Africa and National Dialogues

Ambassador Abdel Mahmoud Abdel Halim
Statistics on UN Security Council activities show that African issues and conflicts account for around 70 per cent of its agenda. Other statistics indicate that the continent is experiencing approximately 50 active conflicts, ranging from civil wars and border disputes to resource conflicts, armed-group insurgencies and external aggression. Africa also accounts for around 60 per cent of international peacekeeping operations.
While these wars and conflicts have traditional causes—such as the colonial legacy, the Cold War and economic conditions—new drivers of conflict, warfare and instability have emerged, including:
Climate and environmental change.
Competition and rivalries among international powers.
The ambitions of emerging regional powers.
Struggles over influence and competition for maritime access, ports and the minerals of the future.
Security threats fuelled by the harmful uses of modern and digital technologies.
Crises of legitimacy and political transition, debt, and youth unemployment in a young continent, where failure to invest effectively in young people has turned them into a security threat through their exploitation as fuel for militarisation, insurgency and violence.
Problems arising from the prolonged presence of refugees, as well as demographic and settler migration, among others.
Efforts to Resolve Conflicts and the Evolution of the African System
Conflict resolution and settlement have remained a persistent concern for states, regional organisations, sub-regional groupings, and international organisations. They were also a concern for African states both before and after independence, through efforts to settle disputes via councils of elders and traditional authorities, using customary practices, traditions and restorative justice.
After gaining independence, the countries of the continent emerged from the struggles of liberation burdened by difficult transitions:
On 17 January 1961, Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the Congo, was assassinated and executed.
On 13 January 1963, while Africa was striving to unite its ranks and establish its continental organisation—the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)—Sylvanus Olympio, the first President of the Republic of Togo, was also assassinated under a plan involving both internal and external forces.
This led to the principle of “condemnation of political assassinations” becoming a prominent feature of the OAU Charter, adopted in Addis Ababa on 25 May 1963. The founding fathers envisaged the Charter as a code of conduct governing relations between and within states, resolving conflicts and safeguarding stability. It explicitly provided for:
Non-interference in internal affairs.
The prohibition of altering borders inherited from colonial rule.
Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.
The peaceful settlement of disputes, African solidarity and international cooperation.
Although the OAU’s experience in resolving conflicts was modest, the African Union (AU) later developed considerably. Its Constitutive Act authorised intervention and even the suspension of states’ activities in cases of “unconstitutional changes of government”. The AU adopted a more proactive approach through the African Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, the Panel of the Wise, and conflict-resolution mechanisms operating through regional and sub-regional economic communities.
During discussions on reforming the African Union, critics targeted its role in conflict resolution, particularly sanctions that suspend member states. The argument was that the Union punishes states by suspending their activities when it should instead engage more closely and help them overcome the obstacles and challenges associated with political and civilian transitions. Questions have also been raised about the influence of external funding on the AU’s choices and policies.
The Role of the United Nations and the Problem of Conflict Relapse
The United Nations’ role and experience in resolving African conflicts has been no better. As noted earlier, African issues account for around 70 per cent of the UN Security Council’s agenda. The UN’s familiar response begins with deploying peacekeeping forces—even where there is no peace to keep—potentially prolonging conflicts, particularly because some countries accustomed to participating in UN operations lobby for their continuation as a source of foreign-currency earnings.
Of even greater concern is conflict relapse—the recurrence or return of conflict, commonly known as Conflict Relapse. According to the United Nations and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the overall relapse rate is between 40 and 50 per cent during the critical first five years.
This has prompted the United Nations to seek ways of addressing the problem, including:
Moving towards peacebuilding rather than relying solely on traditional peacekeeping.
Greater emphasis on early warning systems and linking security with development.
Deploying multidimensional political missions.
Strengthening the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and establishing a consultative follow-up mechanism developed by the Security Council in cooperation with the General Assembly.
Focusing on reconstruction and using special envoys to engage with the countries concerned.
Causes of the Failure or Relapse of Conflict Resolution
Failure to address the root causes of crises.
Failure to honour peace agreements and the absence of political will.
Excessive focus on distributing positions of power and wealth.
