The Sudanese Dialogue Awaited by Both Sudanese and the World

Mahmoud Hussein Sari
In 1974, following the October War, President Mohamed Anwar Sadat published a political document prepared with the participation of several prominent Egyptian intellectuals. Known as the “October Paper”, the document was widely explained by the Egyptian government and subsequently submitted to a national referendum. It served as a 25-year national strategy designed to transform Egypt from a wartime state into a politically, militarily, economically, diplomatically, socially and culturally strong nation.
Although the document has long since faded into history, anyone who reads it today will recognise that it laid many of the foundations upon which the modern Egyptian state has been built.
Since Sudan witnessed the events of 25 October 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces—the country’s national institution—hesitated, under considerable regional and international pressure, to appoint a civilian government and establish a transitional authority capable of leading the country towards free and fair elections. That hesitation, uncertainty and delay eventually opened the door to extensive international intervention through the Framework Agreement process led by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), under the former UN Special Representative, Volker Perthes. Many Sudanese believe that this process ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on 15 April 2023.
Now, after more than three years of conflict, both regional and international actors—through the Quartet, the Quintet, and numerous conferences convened in European capitals—are attempting to shape a post-war political framework for Sudan.
Following his appointment as Prime Minister, Dr Kamil Idris officially launched an initiative for an inclusive national dialogue. The initiative aims to bring together Sudan’s political forces in order to end the country’s crisis and pave the way for internationally monitored, free and fair elections.
Sudanese officials have repeatedly emphasised that the proposed dialogue will be comprehensive and will extend beyond political elites to include all sectors of Sudanese society, without excluding any legitimate stakeholder.
They have also stated that the dialogue is intended to restore national consensus, revive the democratic transition, facilitate the holding of general elections, and enable the safe return of Sudanese political figures currently living abroad.
In this context, the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, instructed the authorities to renew passports and official documents for certain opposition leaders to facilitate their participation. Prime Minister Kamil Idris further indicated that the dialogue sessions could begin either in Khartoum or in another Sudanese city to reinforce the nationally owned character of the political process.
Yet since these announcements, neither Sudanese citizens nor the international community has witnessed any concrete or visible steps demonstrating meaningful progress towards launching this comprehensive national dialogue.
In parallel with these efforts, and in an attempt to address the constitutional vacuum within state institutions, the Transitional Legislative Council was approved by amendments to the Constitutional Document, adopted in February 2025. The revised document provides for the establishment of an independent transitional legislature representing the parties to the peace process and other national political forces, with meaningful participation by women and a maximum membership of 300 representatives.
The amended Constitutional Document also outlines the responsibilities and powers of this legislative body.
Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Malik Agar, declared that the war is approaching its conclusion and that it will be followed by the equally important battles of reconstruction, development and national reconciliation to heal the social divisions and grievances left by the conflict.
Similarly, Prime Minister Kamil Idris announced that his government’s first meeting focused on launching an inclusive “Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue that excludes no one”, promoting national healing, and strengthening Sudan’s international relations through both official and public diplomacy.
Sudanese political figures have also disclosed that the Sovereignty Council’s Political Committee, comprising Lieutenant General Shams El-Din Kabashi, Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta and Abdullah Yahya, has held consultations with political parties and community leaders regarding the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council.
These consultations reportedly addressed the criteria for political representation, whether eligibility should be based on registration under the Political Parties Act or on other standards, the participation of political blocs and parties, and the interpretation of the term “national forces” in the amended Constitutional Document.
Despite the significance of these developments, none has yet translated into tangible institutional or political progress on the ground.
The prolonged delay by Sudanese state institutions in presenting a nationally led political solution to the war has inevitably encouraged regional and international actors to fill the vacuum by proposing their own initiatives to bring Sudanese political and civilian groups together under externally managed processes designed to establish civilian leadership and launch comprehensive peace negotiations.
