Sudan’s Governance Crisis: Fixing the System’s Structural Flaws Before Changing the Government

Abbas Dalil
This article emerged from my discussions with Dr Ismail Sati, a pioneer of systems thinking and author of books on the subject in Arabic, particularly his excellent article, “A Systems-Based Reading of Repeated Calls for Changes to Sudanese Governments”.
Introduction
Calls for a change of government in Sudan, headed by Dr Kamil Idris, are resurfacing amid worsening political, economic, security and administrative crises. While some of these calls are based on assessments of the government’s performance and demand accountability for its results, a strategic approach to the crisis requires us to move beyond the conventional question of who governs? to a deeper and more fundamental one: How does the system of governance function, and what structural deficiencies are undermining its performance and limiting its ability to manage the state and achieve its national objectives?
Reducing the crisis to the individuals involved, important though competence and accountability may be, overlooks the fact that government performance is determined not only by the abilities of those holding office, but also by the constitutional and institutional environment in which they operate, the distribution of powers and responsibilities, the clarity of their respective mandates, and the mechanisms for decision-making, implementation, oversight and accountability.
Consequently, changing the government without diagnosing the roots of the crisis and addressing its structural causes may replace some individuals with others while leaving the same deficiencies intact. Failures will then recur and crises will re-emerge, even if the faces and slogans change.
First: The Dual Structural Defect in the State System
Sudan faces two interconnected structural deficiencies in its constitutional and institutional framework. These directly affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance and limit state institutions’ ability to fulfil their functions according to clear and stable rules.
The First Defect: The Absence of a Comprehensive and Agreed Transitional Constitution
The absence of a comprehensive transitional constitutional framework that defines the nature of the state, the system of government, the mandates of its institutions, the relationship between the branches of government, guarantees of rights and freedoms, and mechanisms for the transfer of power creates ambiguity about constitutional authority. It increases the likelihood of overlapping powers and competing jurisdictions, making state administration more vulnerable to conflicting interpretations and shifting balances of power.
A constitution is not merely a legal document regulating the exercise of authority. It is the supreme frame of reference that establishes the rules of governance, regulates the relationship between the state and society, provides legitimacy for institutions, and ensures that the exercise of power remains subject to the law. The absence of a clear and mutually agreed transitional constitutional framework therefore undermines the orderly functioning of state institutions and makes political and institutional stability more fragile.
The Second Defect: The Absence of an Effective Legislative and Oversight Authority over the Executive
The absence of a representative legislative authority exercising its powers in legislation, oversight and accountability disrupts the institutional balance between the branches of government. It weakens scrutiny of government performance, public expenditure, the implementation of policies and programmes, and the extent to which national priorities are being respected.
Without such authority, the executive loses one of the most important institutional oversight mechanisms for reviewing decisions, holding officials accountable, identifying shortcomings, and correcting deviations. Opportunities to subject government performance to regular, objective evaluation based on transparency and results also diminish, leaving it more vulnerable to political rivalries and media campaigns.
The danger of this deficiency lies not merely in the absence of a legislative institution, but in the weakening of a fundamental pillar of good governance: a balanced separation of powers, mutual oversight, and linking the exercise of authority to accountability and answerability.
These two deficiencies interact to create a dual structural defect in Sudan’s system of governance. The absence of a comprehensive transitional constitutional framework, combined with the lack of an effective legislative and oversight authority, undermines clarity over powers and responsibilities, restricts institutional accountability, makes the correction of errors more difficult, and creates conditions in which crises are reproduced regardless of changes in officeholders.
Second: From Replacing Individuals to Reforming the System of Governance
Systems thinking does not deny individual responsibility, nor does it diminish the importance of competence, integrity, leadership ability and sound decision-making. Instead, it distinguishes between two complementary levels of intervention: one focused on officials’ performance and suitability for their positions, and the other on the soundness of the institutional system through which they operate.
Replacing the Prime Minister or some ministers may be necessary if an objective assessment establishes failures that warrant accountability or a change of personnel. However, such a measure alone does not guarantee improved performance unless it is accompanied by reforms to the constitutional and institutional environment that defines the government’s powers, regulates its relationships with other state institutions, ensures coordination among its various bodies, and links responsibility to accountability.
Accordingly, the priority should not be to choose between retaining and dismissing the government in isolation from the institutional context. Instead, the focus should be on identifying the required reforms, the deficiencies to be addressed, and the outcomes to be achieved.
This requires work towards establishing a comprehensive and mutually agreed transitional constitutional framework; creating an effective legislative and oversight authority through legitimate and consensual arrangements; clearly defining the mandates of state institutions and their relationships with one another; strengthening judicial independence and the rule of law; establishing principles of transparency and accountability; and linking public policies to national priorities, implementation programmes and measurable performance indicators.
It also requires building an effective system of inter-institutional coordination, defining executive responsibilities, conducting regular performance reviews, and providing institutional mechanisms for learning from mistakes and correcting the course. These measures would help ensure that plans and decisions are translated into tangible results that improve citizens’ lives.
Conclusion: Reforming the State Is the Gateway to Reforming the Government
Sudan’s governance crisis is too deep to reduce to the person of the Prime Minister or a group of ministers. State reform cannot be achieved merely by replacing officials and appointing others to manage the same system while the constitutional and institutional deficiencies that limit its effectiveness remain.
A change of government may be a legitimate and necessary option when performance and accountability demand it. However, it cannot constitute genuine reform unless it is based on an accurate diagnosis of the crisis’s roots and linked to practical measures that address its structural causes and establish a clearer, more balanced, more efficient, and more accountable system of governance.
The proper starting point for addressing Sudan’s governance crisis is to reform the state system first. This means completing the transitional constitutional framework, establishing a legislative and oversight authority, clarifying the relationships between the branches of government, and strengthening the rule of law and good governance. Only then should the government’s performance be evaluated and its members held accountable within a clear institutional framework.
Sudan needs more than a change of faces. It needs a change in the rules, relationships, and mechanisms that govern the state’s operations; a shift from managing recurring crises to addressing their root causes; and a transition from struggles over power to consensus on building a modern national state.
For national renewal does not begin merely by changing the person occupying the seat of power. It begins by building institutions that define that person’s powers, monitor their performance, hold them accountable, and ensure that authority serves the nation and its citizens rather than becoming an end in itself.

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