Towards a New Sudan: Visions for Building a Developmental State and a Productive Economy (5)

 

Nu’man Yusuf Muhammed **

Before we ask for investment, what should we build first? Any talk about attracting investment to post-war Sudan will be incomplete if it is not preceded by a more important question: Have we prepared the country to receive investment?

Investment does not flow to countries because their resources are abundant, but because their institutions are trustworthy. A country with limited resources may succeed in attracting billions of dollars if it possesses strong institutions and stable foundations, while a country rich in resources will fail to attract capital if the rule of law is absent, policies are unstable, and decision-making centers are multiple.

Sudan’s battle in the post-war phase will not be decided in donor conferences or promotional campaigns, but rather within the state institutions themselves. Before we ask the world to invest in Sudan, we must build a state in which the world feels confident about investing.

Where does the problem lie?

Natural resources have never been the real problem in Sudan. Agricultural land, livestock, mineral resources, and a strategic geographic location all qualify Sudan to be one of the region’s largest productive economies. However, these advantages have failed to translate into sustainable development because the institutional environment has been unable to convert potential into economic value, opportunities into investments, or plans into results.

Experience has shown that weak institutions are more costly than a lack of resources, and that the absence of good governance squanders competitive advantages, no matter how abundant. Therefore, the real challenge facing Sudan is not discovering new resources, but rather building institutions capable of managing the resources it already possesses.

Why has governance become a priority after the war?

The recovery phase will witness an expected influx of grants, loans, investments, and reconstruction programs. However, the success of this historic opportunity will not depend on the amount of money, but rather on the state’s ability to manage it efficiently, transparently, and equitably.

Countries emerging from conflict are not measured by their ability to attract funding, but by their ability to transform that funding into productive projects, improved services, job creation, and sustainable economic growth. This can only be achieved when state institutions are capable of making decisions efficiently, implementing them effectively, holding those responsible accountable, and protecting public funds.

Therefore, governance is not merely an administrative project added to reform programs; rather, it is the foundation upon which all reconstruction programs will stand.

This is where reform begins.

If the government wants to make governance the starting point for a productive economy, reform must begin by redefining the role of the state. The state is not an investor competing with the private sector, nor is it a trader managing markets. Instead, it is the entity that sets the rules, protects competition, ensures fairness, and provides an environment that allows production and investment to flourish. The more the state expands its role in economic activity, the less space there is for initiative, investment, and innovation.

Following this comes reforming the legislative system, not by issuing more laws, but by reviewing existing laws, eliminating inconsistencies between them, and unifying the regulatory frameworks for investment and business. An investor cannot be expected to make quick decisions while the state takes months to grant approvals, or when multiple authorities are involved, or when interpretations and procedures conflict.

In parallel, the unified investment window must transform from a mere slogan into an institutional reality. All procedures for establishing projects, obtaining licenses, allocating land, registering, and linking with government entities should be integrated into a single system operating within specific and binding timeframes. Every day saved in the procedural cycle translates to lower costs for investors and sends a message of confidence that the state values time as much as it values capital.

This reform will not be complete unless digitalization is adopted as a national policy, not just a technological project. A government that provides its services electronically not only achieves speed but also enhances transparency, reduces subjective interpretations, closes many avenues for corruption, and provides an accurate database that supports decision-making and policy development. In the modern economy, data has become a strategic resource no less important than natural resources, and the efficiency of digital governance is now one of the criteria investors use to assess a country’s readiness to receive their investments.

The priorities for the first two years are:

However, institutional reform is not complete with reforming laws and procedures alone. It requires clear executive decisions implemented from day one. The first of these decisions is for the government to adopt a national governance program, binding on all state institutions. This program should establish unified standards for transparency, disclosure, risk management, conflict of interest prevention, and performance measurement, ensuring that governance becomes a daily practice, not merely an administrative slogan.

Following this is a comprehensive review of the structures and roles of government agencies to eliminate duplication, merge similar units, and resolve overlapping jurisdictions. Investors are not concerned with the number of institutions they deal with; rather, they need a single institution that is accountable and has the authority to make decisions.

In parallel, all ministries and economic bodies should be required to prepare and publish periodic performance indicators that measure actual results, not just the number of meetings held or the number of decisions issued. Successful governments are managed by objectives, measured by achievements, and held accountable for results. What is not measurable is difficult to improve, and what is not disclosed to the public makes it difficult to hold those responsible accountable.

The government must also adopt a national program to rebuild the civil service, restoring the value of competence, integrity, and merit; investing in leadership and staff training; and linking appointments, promotions, and incentives to performance and productivity. Institutional reform begins with people before regulations, because the best laws may fail if implemented by weak institutions, while competent individuals can achieve significant results even with limited resources.

Finally, regular dialogue with the private sector should be viewed as an integral part of governance, not merely a formality. The most successful economic policies are those formulated in partnership with those affected by them and reviewed periodically based on implementation results. Trust between the state and the private sector is not built through conferences, but through continuous institutional dialogue, mutual commitment, and the ability to address challenges before they escalate into crises.

What will Sudan gain if we succeed?

If Sudan continues on this path, its first gain will not be an influx of investment, but rather a restoration of trust. Trust is the foundation upon which all major economic transformations are built. When rules are clear, procedures are stable, institutions are efficient, and the law is applied equally to all, investors’ perception of Sudan will shift from a high-risk country to one brimming with opportunities.

This will directly impact the cost of doing business, shortening the time and procedures for establishing projects, reducing financing and insurance costs, and attracting more domestic investment before foreign investment, as the national investor is the first to experience the quality of the business environment.

The state’s ability to attract quality development financing will also increase, the efficiency of public spending will improve, waste will decrease, the economy’s competitiveness will be enhanced, and growth will become based on production and exports, rather than raw materials or government spending.

The most significant impact, however, is that governance will reshape the relationship between the state and its citizens. When citizens trust the fairness of institutions and the transparency of procedures, when investors are reassured by the stability of the regulatory environment, and when donors find an institutional partner capable of managing their resources efficiently, reconstruction will transform from a temporary spending program into a national project for building a modern state and a sustainable economy. At that point, governance will not merely be a means of improving administration, but rather the foundation upon which trust is built. Trust is what unlocks investment, and investment is what creates sustainable development.

In conclusion, the state we want:

Sudan will not succeed in winning the battle for recovery if it treats reconstruction as merely a project to rebuild what the war destroyed. Wars do not only destroy buildings; they also expose the fragility of institutions. If we rebuild cities without rebuilding the state, we will have merely postponed the crisis without addressing its root causes.

Therefore, the first sovereign project in the post-war phase should not be a road, a bridge, or a power station, but rather a national project to rebuild state institutions on the foundations of efficiency, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and digital transformation. These are not theoretical principles, but tools for economic production, pillars for attracting investment, and guarantees for sustainable development.

The economic history of nations almost unanimously agrees on one fact: countries do not surpass others because of the resources they possess, but because of how well they manage those resources. Sudan does not lack opportunities or funding; what it needs is a state with a clear vision, robust institutions, and stable foundations. When governance becomes a practiced culture before it becomes a law to be enforced, trust will transform into investment, investment into production, production into jobs, jobs into stability, and stability into sustainable national development.

The path to investment doesn’t begin with promoting opportunities, but with building a state that protects those opportunities.

The future isn’t inherited; it’s built.

**Former Banker – Corporate Development Consultant

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=16140