international financial channels could strengthen its regional influence and strategic reach.
In Sudan, Port Sudan would gain a vital respite. Reduced tensions in the Red Sea would lower transport costs and ease pressure on the prices of essential goods, including bread and fuel.
If the Truce Collapses: The Consequences Could Be Far Worse
A breakdown of the agreement would not simply return the region to its state before 20 June; it could usher in a more dangerous phase.
In the Gulf, even a partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz could drive oil prices above US$120 per barrel within hours. American military bases would become potential targets, major development projects across the region could be delayed or suspended, and the entire Middle East would once again face what investors often describe as a “fear premium”.
In Lebanon, the consequences could be existential. A large-scale Israeli military campaign could trigger further currency collapse, prolonged power outages, and a new wave of displacement. Within six months, the country could risk fragmentation into competing spheres of influence rather than functioning under a coherent central state.
For Sudan, the cost could also be severe. Renewed attacks or instability in the Red Sea would place additional pressure on Port Sudan and vital supply routes. The conflict could increasingly evolve into an overt proxy war shaped by external rivalries.
Three Lessons Few Want to Hear
First, imported weapons tend to prolong wars.
From Syria to Yemen, the pattern has been consistent: every new external arms shipment tends to extend the duration of conflict. A frequently proposed alternative is the development of domestic defence industries. Sudan possesses experience in military manufacturing and could seek technology-transfer partnerships with countries such as Turkey and Pakistan. Supporters of this approach argue that it would reduce strategic dependency and strengthen self-sufficiency in meeting defence requirements.
Secondly, internal political vacuums invite external pressure.
States that find themselves subjected to externally imposed settlements are often those lacking a cohesive domestic front. When societies are fragmented and national consensus is absent, external actors gain greater leverage over decision-making. History offers numerous examples—from Vietnam to Ukraine—where national resilience has depended on the relationship between state institutions and societal mobilisation.
Thirdly, the only consistent winners in regional wars are arms merchants.
Israel may secure political advantages; hardliners in Iran and the United States may gain ideological momentum; and arms suppliers may benefit financially. Yet it is ordinary citizens in Beirut, Khartoum, Tehran and elsewhere who bear the greatest economic and humanitarian costs of instability in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
What Should Be Done in an Age of Uncertainty?
The prospective agreement should not be mistaken for peace. It is, at best, a test.
Prudent states will use these sixty days to build alternatives and strengthen resilience rather than celebrate prematurely.
For the Gulf states, the truce could provide an opportunity to diversify security partnerships and advance a broader regional understanding regarding the future security of the Strait of Hormuz.
For Sudan, it could offer a window to strengthen strategic partnerships, reinforce domestic cohesion, and improve national preparedness. Whether victory is pursued through political or military means, sustainable success ultimately depends upon a resilient society and a united internal front.
The future will not be shaped by those who merely wait for signatures to be placed on an agreement in Switzerland. It will be shaped by those who prepare for the day after the signing—and equally for the day after a possible collapse.
The question every citizen should be asking their government today is simple:
Do we have a contingency plan for the next ninety days, regardless of whether the truce succeeds or fails?

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