Could America Lose the War in Iran? A Reading of Professor Jiang Xiuqin’s Prediction

Dr Mohammed Hasab Al-Rasul
Amid the rapid transformations unfolding across the region, the name of the Chinese professor Jiang Xiuqin has emerged as one of the voices offering a bold, forward-looking interpretation of the trajectory of the American-Israeli war against Iran.
Jiang, a Chinese academic and graduate of Yale University, became known through his platform Predictive History, where he analyses global events by comparing the behaviour of empires at moments of ascent and testing.
In 2024, he made three predictions: the return of Donald Trump to the presidency, the outbreak of a war with Iran, and the possibility that the United States might lose that war. With the first two predictions now realised, the third has gained particular significance. His reading of the war’s potential outcome is based not on the relative size of military power, but on each side’s capacity to endure.
Jiang’s Thesis: Attrition as Strategy
Jiang’s argument begins with the assumption that what is unfolding is not a conventional confrontation that can be resolved quickly, but rather a gradual process of erosion, around which Iran has structured its strategy.
In the Vietnam War, the United States did not lose because it lacked firepower; rather, the conflict transformed into a prolonged struggle in which Vietnamese determination succeeded in exhausting American political and economic will. As a result, military superiority lost its functional advantage.
Yet the comparison with Vietnam must be handled carefully. Iran today possesses capabilities far beyond anything Vietnam had at its disposal: a precise ballistic missile arsenal, an effective drone programme, electronic warfare capabilities, and influential regional partners. Added to this is control over the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-third of the world’s oil passes.
Taken together, these capabilities strengthen Iran’s ability to withstand pressure and defend itself, while enabling it to impose a deeper and broader war of attrition upon its adversaries than the guerrilla warfare seen in Vietnam.
A superpower is not exhausted in a single battle, but through the accumulation of cost, time, and internal pressure. While military superiority provides deterrence, a prolonged war ultimately tests its limits.
The Gulf as a Theatre of Mutual Attrition
The Gulf region emerges as a central strategic arena. Its importance lies not solely in securing maritime routes and energy supplies; it also serves as the backbone of American economic interests and investments, particularly in technology and artificial intelligence.
However, the continuation of the war places multiple pressures on the region. Washington risks losing the smooth flow of these vital resources, while both Israel and the United States face increasing military and economic attrition. Meanwhile, Gulf states may confront economic, social, and security challenges.
At the same time, a growing political discourse in the Gulf argues that this is not the Gulf’s war, but rather Israel’s and America’s war. This sentiment has been expressed by prominent figures such as Hamad bin Jassim, Turki Al-Faisal, and Emirati businessman Khalaf Al-Habtoor, reflecting the growing presence of this perspective within Gulf political consciousness.
While attention remains focused on the battlefield, food security may become one of the most dangerous pressure points. Gulf countries import nearly 90% of their food supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.
Although Gulf capitals reassure their populations that strategic reserves are sufficient for 4 to 6 months, any prolonged disruption to supply chains would create a genuine living crisis.
For this reason, the prolongation of the war could transform the region from a sphere of influence into another arena of attritional pressure within the conflict.
The American Domestic Front
In this war, attrition is not limited to military and economic dimensions. The American domestic arena represents another critical factor influencing the course of the conflict.
For years, opposition within the United States to overseas wars has been growing, driven by both war fatigue and domestic priorities. The “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement, which helped return Trump to the White House, mobilised popular sentiment around the slogan “America First”, a clear call to reduce foreign entanglements and focus on domestic issues.
A prolonged war of attrition may collide with the very political foundation that brought Trump back to power. In the absence of a quick and decisive victory, internal opposition may widen, and political pressure could become an important factor shaping decision-making.
Early indicators of such resistance are already visible at both the public and institutional levels. Opinion polls reveal growing American hesitation to become involved in new overseas conflicts. Meanwhile, the most recent vote in Congress exposed a sharp division over granting the president broad war powers. At the time, the decision passed only by a narrow margin of 53 votes to 47.
It is well known that major external crises often produce an initial “rally around the flag” effect. However, long wars of attrition that do not clearly serve goals related to sovereignty, independence, or existential defence have a particular ability to transform unity into frustration and anger, especially as casualties and financial costs rise. This dynamic may intensify in the United States if the war continues.