Weak and fragile state institutions.
External interference.
The absence or weakness of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes.
The exclusion and marginalisation of influential political forces.
The marginalisation of influential sectors of society, such as women and young people.
The absence of the rule of law, security and an effective judiciary.
Economic collapse or weakness, making militarisation an attractive economic option.
The resurgence of mercenaries arriving from South America clearly illustrates—among other factors—the inability of the economic systems that emerged after the signing of peace agreements there to absorb them, or the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of DDR programmes, or the prioritisation of securing positions of power and wealth for leaders at the expense of the broader grassroots constituencies.
National Dialogue Processes and African Experiences
Political dialogue between parties to conflicts in Africa has never been absent from the scene, particularly at major turning points and periods of transformation. External interventions have also not been absent, employing a variety of scenarios and approaches under the banners of humanitarian relief, aid and humanitarian diplomacy, or through appeals to collective security, counter-terrorism and the protection of international peace and stability.
A review of many initiatives put forward by external actors to resolve conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, shows that they often incorporate external actors’ concerns that are not necessarily domestic problems or priorities in the first place.
Another example of external actors advancing their own agendas is South Africa. Having recognised that the days of apartheid were numbered and that majority rule was inevitable, Western powers worked with the apartheid government to ensure that South Africa relinquished its nuclear capabilities, so that they would not remain available as a source of strength for Africa and for the African National Congress. The programme was subsequently dismantled.
Dialogue was not absent among the parties to, or victors of, these African conflicts. While the CODESA talks that ended apartheid in South Africa are perhaps the best-known example internationally, they were preceded and followed by numerous other significant dialogues:
Benin’s National Conference (1990): This is regarded as an inspiration for many West African countries. It ended President Mathieu Kérékou’s era and paved the way for democratic government without bloodshed.
The National Conference in the Congo (1991–1992) and the Lusaka Agreement (1999): These followed what became known as Africa’s World War, in which six African armies were involved. Recently, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has called, in a meeting with religious leaders, for a new conference to unify national visions.
The Arusha Peace Agreement in Burundi (2000).
Kenyan National Dialogue: Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan facilitated the process following the violent 2007 elections. It ultimately produced Kenya’s new Constitution in 2010.
Tunisia’s Quartet Dialogue (2013): The Tunisian General Labour Union, the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts, the National Bar Association and the Tunisian Human Rights League undertook this. Under the resulting arrangement, the Ennahda Movement relinquished power in favour of an independent technocratic government.
Mauritania: A new round of national dialogue is expected to strengthen national unity and manage diversity.
The Ethiopian Model: The National Dialogue Commission
In Ethiopia, the National Dialogue Commission is expected to submit its report and recommendations from the National Dialogue Conference to Parliament on 20 September 2026. The process follows developments after the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam, most notably the London Conference on Peace in Ethiopia, held on 27–28 May 1991, with the participation of Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
That conference produced an understanding on the governing arrangements of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), including the adoption of “ethnic federalism” and the “right to self-determination”.
The period following the departure of Meles Zenawi, the stepping down of Hailemariam Desalegn and the accession of Abiy Ahmed witnessed seismic developments, including the decline of Tigrayan influence and authority, the war between the federal government and Tigray, deteriorating relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara, and the serious threats currently facing Ahmed’s government.
In this context, the national dialogue initiative launched by Abiy Ahmed should be mentioned. On 29 December 2021, Parliament established the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, which began its National Dialogue Conference sessions on 15 July and continued through 22 August 2026.
In the years following its establishment, the Commission worked to build its structures, train its personnel, study international experiences, establish regional offices and visit thousands of constituencies to identify the agenda with citizen participation.
Structure and Participation
The institutional structure consists of 11 commissioners, selected through a process that began with the nomination of more than 600 individuals before reaching the final list, which the opposition criticised as a government choice.
Approximately 4,000 people participated in the conference.
Eight Areas of Discussion
Nation-building and national identity.
The structure and system of government.
The status and future of federal cities.
Religious affairs and the promotion of coexistence.
Institution-building, the rule of law and human rights.
Economic and social issues, including the affairs of farmers and pastoralists.