The Sudanese government, the Sudanese Armed Forces and many national political forces have expressed varying degrees of opposition or serious reservations regarding both the methodology and objectives of these international initiatives. In particular, they reject attempts to equate Sudan’s legitimate state institutions with the Rapid Support Forces and argue that many external initiatives reflect the interests of foreign actors rather than Sudan’s own national priorities.
Yet rejection alone is insufficient if the Sudanese state fails to present its own credible national alternative.
The concerns raised by Sudan’s national forces regarding these international initiatives are understandable.
Many believe that sections of the international community seek to legitimise the Rapid Support Forces and their political allies by granting them future political roles. They also object to attempts to place the internationally recognised state and an armed group accused of grave violations against civilians on an equal political footing.
No sovereign state can reasonably be expected to accept a political framework that equates its constitutional institutions with an armed organisation responsible for widespread destruction and violence.
Equally concerning are attempts by certain international initiatives to broaden political participation without transparent criteria by introducing newly created or little-known political groups, thereby diluting the authority of established national institutions and, in effect, reproducing the Framework Agreement that many Sudanese associate with the political process preceding the war.
Some initiatives also seek to merge political, military, security and humanitarian tracks into a single negotiating framework, thereby significantly expanding external influence over Sudan’s future political settlement.
The reality is increasingly clear.
As long as Sudan’s national institutions remain slow to present their own roadmap towards peace, regional and international actors will continue to propose initiative after initiative, conference after conference, and political framework after political framework.
Sudan has now entered the fourth year of a devastating war that has destroyed lives, infrastructure and livelihoods, while international organisations increasingly warn of its implications for regional security.
The only effective response to externally driven political processes is for Sudan itself to lead the solution from within—and to do so with urgency.
Just as Egypt’s October Paper provided a nationally owned strategic vision for the future of the Egyptian state, Sudan now requires its own comprehensive national roadmap.
The various international proposals currently under discussion share several common principles that could equally serve as the foundation of a Sudanese national vision capable of securing both domestic legitimacy and international acceptance.
First, all armed groups should ultimately be integrated into a single national army.
The Sudanese people have endured more than enough from the experience of parallel armed forces. No armed movement or militia should remain outside the authority of the Sudanese Armed Forces, regardless of the role it may have played during the current conflict. Sudan’s future depends on a state protected by a single professional national army—not by competing militias.
Second, state institutions must be strengthened and insulated from domination by any political party, ideological movement or armed organisation. Appointments should be based solely upon patriotism, professionalism, competence and expertise.
The war has severely weakened virtually every institution of the Sudanese state, undermining its authority, effectiveness and public confidence.
Third, any national dialogue framework must place comprehensive economic reform among its highest priorities.
The conflict, together with intense regional and international competition over Sudan’s strategic resources, has demonstrated that economic resilience is central to national sovereignty.
Fourth, Sudan must confront its fragmented political landscape.
This may be the most important issue that many political actors continue to avoid.
Large sections of Sudan’s political class still rely upon outdated models of power—whether through armed force, religious mobilisation, ideological confrontation, tribal loyalties or sectarian politics. Many small political groups survive largely on external sponsorship rather than genuine public support, often serving regional or international agendas, knowingly or unknowingly.
Fifth, Sudan’s own “October Paper” must place the fight against political, financial, administrative and ethical corruption at its centre.
It should also address the illicit exploitation of national resources and reform the management of humanitarian assistance. This sector has generated substantial benefits for both domestic and foreign interests over the past three decades.
Impunity, lack of accountability, patronage, manufactured crises and systemic corruption have placed enormous burdens upon Sudanese citizens while eroding public confidence in government.
If incorporated into a genuinely national political vision, these priorities could place Sudan firmly on the path towards democratic transformation, national sovereignty, civilian governance and renewed international confidence.
Above all, such a nationally owned roadmap would close the door to externally imposed political engineering and ensure that the Sudanese people themselves determine Sudan’s future.
Only then will Sudan have taken its first meaningful step towards building the country its people have long aspired to create.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=15339