A Systemic Reading of the War in the Gulf and Its Impact on Sudan

Dr. Ismail Sati
Major wars are not isolated events that can be explained solely within their geographical or military boundaries. Rather, from a systems perspective, they are disturbances that affect the ‘regional system’ and trigger a series of feedback loops through which the political behaviour of states is reproduced. Influence is redistributed between centre and periphery. From this perspective, the confrontation between the United States and the Zionist entity on one side and Iran on the other cannot be understood as a bilateral event, but as a point of disequilibrium in the centre of the Middle Eastern geopolitical system, the repercussions of which extend to further circles, from the Gulf to Sudan.
Within this framework, the question becomes not ‘what is happening?’ but rather ‘how does the entire system move in response to this disturbance?’ and ‘how does this response transmit through repeated cycles of mutual influence, much like the ripples of a stone thrown into water, some reinforcing each other and some limiting each other?’
The Gulf as a Subsystem: From Internal Competition to Cohesion Under Pressure
Before the escalation of the confrontation with Iran, the Gulf system operated according to a feedback loop that reinforced competitive differentiation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This reinforcing loop was fuelled by divergent visions on regional files such as Yemen, as well as by differing modes of influence in Sudan, producing competition, multiple spheres of influence, and multiple channels of support, and allowing diverse decision-making centres.
However, with the escalation of the Iranian threat, the system enters a balancing feedback loop, in which a rise in external threat reduces internal variance in favour of reproducing cohesion. This is not merely a circumstantial policy but a known systemic mechanism: the higher the perceived external threat level among the region’s states, the greater the need to enhance internal cohesion among its components, which gradually reduces the intensity of internal competition. Consequently, resources and policies are redirected from arenas of internal divergence towards confronting and managing the external threat.
At this moment, the Gulf transforms from a competitive subsystem into a relatively cohesive subsystem under pressure, according to the logic of ‘me and my cousin against the outsider’, but in a systemic, not emotional, formulation.
Sudan as a Peripheral System: The Transmission of Impact Through Delayed Feedback Loops
Sudan does not react directly to the centre of the crisis, but rather through delayed feedback loops that first pass through the Gulf. In the phase of Gulf competition, the loops operated as follows:
During the phase of competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the channels of support directed to Sudan took more differentiated forms. Saudi support tended more towards Sudanese state institutions, in contrast to the UAE’s other forms of support linked to the Rapid Support Forces. This divergence contributed to reshaping the balance of power within the Sudanese arena, which was directly reflected in the dynamics of the ongoing conflict and its changing equilibria.
However, as the Gulf enters a state of cohesion under pressure, the loop flips to a different pattern. With the escalation of the external regional threat, the Gulf states tended to enhance cohesion amongst themselves, reflected in increased coordination of decision-making and reduced space for divergence in their policies. This shift gradually led to a reduction in the multiplicity of external influence channels in Sudan, resulting in a notable decrease in the margin for political manoeuvre available to internal actors.
In other words, what happens at the centre of the system not only affects the peripheries but also reshapes the nature of relationships within those peripheries themselves.
The Structural Shift like Sudan’s Role: From an ‘Arena of Competition’ to a ‘Strategic Location’
In systems thinking, there is a difference between a country being an ‘arena of competition’ and its transformation into a ‘node location’ within a wider network. In the first case, Sudan benefits from the multiplicity of external actors. In the second case, it is redefined in terms of its geographical and security functions, especially given the escalating importance of the Red Sea as a strategic corridor.
Here, the feedback loop changes again. With the growing importance of the Red Sea in regional and international geopolitical calculations, interest in Sudan’s geographic location as a strategic pivot has risen. This may gradually be reflected in a decline in interest in aspects of its internal political structure. Consequently, Sudan has begun to be increasingly redefined as a functional area of geopolitical value in the eyes of regional powers, rather than as an integrated state project based on internal political and developmental considerations.
Post-War: Recalibrating the Loops, Not Returning to Square One
In complex systems, feedback loops do not return to their previous state after major shocks; rather, they are recalibrated. Therefore, the end of the confrontation with Iran, regardless of its form, will not mean the system returns to its initial state, but rather its transition to a new equilibrium.
If the conflict weakens Iran, it is expected that the Gulf states’ confidence in their regional environment will increase, prompting them to return to more active roles. This may open the door to renewed interest in Sudan as a sphere of influence and investment.
If the balance of power with Iran persists without resolution, the logic of caution will continue to dominate the behaviour of the Gulf states, leading to the continued limited nature of their engagement in Sudan and to the Sudanese conflict remaining unresolved.
If the scope and depth of the confrontation expand, the Red Sea is likely to become an arena of direct competition between regional and international powers. This will increase Sudan’s strategic importance, but it will also further complicate its internal scene and deepen the intertwining of its conflicts.
Consequently,
What this systemic reading reveals is that major wars produce their outcomes not only through military force but also through reshaping the structure of relationships within the regional system. From the perspective of systems thinking, Sudan is not outside this war but is part of its indirect chains of influence, where shocks are transmitted from the centre to the peripheries through a series of feedback loops that reshape political behaviour and determine the margin for movement within states.
Thus, understanding Sudan today is less about what is happening within it alone and more about how the regional system as a whole functions and how major shocks recalibrate its internal and external equilibria simultaneously.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12898