Sudan Between Beijing and Washington: As Others Reshape the Region, Sudan Remains Mired in War

Hisham Yousif Abdelrahman
The impetus for writing these lines was not a new Sudanese development so much as two events in Sudan’s immediate neighbourhood within a matter of weeks. Yet, in their regional context, they seem far more significant than two isolated diplomatic stories.
On 1 and 2 September 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Cairo on his first visit to Egypt in ten years, coinciding with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Around the same time, Washington and Addis Ababa agreed in late August to elevate their military and security relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, following consultations at the Pentagon on 19 and 20 August, with the agreement formally announced on 21 August.
According to the announcements concerning the US-Ethiopian partnership, it is intended to expand institutional, military and diplomatic cooperation and establish long-term defence cooperation, while linking this to the security and stability of the Horn of Africa and neighbouring areas.
At first glance, the two developments may appear to concern Egyptian-Chinese relations and US-Ethiopian relations respectively. Yet Sudan’s geographical position makes it extremely difficult to separate them from its future.
Sudan lies between Egypt and Ethiopia, has a coastline on the Red Sea, occupies a unique position in the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa, and extends naturally into the Arab world and eastern and central Africa. At a time when countries in the region are reshaping their partnerships and expanding their economic, security and political options, Sudan finds itself mired in a war that has drained the state, society and economy and weakened its ability to assess and influence its surroundings.
The importance of these developments therefore does not lie in the conventional questions—what does Xi’s visit to Egypt mean, and what does the US-Ethiopian partnership mean? Rather, it lies in a more pressing question: What does it mean when the powers around Sudan are moving and reshaping their relationships and interests while Sudan itself remains preoccupied with emerging from its war?
International politics does not stop until countries have resolved their internal crises. States repositioning themselves today will not wait for Sudan to recover before determining their interests in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, trade, or energy. These developments should therefore not be viewed as a series of isolated events, but as part of a broader transformation in the strategic environment Sudan will find itself in.
It would nevertheless be easy to conclude that the region is moving towards a Chinese-Egyptian axis confronting an American-Ethiopian axis, with Sudan caught in the middle of this polarisation. But such an interpretation is simpler than reality.
Egypt, while deepening its partnership with China, is not severing its strategic relations with the United States. Ethiopia, while upgrading its security relationship with Washington, maintains extensive relations with China, the Gulf states, Europe and others. Moreover, despite their rivalry, China and the United States do not always operate as two closed blocs.
It is more accurate to view the situation as a redistribution of partnerships and sources of power and influence around Sudan.
The question Sudan should be asking is not which axis it should join, but how it can regain its ability to understand its interests and negotiate over them, and how it can turn its geographical position, resources and relationships into sources of strength rather than cards over which others compete for leverage.
Against this backdrop, the Saudi-Sudanese move assumes particular importance.
On 17 August 2026, Sudan and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in Riyadh establishing the Supreme Council for Cooperation and Strategic Coordination between the two countries. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohy-Eldin Salem and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, signed the agreement. The move expands bilateral relations into a broader institutional framework for cooperation and coordination in political, economic, investment, trade, and other fields.
The significance of this step lies not only in the agreement itself, but also in the opportunity it offers Sudan to build a more structured network of regional partnerships.
Relations with Saudi Arabia, shaped by geography, the Red Sea, and historical and economic ties, can be one pillar of such a network, alongside Sudan’s relations with Egypt, China, the United States, Ethiopia, and others. From this perspective, Sudan becomes an active participant in rebuilding its relationships rather than merely a recipient of transformations taking place around it.
From this perspective, Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo appears to have been more than a routine state visit.
Information accompanying the visit points to an ambition to expand Egyptian-Chinese relations beyond traditional trade and investment into technology, manufacturing, energy and supply chains, thereby strengthening Egypt’s position as a hub connecting Chinese production and investment with Arab and African markets. Given the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as its African position, Egypt possesses characteristics that make it an important partner in this vision.
This is where Sudan appears in a different light.
Sudan does not merely lie south of Egypt; it extends along the opposite shore of the Red Sea and could, by virtue of its geographical position, connect this maritime corridor to a vast African hinterland.
If Egypt is strengthening its position in manufacturing, logistics, and connecting markets, Sudan has resources, land, and an African hinterland that could make it part of a broader economic system. At present, however, it lacks the stable state capable of transforming these assets into a coherent project.
On the other side came the US-Ethiopian move.
No evidence currently suggests it targets Sudan or Egypt. At the same time, it is difficult to regard it as unrelated to Sudan’s interests.
Ethiopia is a pivotal state in the Horn of Africa and an upstream Nile country. It has ambitions related to trade, energy, and sea access. At the same time, Washington views the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea as important regions for maritime security, international trade, and competition for influence.
