Who Wants to Strip UofK of Its Brightest Minds? And for Whose Benefit?
After weapons have failed to destroy Sudan’s educational institutions—which have since begun to recover through the efforts of their current and former students and faculty—Sudanese universities in Khartoum have resumed their academic mission. Yet, in a painful irony, a different kind of war has been waged against their own professors, marked by dismissal decisions that those affected describe as arbitrary.
This raises the question: to whose advantage is the destruction of higher education in Sudan? And who is leading these campaigns of destruction from within the university administrations?
Sudanhorizon: Nashwa Ahmed El-Tayeb
The ink had barely dried on an investigation by the news outlet “Sudanhorizon” titled “University of Khartoum: Oppressor or Oppressed?”—published just two weeks ago. That piece highlighted two contradictory official documents, both issued within a single week in September 2026, concerning the entitlements of faculty members at the Faculty of Medicine. Now, a new crisis has emerged in another faculty.
In that earlier report, medical professors warned that nearly 90 percent of their staff might leave, noting that their faculty council no longer has a full quorum and that salary payments are being distributed inconsistently.
Sudanhorizon submitted a series of questions to the University President, the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and the office of the Executive Director—all of which remain unanswered. None of the university’s previous issues have been resolved, and now, a new controversy has unfolded.
What the document says…
On November 8, 2026, a letter was issued by the administration of the Central Campus of the University of Khartoum—signed by the campus Secretary-General, Dr. Saif al-Din Saeed Atta al-Mannan—and addressed to Dr. Mohamed Fathallah Mohamed Ahmed, a faculty member in the Department of Environment and Ecology at the Faculty of Geography and Environmental Sciences. The letter conveys a decision by the University Vice-Chancellor to terminate his employment due to “absence,” effective April 1, 2026—the date on which, according to the letter, he failed to resume his duties following the conclusion of his secondment period. The decision is based on the recommendations of a “Committee for the Status Adjustment of Faculty Members Absent from University Duties Prior to April 2023,” which met on November 2, 2026; the Vice-Chancellor approved these recommendations on the same day.
The letter further instructs the Financial Controller to remove the professor’s name from the payroll, effective retroactively from April 1, 2026, and to settle his outstanding financial entitlements or any debts he may owe to the university. It concludes by thanking him for his “distinguished service” and wishing him success in his future endeavors. Copies were sent to the Vice-Chancellor, as well as to officials overseeing Academic Affairs, Finance, Human Resources, Pensions, Budgeting, Internal Audit, and the Legal Department.
Four Faculties, One Crisis: Dismissals, Strikes, and Opposition to Blended Learning—with No Response from the Ministry
The professor’s account
On November 17, 2026, the professor released an extensive statement in which he noted that he had joined the university in 2003, having served there for twenty-three years. He recounts that he submitted a request for leave to the university president but received no response. Although his department and faculty recommended that his request be approved—and he was granted a deadline of November 30, 2026, to return—the decision to dismiss him was issued before that date. He states that he continued to teach and supervise research remotely throughout the years of the war without any financial compensation, even covering some of the costs for distance learning out of his own pocket. He accuses the administration of obstructing the university’s governing councils, noting that the president’s term has expired and he has reached retirement age.
Statement from the Faculty…
On November 18, 2026, the faculty of the College of Geography and Environmental Sciences issued a statement addressed to the university community. While it does not mention the professor by name, the description of the situation—involving a colleague who requested unpaid leave, received no response, and was subsequently dismissed despite having continued to teach and supervise remotely for three years without pay—aligns with his case. The statement calls for the activation of the relevant university councils and committees, urges consideration for the circumstances that have prevented some staff members from returning, and demands adherence to the Prime Minister’s Directive No. (71) of 2026, which mandates granting unpaid leave to employees unable to return—consistent with the policy applied across other state institutions.
It further advocates for leveraging the expertise of personnel currently outside Sudan, in accordance with the decision of the head of the National Council for Higher Education and Scientific Research (Decision No. 38 of 2026), and calls for the implementation of blended learning.
Finally, the statement urges a measured, incremental approach to administrative procedures, cautioning against resorting to exclusion or employment-related sanctions without due regard for established regulations. The proponents of this stance have declared their rejection of decisions that infringe upon the rights of university community members, affirming their resolve to exercise their right to “take collective, peaceful, and legal action.”
The Faculty of Engineering, too…
The crisis does not appear to be confined to just two faculties. In the Faculty of Engineering, students staged a strike on Sunday, November 8, 2026.
According to statement No. 3/2026 issued by the Engineering Student Steering Committee on November 7, 2026, the strike was a protest against the imposition of full in-person attendance, the lack of readiness in student dormitories, and the replacement of faculty members.
The statement notes that their primary demand is the implementation of the “blended learning” policy, which was approved by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research on September 10, 2026.
This decision followed a referendum in which 1,229 out of 1,675 students participated; 943 voted in favor of the strike, while 286 opposed it—representing 76.7 percent of the voters.
