From China’s Gateway to Its Periphery: Can Sudan Return to Its Strategic Partner?

Mohand Awad Mahmoud
Over the past few days, my attention was drawn to the news of a visit by the Director-General of the Sudanese Agricultural Bank, Mr Salah Mohamed Abdel Rahim, to China.
Some may view it as an ordinary banking-related event. In my view, however, it touches upon one of the most important strategic files that Sudan has neglected in recent years: its economic relationship with China.
The significance of this moment is further enhanced by Ambassador Omar Issa’s return to Beijing. He is among the Sudanese diplomats most knowledgeable about the Chinese file. Yet the success of any ambassador, regardless of his expertise, is not sufficient on its own to revive a strategic relationship of this magnitude unless it is backed by a state decision, a government vision, and a clearly defined economic strategy.
To understand the importance of this relationship, one must return to the early 1990s. At a time when many doors were closing on Sudan because of sanctions, political isolation, and international pressure, China opened its doors wide. Beijing did not come to Sudan merely to sell goods or seek a consumer market. Rather, it viewed Sudan as a strategic partner and an important gateway to Africa.
For its part, Sudan found in China a partner willing to invest and operate under circumstances that most Western companies would not even consider approaching.
The greatest transformation came with oil.
When the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) entered Sudan in the mid-1990s, it was not simply investing in an oil field; it was laying the foundations for a comprehensive economic partnership. Then, in 1999, Sudan exported its first shipment of crude oil, marking one of the most important phases in the country’s modern economic history.
Sudan became an oil-exporting nation. Billions of dollars flowed into the national treasury and the wider economy. Roads, bridges, and pipelines stretched across the country. For the first time, a national cadre of engineers, technicians, and specialists capable of managing an integrated petroleum industry was established.
China became Sudan’s largest economic partner, the biggest buyer of Sudanese oil, and one of the country’s largest investors.
According to official Chinese data, petroleum cooperation between the two countries generated tens of billions of dollars in government revenues and foreign exchange earnings for Sudan. It also helped establish a fully integrated oil industry encompassing exploration, production, refining, pipeline infrastructure, training, and technology transfer.
Yet the importance of the relationship extended far beyond oil.
During those years, the Sudanese Trade Centre in Beijing flourished, economic ties expanded, trade volumes increased, and a broad network of official and commercial relationships emerged. This network was built by a number of Sudanese diplomats who understood China well, foremost among them Ambassador Dr Ali Youssef Al-Sharif, Ambassador Omar Issa, and their colleagues at the Sudanese Embassy and Trade Centre.
For many years, Chinese officials repeatedly described Sudan as one of China’s earliest and most successful experiences in Africa, arguing that the success achieved there gave China the confidence to expand more broadly across the continent.
In other words, China entered Africa through many doors, but it entered the modern African oil sector through Sudan.
Then came the decline.
The secession of South Sudan transferred the majority of its oil reserves to the new state, prompting a gradual realignment of Chinese companies toward the new production areas.
But the greater damage came later.
Sudan entered a prolonged period of political instability, followed by the transitional government associated with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which approached foreign relations more as an arena for political struggle and the pursuit of international approval than as a tool for attracting investment and maximising Sudan’s economic interests.
While China was building factories, roads, railways, and industrial zones across Africa, Sudan’s transitional leaders were preoccupied with domestic political disputes, settling scores with opponents, and competing for the favour of Western envoys and ambassadors—as though international political recognition could substitute for investment, production, and genuine economic partnerships.
They referred to Dr Abdalla Hamdok as “the Founder”, yet even today it is difficult for any economic observer to identify precisely what was founded on the ground. No national production project emerged. No industrial strategy appeared. No agricultural renaissance took shape. Nor did any major economic partnership emerge that could be cited as the economic legacy of that period.
Meanwhile, existing partnerships inherited by the government—most notably the relationship with China—were allowed to gradually deteriorate without any meaningful alternative being built in their place.
The result was that Sudan emerged from that period economically weaker and more dependent on external assistance, without obtaining the alternatives that had been promised.
While political disputes consumed Sudan, China was redrawing its economic map in Africa.
In Ethiopia, it expanded into industrial parks, railways, energy projects, and infrastructure development. In Angola, China entered not merely as a contractor but as a financial architect through the “infrastructure-for-oil” model, which began with a credit line of approximately US$2 billion in 2004 before expanding into financing worth tens of billions of dollars, making China one of Angola’s most important financiers and development partners.
In Mozambique, China became heavily involved in giant gas projects whose investments exceed US$30 billion. In Nigeria, it expanded into railways, ports, and energy. In Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea, it became a major player in mining, energy, and infrastructure.
Meanwhile, Sudan—which had once been among China’s most important economic partners in Africa—continued to lose ground year after year.
The figures reveal the scale of this decline.
Trade between Sudan and China in 2024 amounted to only about US$1.39 billion, including approximately US$830 million in Chinese exports to Sudan and US$560 million in Sudanese exports to China.
When compared with the scale of Sudanese-Chinese relations during the oil years, these figures illustrate just how far Sudan’s position within China’s strategic calculations has deteriorated.
Yet China has not changed.
It has not left Africa. It has not reduced its investments. Nor has it retreated from its long-term strategy. Instead, it has continued expanding into ports, roads, energy, mining, and industry, investing tens of billions of dollars across African economies.
The problem, therefore, was never Beijing. The problem was Khartoum, which abandoned a strategic position built over decades without developing a clear vision for preserving or enhancing it.
Today, however, there are some encouraging signs.
The visit of the Agricultural Bank’s Director-General to China deserves recognition, and the return of Ambassador Omar Issa to Beijing represents an important opportunity to benefit from his extensive experience in this field.
But success requires much more than that.
An ambassador alone cannot rebuild a strategic relationship, and the Agricultural Bank alone cannot return Sudan to the centre of Chinese attention.
What is required is a comprehensive China strategy sitting on the desk of the “Government of Hope”, encompassing a clear vision for agriculture, mining, energy, ports, railways, agro-industrial development, and post-war reconstruction, supported by a portfolio of investment-ready projects suitable for financing, implementation, and partnership.
But the most important question remains:

