The Red Sea Belt Ablaze: Sudan in the Eye of the Storm

By Dr Mohammed Yousif Hassan
The Red Sea is no longer merely a blue line on the map separating the Arabian Peninsula from Africa. It has become one of the hottest theatres in the emerging international order, where the interests of global trade, energy security, counter-terrorism, and competition between major and regional powers increasingly converge.
From the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the Somali coast, and from Cairo to Khartoum and Asmara, the states along the Red Sea littoral have become part of a single strategic equation. The crises in Yemen, Sudan and the Horn of Africa can no longer be treated as separate issues; rather, they are intertwined chapters of one story that began in the south and will not end there.
Recent Western reports have revealed direct contacts between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman prior to the latest strikes against the Houthis. During those discussions, Riyadh conveyed its concerns over the group’s escalating activities and received clear American backing. Yet this renewed coordination differs significantly from the relationship of the past. After years of strained ties and divergent views over Yemen, Iran and the extent of America’s regional role, international developments have created a new reality. Washington now needs a capable regional partner able to safeguard maritime routes and help maintain stability in the Gulf, while Riyadh requires an international umbrella that supports its development ambitions and ensures stability in its immediate neighbourhood. The fundamental difference is that this partnership is emerging in a world that is no longer unipolar. The old choice of being “with or against” a particular power is no longer viable. Success now belongs to those who can balance their relationships with Washington, Beijing and Moscow without losing sight of their national interests.
The Houthi crisis has demonstrated that security in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is no longer solely a Yemeni concern. It is a global issue. Any disruption to this vital waterway immediately increases shipping costs, disrupts supply chains and threatens energy markets. Consequently, a new strategic concept is taking shape, linking Gulf security to the security of the Horn of Africa within a single framework. This could aptly be described as the “Red Sea Security Belt”. It is not a formal military alliance, but rather a practical recognition that instability on one shore will inevitably affect the other. Within this framework, Saudi Arabia serves as the principal driving force, given its geographical position, political weight and network of relationships with Cairo, Khartoum and the capitals of the Horn of Africa. Yet any security architecture requires a firm foundation, and this is where Africa’s pivotal role becomes indispensable.
Egypt serves as the northern gateway via the Suez Canal, the lifeline of global commerce. Eritrea occupies a strategic position close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Sudan, however, occupies the most sensitive position of all, combining a long Red Sea coastline with vast African depth and historic ties to the Arab world. These states do not necessarily require a closed alliance as much as they need a practical understanding that transnational threats cannot be confronted individually. Smuggling, irregular migration and extremist groups do not recognise borders. What occurs in Yemen reverberates in Somalia, and developments in Somalia inevitably affect the Arabian Peninsula. Red Sea security is therefore indivisible.
This brings us to the most complex element of the analysis: Sudan. Sudan is not merely a country suffering from an internal conflict; it is the geographical hinge connecting the Gulf with Africa. If stable, it could become an active partner in the Red Sea security framework, as well as an economic and political bridge between the Arab world and the African continent, offering both a substantial market and strategic depth for investment. If the war continues, however, Sudan risks becoming a security vacuum through which arms trafficking networks, smugglers, armed groups and external powers can extend their influence.
The essence of Sudan’s crisis, however, lies deeper than the war itself. The core problem is the existence of a force operating parallel to the state. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are no longer merely a military formation that can be rehabilitated and integrated. They have evolved into an entity that has undermined state institutions, threatened the country’s social fabric and received external backing that has transformed them into an instrument of regional influence. Recent experiences across the region clearly demonstrate that armed groups that emerge outside the authority of the state do not produce lasting peace. The Houthis in Yemen provide a stark example. They began as a local movement and ultimately came to threaten a vital international maritime corridor. Any durable solution in Sudan, and indeed for the Red Sea as a whole, must therefore begin by ending the logic of militias rather than recycling them into governance structures.
At the same time, the presence of international and regional actors cannot be ignored. China has expanded its influence through trade, resources and investment. Russia has strengthened its position through mining interests and security cooperation. Over the past decade, the United Arab Emirates has sought to establish maritime and investment influence through ports and the Horn of Africa. Yet the Red Sea is not an empty arena that can be reshaped without regard for geography and history. The states bordering it possess an inherent right to manage its affairs. Any external role, regardless of the tools employed, must align with the interests of those states rather than conflict with them. Sudan, in particular, does not need to choose between East and West. It first needs to restore its state and rebuild its institutions. Neither geographical location nor natural resources can become genuine sources of strength without a stable and functioning state.
The Red Sea has now entered a decisive new phase. Its future will no longer be determined solely by warships, but by the ability to forge regional understandings to secure trade, counter extremism, and promote sustainable development. Sudan stands at the centre of this transformation. Yet Sudan’s greatest challenge is not whether it aligns itself with East or West, but whether it can manage its international relationships in accordance with its national interests.
Sudan therefore faces only two possible paths. It can rebuild its institutions and reclaim its historic role as the vital link between the Gulf and Africa, transforming its geographical position from a burden into a strategic advantage. Or it can remain an open arena for regional and international rivalry, squandering a historic opportunity not only for itself but for the wider region. The security belt is already taking shape, and the necessary instruments are in place. But the first and final decision must come from Khartoum.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=16032