Engineering the Transition: A Realistic Approach to Managing Change and Addressing Structural Distortions

Dr Al-Haitham Al-Kindi Yousif
As we continue our discussion on engineering transition and how to engage with forces that resist reform, we previously outlined the foundations for moving from a “rent-seeking state” to a “productive state” through a strategy of inclusion and participation rather than exclusion. Today, we seek to delve into an objective and realistic reading of the current landscape, in order to develop both a conceptual and practical approach to restoring civilian rule in a safe manner—one that avoids violence and ensures the building of a durable state founded on strong national institutions.
When we speak of the distorted transitional condition we are experiencing today, it cannot be separated from Sudan’s political history. The country has witnessed several transitional periods following revolutions and popular uprisings against military regimes. If we undertake a comparative analysis between those historical periods and the current transition following the December 2018 revolution, we find a fundamental divergence in the objectives governing each phase.
Previous transitional periods—namely the October 1964 Revolution and the April 1985 Intifada—were short and clearly defined. Their ultimate aim was to reach free and fair elections in the shortest possible time, based on consensus around an electoral law that ensured peaceful transfer of power without excluding any political actor.
By contrast, the December 2018 experience presents a structural distortion arising from the convergence of the ambitions of political actors who led the change and of protests against the former regime, with those of the military institution to govern. These internal dynamics intersected with overlapping external interventions and agendas, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the war whose consequences we are suffering today.
The country’s structural crises are starkly manifested in this transitional moment. Political and military elites have remained locked in continuous conflict, strangling one another in a scene that reproduces failure. The structural distortion reached its peak when narrow partisan agendas collided with the military establishment, creating an environment hostile to competence and fertile for personal interests at the expense of the public good. Political forces pursued vendettas and score-settling against affiliates of the former regime, rather than building a state governed by the rule of law and laying the foundations for transitional justice.
This preoccupation with conflict led politicians to make desperate attempts to retain power for as long as possible without a popular mandate, resulting in the absence of political and legal legitimacy.
At the same time, the military institution pursued its own ambitions to remain at the forefront, extending the transitional period to 7 years—roughly equivalent to 2 electoral cycles. This situation paralysed political life and stalled development, producing a complex reality burdened with economic and social crises, with the ongoing war representing its peak.
Understanding the present reality does not mean accepting it as permanent or surrendering to it; rather, it means recognising the causes of its emergence to address it wisely. Some have justified the continuation of this political-military arrangement as a necessity to preserve the state from collapse and fragmentation. By the same logic, one may argue for the continuation of this exceptional situation until complete victory is achieved in the “War of Dignity” and the authority of the state is fully restored. Rushing into fragile settlements without resolving core security and existential issues would only recycle the crisis and produce new distorted transitions. Therefore, the national strategy must focus on supporting the war effort to bring it to an end, unifying the internal front, and developing a comprehensive vision for the post-war phase.
Sudan’s political arena has long experimented with exclusionary politics, leading the country into cycles of strife and dangerous impasses. Exclusion has never succeeded in building a state; on the contrary, it has consistently entrenched division and conflict. Our proposed solution, therefore, requires a high degree of inclusiveness and acceptance of the other. Development requires a safe environment, and investment flows where security prevails.
All parties must embrace the idea of reform and build a new social contract that accommodates the full political and social spectrum. Real change does not mean exclusion; rather, it means integrating active forces and redirecting their energies towards productivity and growth.
Based on the foregoing, the armed forces, armed movements, and the forces that emerged in the aftermath of the “War of Dignity” should be integrated into a single national army—professional, inclusive, and guided by a clear military doctrine that keeps politics at arm’s length.
The key question is: how can civilian rule be restored without descending into a cycle of violence or chaos?
The answer lies in engineering a functional transformation of the military and security elites. The role of the military and security institutions must be redefined—from actors that govern or intervene in political affairs to institutions that safeguard sovereignty, the constitution, investment projects, national capital, and economic development. Protecting the constitution and elected civilian institutions is a fundamental requirement for the stability of the modern state.
To achieve this, companies owned by the armed forces and security services should be converted into public shareholding companies, with shares offered to the Sudanese public as well as to military leaders. In this way, military leaders become shareholders and beneficiaries of the growth of these institutions, aligning their interests with macroeconomic stability rather than political control.
Moreover, the political process should be managed by a civilian technocratic government responsible for economic management, public services, and foreign relations, while the military focuses exclusively on defence duties.
The development of the armed forces lies at the heart of the broader state-building strategy. The goal is to build armed forces whose doctrine is centred on Sudan—strong, national, professional, well-trained, and efficient. Achieving this requires clear practical steps, including:
Training and capacity development: Providing comprehensive training for all ranks, alongside modern equipment and technologies highlighted by recent conflicts, including drones, electronic warfare systems, and air defence capabilities.
Localisation of military industries: Building on existing defence industries by drawing lessons from wartime experience, thereby strengthening domestic production. This not only enhances national security but also reduces external dependency and opens new avenues for the national economy.
Standards of recruitment and transparency: Membership in the armed forces must not be subject to political, partisan, or tribal patronage. Transparent and merit-based criteria should govern admission.
Incentives and remuneration: Armed forces personnel must receive adequate salaries that ensure a dignified and stable life for them and their families, enabling them to focus solely on their professional duties and making service more attractive.
Promotion and accountability: Advancement must be based on competence and performance, not narrow loyalties.
Exiting this distorted situation requires all parties to be convinced of the necessity of each institution performing its role without encroaching on others. This underpins our central idea for resolving Sudan’s crisis: the military must recognise its sovereign and defensive role, and politicians must recognise their civilian and institutional responsibilities.
The transition from a rent-seeking state to a productive state is not merely a theoretical slogan. It is a practical vision that requires the participation of all—including political elites and the military. The conviction of all parties that their true interests lie in construction and stability, rather than conflict and confrontation, is the key to halting the bloodshed.
Let us open the doors to all who wish to contribute, and build our institutions on the foundations of competence, transparency, and justice—guided by a clear vision and sustained effort.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=13526