Salaries and Development

Rashid Abdel Rahim
The greatest damage ever inflicted on the Sudanese economy came first from the colonial administration and later from the May Regime.
When the British left Sudan, they left behind a strong and well-established civil service. However, the largest productive enterprise they left was the Gezira Scheme. Nothing else existed on a comparable scale because the Scheme provided a direct economic benefit.
The strength of the civil service created jobs with substantial salaries and generous benefits, while private-sector incomes in agriculture and commerce could not compete.
We were told that senior inspectors of the Gezira Scheme earned around £700 a month.
I had an uncle who was a member of the committee responsible for distributing plots of land in Nasr Extension. The committee was established during the May era and was composed largely of communists. It had dissolved the previous committee because it was a “reactionary” body.
The total cost of a plot in Nasr Extension was around sixty pounds. One can imagine how many plots the Scheme’s governor could have bought with his salary. The governor and senior Scheme officials—and indeed senior government officials—also received numerous other benefits, including large houses, cars, and allowances sufficient to cover domestic servants and other necessities, as well as comfortable holiday travel by aeroplane or train using special “permits”.
When the plots in Nasr were distributed, many remained unallocated. The “reactionary” committee decided to grant an additional plot to eligible applicants with children.
The “revolutionary” committee considered this decision to be a violation of the rights of the “popular forces and the working class”. It therefore opened applications to anyone who wished to apply. Workers in the areas around Burri—including those at the Burri Power Station, the University of Khartoum, the Ordnance Corps, and the Ministry of Education, as well as staff of the old Khartoum schools and the School of Commerce—were subsequently allocated plots.
This was when land speculation became widespread. Anyone who had obtained a plot for sixty pounds could sell it for more than one hundred, then buy land in Al-Daroshab and other areas where considerably larger residential plots were available, while using the remaining money to establish a small business, such as a shop or a taxi. In the process, the people of Al-Barari became dispersed.
Many respected readers will remember the degree of luxury students at the University of Khartoum enjoyed, including the quality of food and the other services provided to them.
Government employees also became remarkably adept at manipulating state allowances. A newly appointed employee would receive what was known as a “transport allowance”. If his circumstances improved and he bought a car, he would then receive a “fuel allowance”. Under the rules and conventions of the time, anyone entitled to a transport allowance was not supposed to receive the fuel allowance as well. Yet once an employee was promoted and became eligible for the fuel allowance, he could receive both simultaneously. This was not permitted for the lower-ranking employee, who continued to struggle with public transport.
An economy characterised by such expenditure, while relying on a single major productive enterprise, could not survive indefinitely, regardless of how strong that enterprise might be.
Then came the greatest blow to our economy: the nationalisation and confiscation measures through which the May Government, following its communist approach, seized some of the finest productive and service enterprises, whether owned by the British or by other Europeans. Major enterprises disappeared, such as the Hilla Koko Dairy, along with many other products and businesses. Leading names in production and commerce also vanished, including Contomichalos, which operated in maritime navigation, shipping and commercial agencies; Glatley Hankey, one of the oldest and largest British companies in Sudan, with more than 16 branches; and the Bitar family, whose roots were French and whose businesses included the manufacture of edible oils and soap, as well as general trading.
Some of these enterprises were merged with others and given revolutionary names such as “Acto-May”, referring to October and May.
Managers were then appointed to run these enterprises from among revolutionaries, loyalists and relatives—people with little or no experience in the businesses they were expected to manage. The outcome was inevitable.
Major enterprises disappeared, and the Gezira Scheme was no longer the powerful institution it had once been. Our economy was no longer strong enough to sustain either failure or such levels of extravagance.
What is needed now is radical reform. The government must withdraw from the marketplace and concentrate on the responsibilities that properly belong to it: matters of sovereignty, governance, regulation of economic life, and the organisation of commerce and markets.
Once the economy is placed on the right path, the salary of the Governor of the Central Bank will no longer be the problem.
And when we reach that stage, what concerns us—and what concerns the press—will no longer be the salary of a senior official. Our focus will instead be on development, its pathways, and its sustainability.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=17627