Lost Objectives
Rashid Abdelrahim
Rather than simply declaring that Sudan’s political parties and political forces have failed, it may be more accurate—and perhaps more charitable—to say that they have failed to achieve their stated objectives, whether in government or in opposition.
Every attempt to build a new national consensus or political understanding has been shattered under the weight of forces constantly positioning themselves to seize power—ostensibly through democratic means.
The Round Table Conference of 1965 was followed by another roundtable initiative in 2022, yet the outcome remained largely unchanged.
How often have we heard the phrase “constitutional conference”? Yet it has joined a long list of political slogans and promises that have faded into history alongside countless declarations by party leaders and political actors.
Calls for local, regional, and ethnic loyalties have unfortunately accompanied Sudan from the earliest years of its modern existence. They have chipped away at the foundations of national belonging and weakened the country’s cohesion.
History records that Sudan found itself encircled by armed movements and regional insurgencies: the organisation known as Soni in the Nuba Mountains, the Eastern Front on the Red Sea coast, and later the long war in Southern Sudan.
Many of these groups that rose against the state received support and assistance from various external actors and mercenaries, some of whom were eventually captured.
When Sudan’s major political parties themselves resorted to armed struggle, underwent military training, and took up weapons, they did so primarily to regain power they had lost or to secure power they sought—not to achieve development, progress, or the aspirations of the Sudanese people.
Today, Sudan faces a profound national dilemma.
The country’s situation remains unstable. The war has not yet fully ended. The economy is staggering under immense pressure. Exports have been disrupted, and productive activity across many sectors has slowed or ceased altogether.
Today, we are sounding the alarm.
Corruption has spread to such an extent that it has narrowed people’s means of livelihood. Security deteriorated during and after the war, perhaps inevitably so. Weapons circulated widely during the conflict, and some eventually found their way into the hands of criminals, while many accused individuals remain at large.
The Sudanese pound has collapsed. The decline has been accompanied by deterioration in key economic sectors, factory shutdowns, and weakening of agriculture.
Sudan no longer appears capable of mobilising its economic potential, stimulating production, or harnessing the vast range of goods and resources with which it has been endowed. In this regard, the description of Sudan as the “sick man of Africa” has become painfully familiar.
The nation has endured every conceivable hardship and test—from famine and hunger to poverty and food insecurity.
Pressures have come not only from neighbouring countries but also from more distant powers and international actors.
Yet despite everything, Sudan has survived. The armed forces have pushed back most of those who attacked the country, though not entirely.
We confronted the greatest dangers and survived them. Yet in lesser tests, we failed and fell behind.
Today, Sudan has reached a point where its assets are traded in neighbouring countries and beyond. The property of its citizens, its antiquities, and even copper taken from electricity networks appear in markets across West Africa.
This stands in stark contrast to a time when Sudan exported salt, soap, perfumes, sugar, teachers, and books to many of these same countries. In some places, people would sing in celebration when Sudanese aircraft landed. It was a reputation and legacy that many of those countries—some of which now contribute to instability and facilitate the flow of weapons and destruction into Sudan—never enjoyed themselves.
We no longer have opportunities to waste.
We no longer have time to squander.
The political forces and personalities currently presenting themselves as future leaders of the country do not appear capable of guiding Sudan out of its present turmoil.
We turned a blind eye while the rebellion expanded its military capabilities, recruited and infiltrated personnel, and openly moved armoured vehicles and equipment through the streets of the capital.
There may not be another opportunity.
For many Sudanese, the fear is no longer merely that the crisis will continue, but that the state itself could collapse if wise, patriotic, and courageous individuals do not act in time to rescue it.
Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=14919