Kordofan and Darfur: Has Military Victory Become Hostage to External Settlements?

Dr Al-Haitham Al-Kindi Yousif
I agree with many observers that external factors have had a greater influence on the war in Sudan than internal ones. Regional and international interventions have been deeply embedded in the conflict, from its very outbreak to the political and military support that has sustained it. Within this complex web of interests, it appears increasingly evident that external powers do not wish to see the Sudanese Armed Forces achieve a decisive military victory.
It had been widely anticipated that military advances would continue towards the Darfur region through the Al-Sayyad Force, which recorded significant victories from the borders of White Nile State and succeeded in bringing extensive areas of the Kordofan plains under government control. However, a range of factors have impeded this advance, foremost among them external interventions that have erected obstacles and restrained the army’s momentum towards a decisive conclusion.
The proposition that external actors are directing the course of the war enjoys broad support among many analysts and observers of developments on the ground. It is therefore worth examining and analysing this hypothesis, particularly as it appears both logical and widely accepted within Sudan’s political landscape, especially when the military slowdown is viewed alongside the recent political and diplomatic initiatives sponsored by the Quintet in Berlin and Addis Ababa.
It is widely believed that the principal objective behind obstructing and delaying the Sudanese Armed Forces’ recapture of the remaining territories under militia control is to allow international powers to complete the engineering of Sudan’s post-war political order. Through an imposed de-escalation, they seek to determine the principal figures who will participate in the forthcoming transitional period, define the nature of that transition, and decide the future roles, legal status and political standing of the military leaders who have led the war once hostilities cease.
Added to this is the attempt to settle the question of the Islamists: whether they will be permitted to participate in political life or be excluded altogether, both during the transitional period and in any subsequent elections. External actors also appear intent on using this delay to reorganise the influence of regional powers supporting the various sides in the conflict, particularly given that these regional players maintain strong strategic, economic and political relationships with major international powers.
The mechanisms through which this external obstruction is pursued appear evident across several tracks:
Weakening Domestic Resolve
By offering reassuring diplomatic proposals and political promises designed to influence internal decision-making.
Controlling Military Supply
By delaying arms agreements benefiting the Sudanese Armed Forces while, at the same time, strengthening the militia through the provision of sophisticated weaponry, including air defence systems and advanced unmanned aerial vehicles. Such capabilities increase both the military and human costs of any offensive undertaken by government forces.
Political Pressure
By raising the prospect of applying a Libyan-style model to Sudan through the implicit international recognition of a militia-led administration, potentially leading to a de facto administrative separation and the emergence of a quasi-state in Darfur and parts of Kordofan.
For all these reasons, the Sudanese Armed Forces, together with the Joint Forces and their allied formations, appear to have entered a state of operational stagnation on the Kordofan and Darfur fronts. Rather than launching the anticipated campaign to liberate the remainder of Kordofan and the whole of Darfur, these forces now appear primarily focused on defending the city of El Obeid.
Yet these international calculations confront the awareness and aspirations of the Sudanese people, who have paid an enormous price in the blood of their sons and daughters and the destruction of their property. For that reason, they are unlikely under any circumstances to accept the return of the rebel militia or its political affiliates to positions of power after such immense sacrifices.
Likewise, there is likely to be widespread opposition to external attempts to shape Sudan’s internal political order or to exclude a political movement whose members played a significant role alongside the armed forces in defending the country and liberating territories previously controlled by the militia in central Sudan.
It is also reasonable to expect that Islamist organisations, in their various forms, will resist any attempt to impose political exclusion upon them, particularly during the anticipated electoral process. This development could further complicate an already fragile political landscape.
The country’s military and political leadership would do well to learn from the lessons of both recent and distant history. Genuine victory can only be secured through national will and internal determination. At present, the leadership enjoys overwhelming popular support to continue what many regard as the Battle of Dignity and to pursue the liberation of every part of the nation’s territory.
That support should be harnessed by mobilising an effective and genuine popular resistance capable of contributing to the completion of the liberation campaign. At the same time, the leadership should place no unquestioning trust in promises made by external actors—for, as the old saying goes, those who repeat past mistakes are destined to regret them.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=15104