The statement adds that the “persistent refusal” of the university president to meet with student representative bodies is what compelled them to take this step. In a subsequent update dated November 9, 2026 (No. 13/2026), the committee stated that it had submitted an official memorandum to the university administration—via the Faculty Dean—granting a 72-hour window for a response. As it proved impossible to meet with officials in person on Saturday and Sunday, the memorandum was sent electronically.
The committee also noted that it encountered a degree of understanding from several faculty members, particularly regarding the cancellation of lectures on the day of the strike. It is worth noting that the faculty administration proposed reducing the number of study days to three per week—a suggestion the association deems insufficient, as it would lead to overcrowded schedules and increased pressure on students. Instead, the association maintains that the solution lies in the university administration’s formal adoption of the 2026 regulations for e-learning and blended learning, alongside leveraging the expertise of faculty members currently based outside Sudan.
These demands align with those put forward by medical professors and the faculty of the College of Geography and Environmental Sciences, suggesting that the issue extends beyond any single college.
The Faculty of Pharmacy and its categorical rejection…
Joining the three aforementioned faculties is the Faculty of Pharmacy. On Wednesday, November 18, 2026, its faculty members issued a statement and briefing (No. 2)—following an initial statement released on September 20, 2026—in which they recounted the sequence of events. They state that on August 19, 2026, they submitted a letter to the university administration detailing the outcomes of a Faculty Council meeting. The Council affirmed that resuming in-person classes was not feasible under the current circumstances, while expressing readiness to resume instruction via electronic means. This proposal, however, was met with a “categorical rejection” by the administration, which insisted on in-person attendance.
They further note that a sub-committee, led by the Dean of the Faculty, met with the administration in September 2026, yet the administration did not alter its position. On September 30, 2026, the Faculty Council held an expanded meeting involving all faculty members, which concluded with a plan to urgently conduct fourth-year examinations and develop an academic calendar based on a “blended learning” model—a system approved by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. This plan also included provisions for supplementary and alternative examinations, with a gradual return to in-person classes once maintenance and refurbishment work is completed.
They state that this academic calendar was submitted to the administration on October 13, 2026, only to be rejected once again.
The statement outlines the reasons why a return to in-person classes is not feasible: the faculty’s facilities are not prepared to receive students; students and their families are facing difficult living conditions; and a significant number of faculty members are currently residing abroad, unable to return due to unfavorable circumstances.
The group calls on the administration to reconsider its decision and adopt a blended learning model as an interim solution—one that ensures the continuity of studies while accelerating necessary maintenance. They emphasize that the resumption of classes “should not be a purely administrative decision.” In the case of the Faculty of Engineering, for instance, they are requesting the adoption of a system that the two faculties claim has already been authorized by the Ministry.
Sudanhorizon has not received a response from the administration regarding the points raised in the statement.
Retroactive dismissal after three years of remote teaching
Conflicting interests…
Behind these events, a private source who spoke to this news outlet suggests that the issue of higher education extends beyond the apparent professional and administrative problems. The source indicates that various parties may have a direct interest in the persistence of these systemic dysfunctions, describing some as “parties fostering sabotage”—a group that could encompass a wide range of stakeholders affected by the situation.
The source points specifically to a conflict of interest: certain officials and staff members within higher education administrative bodies simultaneously hold influential positions—such as chairing boards of directors or serving as secretaries—within private universities.
The source argues that this dual role raises questions regarding the independence of administrative and regulatory decisions, and whether such decisions might be swayed by the interests of the private education sector at the expense of public educational institutions.
While the source did not name specific individuals or provide documentation, they acknowledge that identifying these officials and staff—and obtaining verified information about their external affiliations—is the key to understanding the underlying dysfunctions. He adds that approaching this issue might be met with resistance or attempts to obstruct journalistic work, given the sensitive interests involved.
The source also suggested examining another hypothesis: that parties linked to the conflict itself may have infiltrated various state apparatuses, and that their potential connection to acts of sabotage should be considered. It offered no names or evidence, presenting this merely as a line of inquiry rather than a firm conclusion.
It also explains why the initial handling of the matter focused specifically on the faculties of medicine. According to the source, those in charge sought to keep the issue confined to a professional scope, deliberately excluding unions and administrative bodies—which include individuals with diverse political affiliations—to prevent the matter from devolving into a political conflict.
It notes that, in its view, the level of media and public engagement has remained disproportionately low, given the significance of the issue.
What do these faculties have in common?
When the situations at the four faculties are examined side by side, common threads emerge. First, physical presence has become the criterion for remaining in one’s position.
This was evident in the Faculty of Medicine, where the administration conditioned contract renewals and the payment of salaries on a return to Khartoum.
Similarly, in the faculties of Engineering and Pharmacy, students and professors report that the administration insisted on in-person attendance; meanwhile, absence has led to the termination of a professor’s membership in the Faculty of Geography and Environment.
Second, the documents reveal a clear financial dimension. The outcomes of the Deans’ Council meeting on September 15, 2026, stipulated that contract renewals must not impose any additional financial burdens or obligations on the university; furthermore, the termination notices mandate the retroactive removal of names from the payroll and demand the repayment of any outstanding dues owed to the university.
