The Silent Earthquake in Juba… How Is Salva Kiir Re-engineering Power and Opening a Strategic Window for Sudan?

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud

In recent weeks, Juba has witnessed one of the deepest restructuring processes since South Sudan’s secession, as President Salva Kiir Mayardit has moved to dismantle entrenched economic–security networks within the state and redistribute power across the army, intelligence services, and the financial sector. These steps were not mere administrative reshuffles; they amounted to a deliberate “engineering of power” ahead of a sensitive political phase relating to succession, the unity of the SPLM, and the risk of parallel power centres emerging within the state.

The first link in this chain of change was the dismantling of the influence of Benjamin Bol Mel Kuol, a figure who fused money, politics and security in a way that made him one of the most powerful men in the country, despite not holding a high constitutional office. It is essential to emphasise that Benjamin was not the Vice-President, as some assume, but he wielded de facto influence exceeding that of many formal officeholders. Through his company, ABMC, he secured infrastructure contracts worth more than $ 1.7 billion for projects that were never completed, according to international reports. He built a complex web of interests that extended into the security apparatus and was linked to informal economic activities, whose effects reached the Sudanese border.

As signs grew that he was becoming a parallel decision-making centre—and a possible undeclared contender in the post-Kiir landscape—the decision to demote him to the rank of private and expel him from the National Security Service came as a kind of internal “surgical strike,” restoring the financial–security power centre to the presidency.

In parallel, Kiir sought to rebuild the General Intelligence Service, the body responsible for monitoring the state’s security, political, and economic environment, as well as informal financial activities and internal balances within the army. Over the past years, the service had been penetrated by overlapping loyalties and vested interests from businessmen and tribal actors. This led to the dismissal of its director, Simon Yien Makuac, along with Khalid Patras Bora, and the appointment of Major General Thoi Chan Reat to restore the agency to its proper role as a security instrument under a unified decision-making centre, free from external branching.

The army also received its share of restructuring. The dismissal of the Chief of General Staff, Paul Ngang Majok, and the appointment of Lt. Gen. Dau Aturjong were intended to restore discipline to the chain of command and prevent the formation of officer blocs bound together by overlapping interests that could undermine the stability of the military institution. Aturjong is seen as belonging to the traditional military school; he has long experience in border regions and is viewed as capable of re-imposing control over units and distancing them from the influence of money and informal networks.

Within the SPLM itself, the rebalancing process included the confirmation of Tut Gatluak as National Security Adviser—not as “Khartoum’s man” in Juba, but as an internal balancing point between Dinka and Nuer. He commands a wide network of influence inside both the army and the movement, and has long experience managing sensitive transitional moments. At the same time, his presence at the top security post inevitably affects Sudan-related files, given his deep familiarity with the complexities of the border and the relationship between the two countries.

Changes also extended into the financial sector, with the dismissal of Finance Minister Athian Ding Athian and the appointment of Barnaba Bak Chol. This move aimed to close one of the most important unmonitored sources of funding, which for years had been used in parallel economic activities—some of them linked to Sudan through the smuggling of goods, gold, and gum arabic that ultimately reached Kenya’s port of Mombasa via illegal routes.

Although these changes stem from internal motives related to regime security and state cohesion, their effects will naturally spill over into Sudan. A dense web of shared interests binds Khartoum and Juba: the longest open border in the region, cross-border trade both formal and informal, intertwined contact communities, and—most importantly—a single oil artery that ties the fate of both countries together.

Sudan earns around 16 US dollars for every barrel of South Sudanese oil that passes through its territory—direct revenue that the Sudanese economy desperately needs—while South Sudan is almost entirely dependent on this route, lacking any alternative outlet. Any disruption to stability in Juba or expansion of uncontrolled armed influence would pose a direct threat to this lifeline. For that reason, Kiir’s tightening of control over state institutions and his reduction of informal group influence enhance the stability of oil flows and restore the energy file to its place as the foremost shared interest between Khartoum and Juba.

And because major shifts create opportunities if seized, and threats if ignored, Sudan now stands before a rare strategic window. A more centralised and disciplined leadership in the South opens the way for clear bilateral arrangements, including:

Reactivating joint ministerial committees between the two countries, restoring their role as platforms for coordinated policy-making in trade, security, and energy.

Building institutional cooperation between security and intelligence services, enabling regular information exchange and closing illegal border routes.

Developing a joint plan to control the border and shut down smuggling routes that drain both economies and open the door to organised crime.

Blocking the cross-border movement of fighters and mercenaries who use South Sudanese territory to enter Sudan and fight alongside the terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia.

Establishing a joint mechanism to protect the oil pipeline, ensuring continuity of flow and shielding it from internal disruptions in either country.

Regulating cross-border trade in ways that protect border communities from the volatility of the shadow economy and provide greater economic stability for border states.

These measures are no longer optional or postponable; they have become essential for survival and national stability. The transformations underway inside South Sudan can either turn into a golden opportunity or develop into a heavy burden. Prompt, coordinated institutional action today could spare Sudan—at least in the short term—a steep security and economic bill that might otherwise have been avoided with sound judgment and timely moves.

The scene in Juba is being reshaped right now—quietly, but profoundly. The question is not what the South is doing, but rather: is Sudan ready to seize the moment before it passes it by?

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