Guns or Ballots? Why a Weary Public Still Clings to the Military’s Shield as Political Promises Fade

By Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yousif
There is an objective reality that imposes itself on Sudan’s political landscape: the military institution will continue to play a role in government for as long as security threats emanating from the country’s peripheral regions persist. The fundamental problem is that the elites emerging from these marginalised areas have often used the grievances of their communities as a source of political and economic leverage, rather than making a serious effort to resolve those issues. For this reason, every attempt to solve Sudan’s problems has failed because it has been based on a flawed approach.
The economic disparities that originally gave rise to marginalisation—and which in turn fuelled armed rebellion in the country’s peripheral regions—have themselves become the cause of even greater marginalisation and widening development gaps between those areas and the more stable parts of Sudan. This is a direct consequence of the destruction of infrastructure caused by war, the disruption of development projects, and the collapse of the education sector, which had been expected to raise public awareness and improve the conditions of these communities.
Time and again, the elites in these regions resorted to taking up arms. As a result, communities in the more stable parts of the country increasingly came to view military governments as necessary to preserve security and prevent armed movements from the peripheries from extending their reach. In pursuit of that security, many citizens in the urban centres and stable regions were willing to sacrifice some of their political rights and freedoms.
Given the nature of the conflicts in the areas affected by rebellion, successive central governments also exploited social divisions by recruiting some tribes to fight against others in an effort to suppress insurgencies. This approach, regrettably, continues to this day.
It is also worth acknowledging a painful truth that has become increasingly evident: the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would never have emerged had there not first been armed rebel movements. This suggests that the current situation in Darfur—which has exacted its heaviest toll on the very communities associated with those armed movements, many of which have lost most of their territories—is the inevitable consequence of an earlier mistake: resorting to armed struggle to demand political and economic reforms that might have been achieved through other means. An even greater error, however, was governments’ reliance on rival communities to confront those who had taken up arms against the state, although I remain convinced that governments felt compelled to do so for many reasons, the discussion of which lies beyond the scope of this article.
Because war has dominated almost the entirety of Sudan’s modern history—with the first rebellions beginning shortly before independence and conflict continuing, almost uninterrupted, ever since—it is hardly surprising that military regimes have governed the country for much of the post-independence era. This also helps explain why military coups have often enjoyed broad popular support from ordinary citizens, whose overriding concern has been the threat of insecurity and the fear that conflict would eventually reach their own communities—a fear that ultimately became reality.
By contrast, opposition political elites, particularly those on the left, will continue to find power elusive unless they grasp the premise outlined above. The crisis facing these forces lies in their insistence on persuading people to embrace ideas that, in the author’s view, cannot easily take root in Sudanese society because of the country’s distinctive social and political composition, the central role of religion in shaping the Sudanese state, and the alliances that have formed its cultural and social fabric. For this reason, the author argues, society resisted attempts by the Forces of Freedom and Change, during their period in government, to introduce laws that many citizens believed were inconsistent with their religious convictions and social values.
Furthermore, the long-standing reliance of these political parties on armed movements operating outside state authority—and their role as political backers of such groups—has placed them in direct opposition to ordinary citizens, who constitute the majority of the population and are unaffiliated with any political party. According to the author, this hostility is a natural response driven by fear that political support from civilian parties has strengthened armed rebellions, thereby posing a greater threat to public security. Consequently, many people have become even more inclined to place their trust in the armed forces.
The same citizens, the author contends, now express gratitude towards the young Islamists who joined the defence of the country and sacrificed their lives in the process. It is therefore unsurprising, in his view, that one leader of these opposition parties, in a moment of frustration, declared that “the entire nation has become Kayzan”—a colloquial reference to Islamists. These politically isolated elites, the author argues, fail to appreciate the simple fact that the human need for security transcends ideology.
For the same reason, the author concludes, these politicians must adopt a more realistic approach. In seeking to end the current war, they should not call for political dialogue or power-sharing arrangements that exclude Islamist currents, nor should they attempt to impose such arrangements through external pressure. In the author’s assessment, the public will oppose such proposals for the logical reasons outlined above. As a result, these demands would only prolong the conflict, creating the very conditions that enable the military to remain in power, while leaving civilian politicians waiting indefinitely on the platform for an election that may never arrive.
Translator’s note: This translation faithfully reflects the arguments and opinions expressed by the author. They are presented as the author’s views and should not be understood as established facts or an endorsement of those positions.

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