Who Has the Right to Declare the Death of Political Parties?

Mustafa Abdelaziz Al-Batal
I have little interest in what Mr Babikir Faisal recently wrote, calling for the dismissal of Islamists from Sudanese political life and their exclusion from the public sphere. In my view, he is merely expressing his aspirations and wishes, driven by a genuine desire to clear the political stage of forces that stand in the way of his and his colleagues’ return to the seats of power.
Nothing is surprising about this. Those who have once tasted the sweetness of authority and were then weaned from it prematurely often remain captive to nostalgia, seeing the removal of their political rivals as the shortest route back to government.
We have previously argued that the return of the transformed “FFC” group—now rebranded as “Sumoud”—to repeat the experiment of an exclusive partnership with the military and the monopolisation of executive power, similar to what occurred after the Security Committee seized power in 2019, is impossible. We explained the reasons elsewhere and noted that the political capital of the Sumoud group, as reflected in the support it receives from regional and international actors, is insufficient to translate these ambitions into political reality.
What particularly caught my attention, however, was an article written by my friend, Engineer Osman Mirghani. In it, he appeared not merely to agree with Babikir Faisal but to outbid him politically. He does not simply call upon the Islamic Movement to review its experience and apologise for its mistakes; he calls upon it to dissolve itself entirely and withdraw from political life altogether.
This morning, I asked Osman—within an electronic discussion group to which we both belong, a group some members call “The Thinkers’ Group” while our dear friend Dr Ashari Ahmed Mahmoud refers to it as “The Charlatans’ Group”—to elaborate on the intellectual basis for such a position so that I might better understand it.
He responded that the Islamic Movement, as an idea, had “lost the foundational principles upon which it was established”.
I then asked whether this meant that the movement’s principles, ideas, and programmes had been overtaken by history and were no longer relevant to contemporary Sudan.
His answer was yes.
I felt it worthwhile to move this discussion into the wider public arena of Mark Zuckerberg’s platform, in the hope of stimulating broader reflection and intellectual exchange. This discussion will bring us closer to what is correct and nearer to the truth.
I asked Osman to provide me with what he knows of the principles, objectives, and programmes of the Sudanese Communist Party, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the Republican Party, the Democratic Unionist Party—which its supporters often describe as the party of the national movement—and the various branches of the Umma Party.
Our discussion ultimately led to several conclusions:
The Communist Party, too, has been overtaken by time in terms of theory, ideology, and practical application, and no longer possesses a meaningful capacity for renewal.
The Ba’ath Party’s ideological project has faded and lost much of its political relevance.
The Republican Party effectively ceased to exist following the death of its founder and principal thinker.
If that is the case, does it then follow that the remaining parties occupying centre stage in Sudanese politics alone possess the necessary qualifications for survival and continued political existence?
Consider the Democratic Unionist Party.
What exactly is its ideology today?
What are its objectives?
What is its political programme?
What we know is that, after returning to political life following 16 years of absence following the May 1969 coup, the party contested the 1986 elections on a platform titled “The Islamic Republic”. This may come as a surprise to many younger Sudanese.
But the relevant question is this:
Does the Democratic Unionist Party still advocate the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Sudan?
The reality is that the party has not presented a new political programme since the 1986 elections—nearly four decades ago. Throughout this period, no clear ideological framework, theory, or political programme has emerged from the party. What the public primarily sees instead is a continuing struggle among the sons of the party’s spiritual leadership over control of the organisation. At times, the star of Sayyid Al-Hassan rises; at other times, it fades, and the star of Sayyid Jaafar ascends. Supporters gather around one figure or the other, while discussion of principles, ideas, and programmes remains conspicuously absent.
The same can largely be said of the various branches of the Umma Party. In practical terms, the party became embodied in the person of the late Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi: the ideas resided in his mind, the resources in his pocket, and the decisions in his hands.
The party fought the 1986 elections under a programme called The Islamic Awakening. Like the Democratic Unionist Party’s programme, this slogan remained effectively frozen for forty years without substantial revision or development.
When the Imam passed away, public discussion of principles, ideas, policies, and programmes seemed to disappear with him. Today, few people can identify a coherent ideological or political project associated with the party. Instead, conversations revolve around family dynamics, inheritance, competing branches of the Mahdi family, and the political role of sons, daughters, and sons-in-law.
One cannot help but say: Subhan Allah.
If all these parties suffer—according to the criteria proposed by these friends—from ageing ideas, weakened projects, absent programmes, and an inability to renew themselves, why is the call for dissolution directed exclusively at the Islamic Movement?
Why should the same logic not be applied consistently to all political parties that no longer possess a coherent intellectual vision, programme, or policy agenda to offer their people?
The real crisis in Sudan is not the existence of a particular party, movement, or ideological current.
Rather, it is the broader failure of Sudan’s political forces to engage in meaningful review, renewal, and adaptation.
If the criterion for remaining relevant in public life is the ability to generate ideas, develop programmes, and respond effectively to changing realities, then that standard must be applied equally to everyone without exception.
But if the criterion is invoked selectively against political opponents while allies are exempted from scrutiny, then what we are witnessing is not an objective judgement upon ideas and movements.
It is simply the triumph of political selectivity and the perpetuation of double standards.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=14961