The Crisis of the State… It Is About Institutions

Dr Yasser Yousif Ibrahim
At the outset, it is important to commend the wide-ranging public debate sparked by Mr Obeid Marouh’s article, “Sudan’s Earthquake… Are We Approaching the Formation of the Largest Bloc?”, as well as the responses by Mr Adil Al-Baz. These contributions form part of an ongoing effort to address the painful question: why have we failed, and how can Sudan return to the path of state-building?
These writings have offered precise analyses, proposed thoughtful solutions, and highlighted the central issues underlying the Sudanese state’s failure. As a contribution to this important debate, I would argue that the core issue lies in our ability to diagnose the crisis correctly and to formulate appropriate remedies.
What we are witnessing today—war, economic collapse, and political conflict—is merely a symptom of a deeper condition. The essence of Sudan’s crisis lies in the absence of strong institutions and the persistent elevation of individuals at the expense of institutional rules.
A modern state is not built upon individuals, regardless of their capabilities or status, but upon institutions and laws that place principles above personalities and rules above leaders. When this balance is disrupted, the state becomes an arena for elite competition, and institutions recede in favour of personal influence and narrow loyalties.
A look at Sudan’s history reveals that this crisis is not new. Its roots extend back to the very formation of the state during the era of Muhammad Ali Pasha in the nineteenth century (1821–1885), when the state emerged primarily as a centralised apparatus of taxation and control rather than as a contractual framework between state and society.
Since then, the relationship between state and society has remained ambiguous—either domination by the centre or grievance driving the peripheries towards rebellion and armed resistance. After independence, Sudanese political elites failed to reconstruct this relationship on a contractual basis that would balance authority with societal participation. Even the efforts of the Graduates’ Congress, established in 1938 to build a modern political system, quickly succumbed to the culture of power competition in the absence of a unifying national project.
Contemporary challenges—such as the failure to manage diversity, the misallocation of resources, the inability to establish a stable political system, and the persistence of conflict—are all manifestations of a single underlying problem: the absence of institutions.
When strong institutions are lacking, the state becomes incapable of managing social and cultural diversity, and diversity itself shifts from being a source of richness to a source of conflict. Weak economic institutions lead to the squandering of natural resources, leaving the economy vulnerable to disorder, corruption, and mismanagement.
Similarly, in the absence of stable political institutions, the struggle for power becomes a zero-sum contest, often conducted through arms rather than dialogue. Each actor recognises that losing power means total exclusion from influence—an understanding that explains the current militarisation of politics and the marginalisation of political parties and civilian institutions.
Economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson demonstrated in their book Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty that state failure is not due to geography, culture, or resource scarcity, but to the nature of institutions.
Countries that build inclusive institutions—allowing broad participation and accountability—achieve stability and development. By contrast, those where power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of a narrow elite create extractive institutions that produce conflict and instability.
Since independence, political struggle in Sudan has centred on who governs, rather than how the state should be built. Short-lived civilian governments alternated with military regimes, yet none succeeded in establishing enduring institutional foundations. This deepened ideological polarisation and fostered a political culture resistant to dialogue with opponents—a reality noted by Mansour Khalid.
Even more troubling is that, despite repeated failure and ongoing war, some political forces continue to rely on external actors and pursue exclusionary strategies, believing they can secure power through coercion. This reflects either a profound lack of foresight or the pursuit of agendas that do not prioritise national stability.
In contrast, other African experiences demonstrate that success is possible when institutions are built effectively. Countries such as Botswana, despite limited resources since independence, have succeeded in establishing stable political and economic institutions grounded in the rule of law, accountability, and transparency.
With the later discovery of resources, Botswana managed its wealth rationally, achieving notable stability and growth. Similar, though varied, trajectories can be observed in Ghana, Rwanda, and Mauritius, where institution-building has been central to development.
The key lesson from these experiences is clear: accurate diagnosis leads to effective treatment. If Sudan’s true ailment is institutional weakness, then any attempt to resolve the crisis without addressing this fundamental flaw will yield only temporary solutions. As Mr Adil Al-Baz aptly stated: “We have failed repeatedly because we tried to solve Sudan’s problems before understanding Sudan itself.”
Sudan does not suffer from a shortage of conferences or political meetings. Numerous agreements have been signed, and issues such as identity, religion, governance, and the economy have been discussed repeatedly. Yet, as Sudan remains in the phase of nation-building and state formation, the role of politicians should be to safeguard and implement the proposals developed by specialists—through genuine and constructive cooperation—rather than to deviate from or undermine scientifically grounded frameworks.
The historic task facing Sudan today is not merely to end war or address economic collapse, but to rebuild the state on a solid institutional foundation. This means establishing political institutions that ensure the peaceful transfer of power, independent legal institutions that protect rights and freedoms, and transparent economic institutions capable of managing national resources efficiently and fairly.
Only through such institutions can Sudan’s diversity be transformed from a source of conflict into a source of strength, and its vast resources into engines of development rather than fuel for conflict.
The starting point must be an honest recognition of the opportunities that have been lost, and a commitment to scientific, evidence-based solutions grounded in accurate diagnosis. These solutions must define clear standards and mechanisms to ensure accountability for both rulers and citizens, while situating the current war within its proper context—as both a product of internal failure and a consequence of external ambitions that have exploited this weakness.
Ultimately, the integration of scientific expertise with genuine cooperation from political elites to implement expert-driven solutions represents the only viable path to restoring Sudan to a trajectory of a stable state capable of achieving development and peace.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12377