Israel and the Fear of Attrition
Israel, America’s principal partner in this war—and arguably the party that drew Washington into it—bases its military doctrine on rapid, decisive wars, not prolonged confrontations that drain resources and threaten the structural foundations of the state.
Israeli society has historically shown a heightened sensitivity to human losses, psychological pressure, and economic strain. Reactions during the first week of the war already suggest that Israeli society is wary of the conflict and fears its consequences. Its capacity to sustain a prolonged struggle may be extremely limited.
The Israeli Broadcasting Authority has estimated that the damage inflicted upon vital economic facilities during the war has reached billions of shekels. Meanwhile, Reuters, citing informed sources, reported that the first week alone inflicted direct losses exceeding $2 billion on the Israeli economy due to factory shutdowns, population displacement from northern areas, and reduced air traffic.
Despite this, the Israeli right views the war as a strategic opportunity to neutralise what it considers Iran’s existential threat. Some see it as a moment to redraw geopolitical maps in the region and advance the project of “Greater Israel.”
Here a clear contradiction emerges between the ambition to achieve these strategic objectives and the actual capacity of Israeli leadership and society to bear the burdens of war.
China and Russia: The Greatest Beneficiaries of Attrition
This conflict cannot be analysed without considering the positions of Russia and China, both of which closely monitor developments as opportunities to weaken American influence.
Moscow, itself engaged in a war of attrition in Ukraine, understands the strategic value of Washington becoming entangled in a new Middle Eastern quagmire. Russia may therefore provide Iran with political, technical, and security support—particularly in air defence systems refined on the Ukrainian battlefield. Such cooperation could also be seen as repayment for Iranian assistance and part of the broader strategic partnership between the two countries, with Moscow seeking to maximise American exhaustion at this moment.
China, for its part, views the conflict from a deeper geostrategic perspective, reinforced by the comprehensive strategic partnership linking Beijing and Tehran. This relationship places both countries within a broader alignment opposing unipolar dominance, while affirming Iran’s central role as an indispensable regional power.
Although Beijing recognises the war’s impact on global supply chains, it may also see the greatest losses falling upon the United States and its allies. Thus, China may regard the conflict as an opportunity to weaken Washington by strengthening Iran’s resilience—while carefully balancing the benefits of attrition against its economic consequences.
Such dynamics could encourage both Beijing and Moscow to pursue a diplomatic settlement to end the war, consistent with their broader vision of building a multipolar international order that reflects emerging power balances.
The Question Is Not Power but Capacity
From the interaction of these four fronts, the true nature of the war emerges.
In Washington, burdened by debt, political divisions are intensifying over war powers. In Israel, high economic costs are accumulating alongside the psychological strain of conflict. In the Gulf, food security has emerged as a silent but powerful pressure point, alongside a growing political voice rejecting a war fought on its territory at the expense of its security and resources. Meanwhile, in Iran, institutional and societal structures appear capable of absorbing shocks and sustaining the conflict for longer, despite internal challenges related to economic conditions, political tensions, and security concerns.
Here lies the fundamental equation: the issue is not the traditional balance of military power, but the ability to employ that power continuously without allowing its costs to transform into a source of internal weakness. It also depends on the effective mobilisation of society’s spiritual and national capacities in ways that enhance resilience over the long term.
The greatest challenge today is to avoid the path of slow erosion. When military, economic, and political forms of attrition intersect, the question of military victory becomes less important than the question of the price to be paid.
This is where Jiang Xiuqin’s analysis gains its significance. It shifts the discussion toward what might be called the sustainability equation of conflict. In wars of attrition, victory does not come through a knockout blow but through the ability to endure longer.
If his prediction of an American defeat were to materialise, that defeat would likely not resemble the military collapse witnessed in Vietnam. Instead, it would manifest as a gradual erosion of prestige, an inability to impose political will, and a failure to achieve decisive outcomes.
Such an impasse could lead to one of two paths: either a chaotic withdrawal reminiscent of Afghanistan, or a compelled political settlement driven by attrition and by American and Israeli efforts to secure Israel’s survival within a region that has become profoundly volatile.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12078