A Comment on the article written by Ambassador Alobeid Murawih on the RSF

By: Mohamed Osman Adam

I read and appreciated Ambassador Alobeid A. Murawih’s article, “Is the Fragmentation of the RSF the Safest Solution?” His analysis centred on splitting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and, rather than resorting to rhetoric of condemnation—however deserved—he focused on the political and social dimensions that could inform a future settlement.
I largely agree with his premises. As a short-term tactic, dismembering the RSF into smaller factions would weaken the rebellion and help bring the militia to its knees—a commendable approach. But from a strategic, long-term perspective, fragmentation is the worst possible solution, both for Sudan and its neighbours.
First, this is not an ordinary militia. In previous Sudanese conflicts—whether the eastern rebellion, the South Sudan war, or western Sudan’s troubles—the fighting remained largely intra-Sudanese, involving tribal clashes or battles with the national army. It never involved cross-border tribal extensions, mercenaries, or shameless foreign government interventions. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, or Chad were not drawn in. This time, the RSF is a transnational tribal militia. Its fragmentation will not stay within Sudan’s borders. It will spill over directly and immediately into neighbouring countries—possibly excepting Egypt.
The breakaway factions have gained not only battlefield tactics and weapons experience but also a dangerous template: how to challenge and try to overrun a central government, like the one in Khartoum. When they return to their homelands—Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Niger, and Cameroon—they will surely attempt the same. This confirms what Ambassador Murawih called “the belt stretching from Sudan’s borders with Chad and the CAR westwards through Niger, Mali, southern Libya and Algeria, all the way to northern Nigeria and Mauritania.” Therefore, while crushing the rebellion is wise, we must also maintain or create a hard nucleus to negotiate with—even a loose entity can contain the shrapnel. Luring defectors to form an alternate leadership when the current one collapses is a wise move.
Second, beyond the repercussions the ambassador listed, I return to a conclusion from my upcoming book: these militias genuinely believe they are the inheritors of the Prophet of Islam and his lofty values—though they display none. As one hakama (female bard) I quoted said, “We believe only in Prophet Mohamed and in Himeidti.” Another elderly woman told me during the hajj, years before the rebellion, “We are subjects of Himeidti, not Sudanese subjects.” This mindset extends beyond Sudan to the entire Sahelian nomadic groups. Fragmentation among the RSF could well breed violent extremism—Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram. As Ambassador Murawih wrote, we must study the tribal groups roaming that vast desert space: the Tebu, Kanuri, Teda, Tuareg, Azawad, and the wider Baggara tribes (Rizeigat, Misseriya, Salamat). They are all nomads—cattle or camel herders—deeply impacted by climate change, which will not reverse soon. With their traditional lifelines shattered, they will seek alternatives. Without proper developmental and resilient programs, the same problems will remain dormant, brewing. The current militias lack a political program or manifesto; they are being used by Gaahat and Tassis, which they know. But once they forge a coherent political manifesto and raison d’être, fragmentation will become impossible. The solution is massive development and economic programs. Capital exists—Himeidti has billions in gold—but his lack of vision led him to use that wealth only for destruction, believing development requires federal government control. He failed to learn from North Sudan and North states, where the public leads development, education, health, and agriculture.
Third, Ambassador Obeid—perhaps due to space—did not elaborate on the cultural issue. Looting and spoils are cultural, not confined to one region. Look at the poetry and songs of the hambata: whatever names you give them, they praise theft, armed robbery, and war spoils. We must reckon deeply with this, engage the hakamat, spread education, and debase those practices—otherwise, we apply double standards.
Finally, an element the article did not tackle: the war has killed hundreds of thousands of youth from these communities, as across Darfur. We will be left with hundreds of thousands of widows, young women, and children growing up in a poisonous atmosphere. The sooner we address this, the better. Fragmentation would only add fuel to the fire. As Ambassador Murawih smartly put it: “Anyone wishing to see a practical illustration of the concept of ‘Shartama’ need only look at the map of Sudan and its southern borders after South Sudan’s secession.”

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=14415