A third issue concerns recurring complaints regarding governance: the absence of a university council, the suspension of various councils, the expiration of the university president’s term, the president’s refusal to meet with representatives, and the administration’s rejection of proposals submitted by faculty councils—at least according to those who have voiced these accounts.
Such concerns were raised by Dr. Sarah Misbah Al-Sadiq in an investigation concerning the Faculty of Medicine; they are echoed by the dismissed professor, and the faculty body of another department has also called for the reactivation of these councils. These accounts are attributed to their respective sources, and this outlet possesses no documentation that definitively confirms or refutes any of them.
Furthermore, there is a potentially more serious matter: based on information received by Sudanhorizon , the administration appears to be acting in direct opposition to directives issued by the executive itself. Prime Ministerial Directive No. (71) stipulates that those who are absent should be granted leave rather than being dismissed, and National Council Decision No. (38) authorizes “blended learning”—yet, on September 15, the Council of Deans declared that no online (virtual) instruction would take place.
On October 26, 2023, the Prime Minister issued a directive to maintain higher education centers operating outside Sudan, even though the university president had previously proposed their closure to the state. Moreover, the minutes of a meeting held on September 10 record the president acknowledging the role of faculty members in sustaining academic operations throughout the years of war—the very same professors, some of whom continued their work from abroad, who are now facing dismissal on the grounds of absence.
A question also arises regarding the committee itself. Its mandate specifically addresses individuals who were absent prior to April 2023—that is, before the war—whereas the professor in question, supported by his faculty colleagues, maintains that he continued to perform his duties electronically throughout those years. Did the committee distinguish between those who were completely absent and those who were working remotely? This remains unclear.
The documents provide an answer.
To whose benefit?
The documents do not explicitly name a beneficiary, nor do the sources identify any specific individual. However, the information provided raises a crucial question that the documents themselves leave unaddressed: what if there are individuals within the sector whose interests align with the weakening of public higher education? When a professor leaves the academic staff, they do not stop working; rather, they move elsewhere—either within Sudan or abroad. In doing so, the university loses their expertise, their research students, and its own standing within the global scholarly community—an intangible asset that cannot be built in a year, or even a decade. Meanwhile, anyone who holds a stake in—or is connected to—the private education sector stands to gain from this resulting void.
While the documents contain no proof that anyone orchestrated this deliberately, the possibility remains a hypothesis worth investigating. This would require mapping the positions held by officials within higher education administration against the membership records and boards of private universities—a line of inquiry suggested by the source.
There are two other possible interpretations, neither of which contradicts the first. The first is financial: if the net result of every decision is a reduction in university expenditure, is this the primary objective, or merely a side effect?
The second is administrative: if the stated goal is to tighten management and centralize decision-making, why are the university councils—the very bodies designed to provide oversight—being sidelined? Furthermore, if these actions are simply the result of administrative discretion, why are the criteria upon which these decisions were based not made public, and how do they align with state policy?
Where is the Ministry?
The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research remains the party best positioned to provide answers. On November 18, 2026, this news outlet reached out to the Ministry once again, sending a message to the Minister, Professor Ahmed Madawi Musa. The message reminded him of a previous inquiry, sent on November 1, 2026, regarding the situation at the University of Khartoum—to which no response had been received by the time this report was prepared.
The outlet reiterated the questions that remain unanswered:
Do the Prime Minister’s directive (No. 71) and the National Council for Higher Education and Scientific Research’s resolution (No. 38 of 2026) apply to the University of Khartoum? Does the Ministry consider the dismissal decisions issued by the university administration to be consistent with these directives and resolutions? Furthermore, what is the Ministry’s stance on the retroactive dismissal of a faculty member who—according to his own account and that of his faculty colleagues—had continued to teach and supervise research remotely (electronically)? Did the Ministry approve regulations for “blended learning” on September 10, 2026—as claimed by students in the Faculty of Engineering—and why have these regulations not been implemented at the university? Is there currently a functioning University Council, and what is the legal status of the Vice-Chancellor’s tenure? Does the Ministry have policies in place to prevent conflicts of interest between administrative roles in higher education and positions held within private higher education institutions? Has an assessment been conducted to identify individuals who hold both types of positions simultaneously? Finally, how does the Ministry respond to the initial questions regarding the outstanding financial entitlements of the Faculty of Medicine’s professors?
Beyond the University…
A source warns that the continuation of what they term a “war on higher education” extends well beyond educational institutions, threatening the future of the state and its capacity for post-war recovery.
In its view, the weakening of the education sector, the departure of lecturers , and the deepening of poverty could leave the country with a fragile educational landscape—one marked by a decline in competence and an expanding scope of ignorance—thereby rendering both society and the state more vulnerable to infiltration and external influence. It argues that military victories alone are insufficient to ensure recovery if, once the war ends, the education system remains mired in deterioration and institutional dysfunction.
Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=20386