Combating corruption and promoting good governance.
Peacebuilding and national reconciliation.
External Support
Western countries welcomed the initiative. The European Union and Western countries provided 50 per cent of the operational budget, in addition to logistical support coordinated with the United Nations Development Programme.
Key Expected Recommendations
With reported levels of agreement exceeding 75 per cent, the anticipated recommendations include:
Moving towards a presidential system by merging the powers of the Prime Minister and President.
Limiting the presidency to two terms, with each term lasting five to six years.
Reviewing the right to self-determination.
Integrating armed groups into political life and safeguarding religious freedom.
Giving greater attention to political symbols, such as replacing the star on the national flag with a national symbol associated with the Battle of Adwa or the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Divergent Positions
Observers have pointed out that the absence of opposition parties and armed movements weakens the dialogue. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front has argued that decisions taken behind closed doors are intended to consolidate Abiy Ahmed’s power, while local organisations have warned of agendas aimed at altering the administrative status of the capital.
The South African Model: The CODESA Experience
“We must change, or prepare to perish…”
With this resounding declaration by F. W. de Klerk, President of the apartheid government, the white-minority regime was already tottering under the weight of the liberation struggle, mounting domestic pressure and unprecedented international isolation.
Momentous developments followed this: the release of Nelson Mandela, the lifting of bans on political parties—above all the African National Congress—and a general amnesty for combatants.
The negotiating platform that entered the history books was the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), whose objective was to end apartheid, establish a pluralistic democratic system and draft a new constitution guaranteeing the rights of all without discrimination.
The Negotiation Process
Launch
The first sessions began at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg in December 1991, with 19 political parties and organisations participating. A joint steering committee, financed by the government and chaired by senior independent judges, guided the process.
Boycotts
Parties on both sides boycotted the talks.
Black South Africans: The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) refused to negotiate with what it regarded as an illegitimate regime and demanded the restoration of land. The Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) also boycotted the talks, as did the Zulu Inkatha movement, citing the marginalisation of the Zulu king.
Whites: The Conservative Party boycotted the process, demanding a separate state for whites. The Afrikaner People’s Front also boycotted the talks, describing Mandela’s party as communist and terrorist, while the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) branded de Klerk a traitor and demanded a Boer republic.
Referendum and Declaration of Intent
De Klerk held a referendum restricted to white voters, securing 68.7 per cent support for his reforms.
CODESA I succeeded on its first day in issuing a Declaration of Intent to establish a united, democratic and non-racial state, and created five working groups to address constitutional principles and the future of the Bantustans.
The Setbacks and Collapse of CODESA II
The talks resumed in May 1992 but collapsed amid escalating violence and deep disagreements over power-sharing and decision-making mechanisms.
The National Party demanded high thresholds for adopting decisions, while the African National Congress insisted on ordinary or two-thirds majorities. Mandela formally withdrew from the process following the Boipatong massacre in June 1992.
The Alternative Process: MPNF
Negotiations subsequently continued through the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF). With the assistance of constitutional experts and technocrats, the parties adopted the Interim Constitution in 1993, eventually paving the way for South Africa’s first fully inclusive democratic elections in 1994.
Historic Achievements
Setting 27 April 1994 as the date for the elections.
Establishing the Transitional Executive Council.
Producing a national Bill of Rights.
Establishing the Independent Electoral Commission.
Dismantling the enclaves and Bantustans and incorporating them into the rest of the country.
Conclusion and Lessons Learned: Where Is Sudan Heading?
The crises facing the African continent are multiplying, with some countries standing at critical crossroads. Their causes, historical contexts and potential outcomes vary.
There is no single magic formula for recovery. There are, however, lessons, insights and principles refined by the experience of past crises, including:
The deeper the roots of a crisis are addressed, the clearer the path to a solution becomes.
The stronger the commitment to national ownership, the better solutions are protected from disruptive interference and external meddling.
The more political actors avoid repeating the failed experiment of exclusion, the closer everyone comes to achieving the objective and sustainable recovery.
As Sudan prepares to launch the aircraft of its national dialogue, it needs to study closely the records and experiences of those who have gone before it.
…to be continued.

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