Islamists in Sudan: Are They All (Muslim Brotherhood)?
Dr. Ismail Sati
Amid the political complexities Sudan is experiencing today, the U.S. Department of State announced the designation of what it called the “Muslim Brotherhood organization in Sudan” as a terrorist group. Regardless of differing views on this decision, what stands out is not only its political implications, but also the considerable oversimplification it reveals in understanding the intellectual and organizational map of Islamic movements in Sudan.
Although the accusations leveled against Islamists in Sudan—on the basis of which the U.S. State Department classified the “Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan” as a terrorist group—have not been accompanied by publicly presented evidence or proof to justify such a designation, we will (setting aside this aspect of the debate) attempt in this article to approach the issue from another angle: The historical and intellectual development of the Islamic movement in Sudan, away from direct political debate.
In prevailing political and media discourse, both inside and outside Sudan, all Sudanese Islamic currents are sometimes reduced to a single entity called the “Muslim Brotherhood,” and all political and security accusations are then attached to this entity. However, this reduction does not reflect historical or intellectual reality; rather, it reveals a lack of understanding of the nature of the Sudanese Islamic movement’s evolution and the complexity of its organizational and political trajectories.
To understand this issue, three fundamental questions must be answered:
Who are the Muslim Brotherhood?
Is everyone who belongs to the Islamic current considered a Brotherhood member?
And how did the Sudanese experience of the Islamic movement differ from the global organization of the Muslim Brotherhood?
First: Who are the Muslim Brotherhood?
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna, presenting a reformist project based on education, preaching, and building a Muslim society, followed by gradual political action to establish a system inspired by Islamic law.
The group spread across many countries, but it remained, at its core, an organization with a specific structure based on allegiance (bay‘a), strict hierarchy, and affiliation with what is known as the international organization.
Thus, “Muslim Brotherhood” is not a general description of everyone working in the Islamic sphere, but the name of a specific organization with its own distinct intellectual and organizational philosophy.
Second: Is every Islamist a Brotherhood member?
The Islamic current in the Muslim world is far broader than the Muslim Brotherhood.
Various schools have emerged: Salafi, da‘wa-oriented, activist, reformist, and Sufi. Independent organizations also appeared that do not follow the Brotherhood, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, founded in the 1950s with a different project centered on the idea of a global caliphate and rejecting conventional national party politics.
In Sudan itself, Islamic activity was never confined to a single organization. From early on, multiple trends existed, especially within student circles. Some groups were influenced by the Brotherhood, while others were shaped by different schools, making the Sudanese Islamic movement more diverse from the outset than the Egyptian experience.
Therefore, reducing everyone belonging to the Islamic current in Sudan to being “Muslim Brotherhood” is an oversimplification that does not withstand any serious historical reading.
Third: The Islamic Charter Front and the beginning of divergence from the Brotherhood
When the Islamic Charter Front was established in the 1960s under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, it was not merely an organizational extension of the Muslim Brotherhood. Rather, it was an attempt to formulate a Sudanese Islamic project with an openly political character, operating within a party system and addressing society as a whole, not just organizational members.
Here, the real divergence began.
Turabi believed that the Islamic movement should transform into an open, mass political movement. In contrast, the classical Brotherhood tendency favored maintaining a closed organizational structure based on allegiance and strict gradual educational development—perhaps due to the security conditions experienced by its members, unlike the relatively freer political environment enjoyed by parties in Sudan.
Because of this disagreement, a group of Brotherhood members led by al-Sadiq Abdullah Abdel-Majid split off, refusing to merge into the Islamic Charter Front. They retained the name “Muslim Brotherhood” and have remained linked to the global organization to this day, unlike the rest of the Sudanese Islamic current, which evolved along different paths.
This is a crucial point often overlooked by many analysts: not all Islamists in Sudan are Brotherhood members; rather, the Brotherhood itself was one current among several within the broader Islamic movement.
Fourth: From the Islamic Charter Front to the National Islamic Front
The movement later developed into the National Islamic Front in the mid-1980s. After the army seized power in 1989, it evolved into a less formally structured Islamic movement until the establishment of the National Congress Party as a political party encompassing various segments of society, political spectrums, and religious communities. Throughout this evolution, the movement moved further away from the traditional Brotherhood model.
While the Brotherhood remained primarily a da‘wa organization seeking gradual influence over society, the Sudanese Islamic movement transformed into a direct political project that recognizes political pluralism and seeks to attain power and govern the state.
This transformation was not merely a difference in methods, but a divergence in the philosophy of activism that had early on moved beyond the framework of Sayyid Qutb.
Fifth: Turabi and his differing philosophy from the Brotherhood
Classical Brotherhood thought is based on three pillars:
- Strict hierarchical organization
- Education before politics
- Long-term gradual change
In contrast, Hassan al-Turabi’s thought moved toward:
- Expanding the concept of the movement to include society as a whole
- Reducing organizational centralization
- Prioritizing political ijtihad over strict organizational commitment
- Accepting party pluralism and open political activity
- Treating the state as a field for ijtihad, not merely a tool for preaching
For this reason, the vision of those aligned with Turabi’s school clashed early with the traditional Brotherhood model, which viewed strict organizational discipline as the primary guarantee of the movement’s survival.
Sixth: The “Successor System”… the final intellectual break
Turabi’s divergence from Brotherhood thought reached its peak in his final paper titled “The Renewed Successor System” (Al-Manzuma al-Khalifa al-Mutajaddida).
In this paper, he presented a vision that goes beyond the very idea of an Islamic organization, calling instead for a civilizational system with a broad framework encompassing both Muslims and non-Muslims within a single homeland, based on consultation (shura), ijtihad, and pluralism, rather than a closed ideological organization.
In this vision:
* The Islamic movement is not a special organization
* Membership is not based on allegiance (bay‘a)
* Change is not led by a single group
* Rather, it is carried out by an entire society participating in building a renewed Islamic system
This conception differs fundamentally from the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is based on the idea of an organized group leading the process of change.
Thus, it can be said that the paper “The Renewed Successor System” represents an intellectual attempt to definitively move the Sudanese Islamic movement beyond the classical Brotherhood framework.
Accordingly, portraying the entire Islamic current in Sudan as a single extension of the Muslim Brotherhood is not a scientific reading of history, but a flawed and misleading political reduction that serves contemporary conflicts.
The Sudanese Islamic movement, since its inception, has been marked by diversity of schools, differences in visions, clear organizational splits, and even intellectual attempts to fully depart from the Brotherhood model.
Therefore, attaching a single accusation to all these diverse experiences does not reflect analytical strength, but rather reveals a weakness in understanding—or a preference for using politics instead of history.
Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12274