The significance of these developments for Sudan is not that others are “planning for Sudan”, but that others are acting in their own interests while Sudan is, to a considerable extent, absent from shaping the environment around it.
This is the paradox: Sudan possesses important geographical, economic and historical assets, yet it has lost much of its ability to convert them into influence, partnerships and bargaining power.
To understand what restoring that capacity might mean, it is enough to look back at Sudan’s experience with China in the mid-1990s.
At the time, China itself was at the beginning of an enormous economic transformation and was not yet the economic power we know today. It was seeking new energy sources and encouraging its state-owned companies to venture abroad as part of its “going out” policy.
Sudan, meanwhile, faced severe international isolation, a civil war, and a serious economic crisis after Western companies withdrew from the oil sector.
Yet, with political insight and an understanding of what China might become, Sudan did not simply wait for its traditional partners or for what might have seemed the most rational option at the time. Instead, it reached out to Beijing, recognising that a rising China might be a partner capable of assuming risks and providing finance and technology.
China, for its part, saw in Sudan an opportunity to secure its growing energy needs, gain valuable experience in overseas oil investment and turn its outward-looking policy into practical experience.
Contacts began in 1994. Then, on 26 September 1995, during the Sudanese president’s visit to Beijing, the two sides signed a production-sharing agreement with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), granting it exploration and development rights in Block 6 in the Baleela area of the Muglad Basin.
Chinese participation expanded the following year, and in 1997 the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) was established with the participation of CNPC, Malaysia’s Petronas, Sudan’s Sudapet and the Canadian partner.
However, this experience mattered for more than discovering and extracting oil.
The project required building an integrated system encompassing production facilities, a pipeline more than 1,500 kilometres long, the Khartoum refinery, and the infrastructure needed to transport oil to the Red Sea and export it. In 1999, the first commercial shipment of Sudanese oil reached international markets, turning a project that had initially seemed extremely risky into an integrated production, transport, refining, and export system.
This is where the story of oil becomes larger than oil itself.
It would not be historically accurate to say that Sudan “introduced China to Africa”, since China already had extensive relations with African countries. Sudan was, however, one of the important early African arenas in which relations with China moved from political and commercial cooperation to a comprehensive strategic investment partnership. Sudanese oil was one of the most prominent fields in this transformation.
China benefited from Sudan by securing part of its energy needs and gaining experience in overseas oil investment, while Sudan benefited from finance, technology and the capacity to implement an integrated project under extremely difficult conditions.
The lesson that matters for Sudan today is not to recreate the oil experience as it once was, but to recover the spirit of initiative that made it possible.
Sudan’s need for finance and technology intersected with China’s need for energy and investment opportunities. Sudanese initiative met China’s search for opportunities abroad, and their mutual interests became an integrated project.
For Sudan today, the problem is not a lack of resources or potential partners. It is the absence of a vision capable of bringing its resources, geographical position and relationships together within a single project.
Moreover, this experience demonstrates clearly that successful international relations do not always begin with the stronger party. Sometimes they begin with a state that recognises an opportunity and dares to take the initiative.
In the 1990s, Sudan went to China. Today, it needs to regain the ability to go out into the world with a clear plan, so that its resources and geographical position can be transformed into production and added value rather than merely raw materials or arenas of competition.
Sudan possesses the Red Sea, agricultural land, livestock, gold and other minerals, energy resources, and a geographical position linking the Arab world to the African hinterland.
But these resources do not deliver their full value if each remains isolated from the others.
Agriculture requires water, energy and transport. Mineral resources require processing and manufacturing. Ports require production and markets. And the Red Sea requires logistical infrastructure connecting it to Sudan’s interior and to regional markets.
This is where a vision could emerge that goes beyond individual partnerships towards Sudanese-Egyptian-Saudi integration.
Such a vision gains additional momentum in light of the growing Saudi-Egyptian engagement, particularly Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Cairo on 15 September 2026 and his meeting with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, at a time when coordination between the two countries over Red Sea security, maritime navigation, the Suez Canal and regional issues is becoming increasingly important.
If Cairo and Riyadh are moving towards building a more integrated partnership, Sudan should not view this development from the outside. Rather, it should see it as an opportunity to redefine its position within this sphere.
The three countries are connected not only by the Red Sea, geographical proximity and intertwined interests; their respective strengths are also strikingly complementary.
Sudan has agricultural land, water resources, livestock, minerals and an African hinterland. Egypt possesses an industrial base, infrastructure and the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia has capital, energy, investment capabilities, ports and markets.
If these elements were connected within a common vision, they could move beyond mere neighbouring relations and fragmented partnerships towards a strategic economic system in which the Red Sea becomes, rather than a boundary separating opposite shores, an interconnected economic space.
Production, trade, energy, food, and transport chains could extend between Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, while also opening a wider gateway to Africa and the world.
