The Ethiopian Trap: Drones in the Skies…Regional Agenda on the Ground

Adel Al-Baz
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Why did Ethiopia launch UAE drones from Bahir Dar towards Khartoum, Kosti, and other areas? And why specifically now?
The answer to this question lies not in the event itself, but in understanding its objective and timing. These strikes, in essence, are not aimed at overthrowing the government, nor at weakening it in a direct military sense. They are not merely an attempt to sow panic, as some might imagine. Nor do they appear, on the surface, to be part of a plan to escalate the war or to force the government to accept a truce imposed upon it according to the Quartet’s framework. What is happening is far more profound.
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The launching of Emirati drones from Ethiopian territory cannot be interpreted as an isolated military act. Rather, it is part of a more complex attempt aimed at dragging Sudan into an open regional conflict. This is the most dangerous objective of all. Once the confrontation escalates to this level, the idea that Sudan has become a threat to regional security can be promoted, justifying international and regional intervention to impose a ceasefire, even if the government inrefusal.
This course of action follows the failure of diplomatic pressure efforts through the London, Geneva, and Berlin conferences, as well as through IGAD and the African Union.

These drones could have been launched from within Sudan, and indeed, this has happened in previous phases. However, the choice of Ethiopian territory this time is not a mere detail, but a carefully calculated step. Its primary aim is to test regional and international reactions, and secondly, to reshape the nature of the conflict itself and gauge the feasibility of drawing Sudan into a war with Ethiopia.
This move serves several objectives simultaneously. Foremost among them is rescuing the militia from its deteriorating field situation, given the mounting pressure it faces as military operations advance toward its strongholds in Kordofan and Darfur. These attacks do not seek a direct victory, but rather aim to engage the army, slow its advance, and dilute its focuss. On the political level, the aim is to impose a settlement that reinstates the militia and its leaders, not in their previous positions, but in a stronger form, as if nothing had happened since April 15, 2023.
At the same time, these attacks represent a practical test of the Sudanese air defense system. Launching drones from a relatively long distance—such as Bahir Dar—allows for measuring the depth of surveillance and early interception capabilities, and gathering precise information about weaknesses in preparation for any future escalation. Furthermore, the repetition of these attacks leads to the depletion of air defense systems by expending ammunition against low-cost targets, a well-known attrition strategy in modern warfare.

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The impact extends even further; drawing Sudan into a confrontation with Ethiopia could, in turn, drag Egypt into the conflict, opening the door to a broad regional escalation that serves an agenda to ignite the entire region.
Domestically, these strikes target vital infrastructure, not only to cause material damage but also to sow despair, especially given the civilian casualties resulting from the drone attacks. At the international level, the use of Ethiopian territory provides evidence that the conflict has transcended national borders, creating a pretext for internationalizing the crisis under the guise of a “regional threat,” and giving organizations like IGAD and the African Union justification for intervention.
This trajectory cannot be separated from the failure of previous attempts in the Blue Nile region, where the militia, despite the support received, was unable to achieve any significant progress that would have the desired impact or disrupt the government’s efforts. This led to the search for alternative tools, including the use of drones to attack cities.
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Given this situation, the most important question becomes: How can this plan be thwarted?
The fundamental principle is to avoid being drawn into war with Ethiopia, no matter how much the provocations escalate. Dragging Sudan into this conflict is the central strategic objective of these attacks. Therefore, the real confrontation will not be a direct military response, but rather a balanced approach on three fronts:
First: The diplomatic front: Broad action becomes a necessity, not an option, not only at the African level, but also at the Arab and international levels, to present the full facts to the international community. Perhaps it would have been wiser to postpone recalling the ambassador from Addis Ababa, as working within the African Union remains crucial. The Foreign Minister’s recent speech reflected a high degree of balance and wisdom, which can be built upon to launch a coordinated diplomatic campaign involving all Sudanese embassies.
Second: The Media Front: The battle is no less important. A well-thought-out plan targeting African, regional, and international media is needed, one that works to reveal the truth about what is happening with evidence, facts, and images. Platforms like Cairo and Riyadh can be utilized to expand this presence, in addition to holding regular regional press conferences to directly address public opinion.
Third: The Intelligence and Security Front: The role remains critical in monitoring and thwarting these operations before they occur, using available tools and networks.
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So far, some regional reactions appear positive, particularly the positions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which condemned the attacks and warned of the dangers of escalation, in addition to Qatar and the United States. This is a gain that should be built upon and developed quickly.
Ultimately, however, the real challenge remains internal: how can Sudan manage this provocation without falling into the trap? Giving in to emotional rhetoric and reacting impulsively could achieve for others what they failed to achieve militarily and politically.
Despite the blatant and brutal nature of the Ethiopian aggression and its denial, engaging in direct conflict now would not serve Sudan’s interests. On the contrary, it could open the door to a wider regional war, for which this is not the opportune moment. The priority today is clear and unequivocal: defeating the rebellion and restoring the state.
Experience has proven that Sudan, through its diplomatic and intelligence tools, is capable of managing complex crises. We patiently endured Chad until we were able to weaken its position and defeat it intelligence-wise, and we succeeded diplomatically in containing Libyan aggression through Egyptian mediation. Today, with the same tools, we can undermine the Ethiopian position and isolate it diplomatically, politically, and through the media, without being drawn into a war desired by others.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=13576