What can Sudan offer China today?
The truth is that Sudan possesses no shortage of attractions for Beijing.
It has the Gezira Scheme, which remains one of the largest irrigated agricultural projects in the world. It possesses millions of acres suitable for agricultural production and food processing—sectors that align directly with China’s growing interest in food security.
Sudan also enjoys a strategic location on the Red Sea, making port development and logistics services natural areas for cooperation. In addition, there are substantial opportunities in railways, energy, and mining, particularly in gold, copper, and rare minerals that are increasingly the subject of global competition.
Likewise, rebuilding what has been destroyed by war represents a vast economic and investment opportunity.
China possesses some of the largest construction and infrastructure companies in the world and has extensive experience in reconstruction projects in post-conflict countries.
However, Sudan will not attract Chinese interest through slogans or wishful thinking. It must present well-designed, bankable, and implementable projects within an integrated economic vision embraced by all state institutions.
China does not enter countries because of rhetoric.
It does not invest in speeches.
It moves where there are clear plans and genuine opportunities.
Sudan was once one of China’s most important gateways to Africa.
But nations do not live on memories, nor do they build their future through nostalgia.
Therefore, the question that should occupy the Government of Hope today is not what China did for Sudan in the past, but what Sudan will do to regain its place in China’s strategic thinking.
The tragedy is not that China abandoned Sudan.
The tragedy is that Sudan abandoned its position within China’s African strategy while Beijing continued building roads, railways, ports, and mega-projects across the rest of the continent.
Countries that lose their place in the calculations of major economic powers do not regain it through words alone.
They regain it through vision, planning, and action.
This translation preserves the article’s analytical tone, economic terminology, and argumentative structure while rendering it in natural British English.

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