This could begin with food security and agriculture, connecting Sudanese production areas to ports, developing food-processing and manufacturing industries, integrating energy, transport and logistics services, and linking Sudanese, Egyptian and Saudi ports to broader trade and investment networks.
The Red Sea could then be transformed from a space separating its two shores into an economic basin connecting them, making its stability and development a shared interest rather than merely an arena for international competition.
Such a vision does not mean closing the door to China, the United States or anyone else. Quite the opposite.
Sudan’s integration with its Arab surroundings could provide a broader foundation for opening up to the world. China could partner in manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, and technology. The United States and the West could play roles in the economy, education, healthcare, technology, investment and institution-building. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and other countries in the region could form essential circles of trade, energy, security, and stability.
The key is to develop these relationships according to a clear Sudanese vision.
This is particularly evident in the Red Sea.
Sudan’s coastline is not merely an area that can attract military interest. It is part of a global economic system linked to the Suez Canal, trade between Asia and Europe, and African markets.
The objective, therefore, should not be to turn it into a theatre of military bases and rivalry, but to make it a centre for modern ports, maritime services, industrial zones, energy, trade, and logistics, linking the Red Sea to Sudan’s interior and to the markets of eastern and central Africa.
The Nile is no different.
Sudan is not merely a country situated between Egypt and Ethiopia, nor a secondary party to their water dispute. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam places Sudan before real, direct and clearly defined catastrophic risks by virtue of its geographical position, particularly concerning dam safety, the regularity of water flows, and the effects of any emergency operation or release on Sudanese territory, infrastructure and population, as occurred in 2025–2026.
Sudan therefore has an independent and direct interest in everything relating to the dam, and its position cannot be reduced to an extension of either the Egyptian or Ethiopian position.
If Sudan regains stability and the capacity to act, it can address the Nile issue as a state with an independent stake and make water, energy, agriculture and food security areas for regional cooperation, while safeguarding Sudanese interests.
In this way, Sudan’s stability can become part of the equation for the Nile’s stability.
But all of this depends on the issue that cannot be bypassed: the war.
The Sudanese war is not simply the result of competition among external powers, nor should it be reduced to a proxy war. Its roots are internal and deep, and the Sudanese responsibilities and conflicts at its heart cannot be erased by blaming external actors.
But its continuation has created an environment open to foreign intervention and conflicting regional and international interests. The weaker state institutions become, the more space others have within the Sudanese landscape.
More dangerously, war does not merely destroy the economy; it destroys the capacity to negotiate.
An exhausted state cannot negotiate over ports from a position of strength, set fair terms for exploiting its resources, build an independent foreign policy, or leverage its position in the Red Sea and Nile Basin.
Ending the war is therefore not merely a humanitarian and political issue. It is also a national security and foreign policy project for Sudan.
After the war, Sudan’s option should not be to align itself with one side against another, but to treat the multiplicity of powers as an opportunity.
China is not a substitute for America, America is not a substitute for China, Egypt is not a substitute for Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia is not a substitute for Egypt, and Ethiopia is not a substitute for any of them.
Each has its own interests, and Sudan has its own interests.
The right question is not “Whom do we choose?” but “What do we want from each party?”
Investment, industrial and technological partnerships with China; economic, institutional and technological relations with the United States and the West; economic and trade integration with Egypt and Saudi Arabia; stable cooperation with Ethiopia; and engagement with the Gulf, Europe, Asia and Africa, guided by a clear Sudanese vision.
The objective is not simply to accumulate relationships, but to transform them into mutual interests that make Sudan’s stability and strength beneficial to others as well.
Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt, the development of the US-Ethiopian partnership, and the establishment of the Supreme Council for Cooperation and Strategic Coordination between Sudan and Saudi Arabia are not, by themselves, enough to conclude that a single plan exists to redraw the region for or against Sudan.
But they reveal something more important: the environment around Sudan is shifting, and states are rebuilding partnerships and positioning themselves for the future.
Sudan therefore does not need to search for a new source of importance. Its position on the Red Sea, its place in the Nile Basin, its resources, and its Arab and African connections already give it genuine assets.
What it needs is a state that knows how to use those assets, build economic integration with its surroundings, engage with international powers from a position of interest, transform the Red Sea into a space for development, convert resources into added value, and turn the Nile into an arena for cooperation while protecting Sudanese interests.
Above all, it needs to recognise that ending the war and rebuilding the state are not stages that precede foreign policy; they are its first condition.
Other states will not stop pursuing their interests, nor will they wait for Sudan to recover.
If Sudan restores its state institutions, initiative and capacity to negotiate, it will not be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington, or between Cairo, Riyadh and Addis Ababa. Instead, it can make its geographical position, resources and relationships the foundation of a genuine national renaissance project.
Then the question will no longer be: Who holds influence in Sudan?
It will be: Who wants to partner with Sudan?

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