Washington Re-engineers the Horn of Africa and Threatens Arab National Security

Dr Mohamed Hasab Alrasool

American and Israeli fears of a complex regional war have driven Washington and Tel Aviv to accelerate efforts aimed at enabling Addis Ababa to realise its long-held maritime ambitions.
In the second week of May 2026, international news agencies revealed internal US State Department documents indicating that the American administration had begun reviewing the sanctions imposed on Eritrea since 2021, while hinting at the possibility of lifting them altogether.
This coincided with the signing of a framework for US–Ethiopian strategic dialogue directed towards achieving “regional peace”, as well as Washington’s decision to lift its ban on arms and military equipment exports to the Ethiopian army — a ban imposed in the same year sanctions were placed on Asmara. The move effectively allows Addis Ababa to modernise its military arsenal.
This development strengthens Ethiopia’s military capabilities at a time when it faces internal security challenges, remains involved in the aggression against Sudan, and continues pursuing access to the sea — even by force if necessary — after once again becoming a landlocked state, as it had been before Washington annexed Eritrea to Ethiopia on 15 November 1962.
These measures come within the context of intensified American efforts to reshape the Horn of Africa amid the ongoing war in West Asia and to secure Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through the Eritrean coastline.
The Grand Bargain: Lifting Sanctions in Exchange for Reconciliation
The eastern African coastline has acquired growing strategic significance, particularly after Yemen’s involvement in supporting Gaza and Sana’a’s declared readiness to back Tehran in confronting the Zionist-American offensive.
For this reason, Washington is exerting significant efforts to achieve its geostrategic objectives in the Red Sea basin and the Horn of Africa by enabling Ethiopia to gain access to the port of Massawa overlooking Bab el-Mandeb.
The United States is attempting to soften Eritrea’s position opposing any Ethiopian domination of Eritrean territory. To this end, it has proposed what the author describes as an unequal bargain: lifting sanctions on Asmara in exchange for reconciliation with Addis Ababa and granting Ethiopia access to Massawa port.
Features of the Anticipated Historic Reconciliation
According to leaked information, the proposed deal may involve granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea through the Massawa port for 50 years, alongside the establishment of an Ethiopian naval base.
The arrangement would reportedly also include a border settlement that reactivates the stalled boundary commission, a cessation of destabilising activities, and broader economic openness between the two neighbouring countries.
Threatening Arab and Turkish National Security
Ethiopian access to the Red Sea would impose an entirely new geopolitical reality and create geostrategic consequences extending far beyond Eritrea and the Horn of Africa, posing direct threats to Arab national security and Turkish strategic interests alike.
Historically, Ethiopia’s expansionist ambitions and imperial aspirations have represented a threat to its neighbours. Western powers detached territories from Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan and attached them to Ethiopia, while the United States incorporated Eritrea itself into Ethiopia, as previously noted.
Today, with growing American and Israeli interest in Ethiopia, these same dangers are re-emerging under the banner of “regional peace”. Any permanent Ethiopian presence along Eritrea’s coast — backed by American and Israeli support and financed by the UAE — would directly affect regional security, global supply chains, and maritime traffic through the Arabian Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, and ultimately the Suez Canal. It would also fundamentally reshape the geostrategic environment of the Red Sea and its wider sphere.
Yemen and the Gulf: Security Implications
For Yemen, the anticipated Ethiopian naval base on the opposite shore represents a significant military and security concern, particularly at a moment when Sana’a has demonstrated its capacity to support both Gaza and Tehran and to impose new realities on navigation through Bab el-Mandeb and the Red and Arabian Seas.
For Saudi Arabia, despite its growing relations with Ethiopia, Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through a military base — combined with Emirati military support since 2020 and the lifting of the American arms embargo — would substantially enhance Addis Ababa’s military and political influence, especially given its involvement in major regional and international projects.
Accordingly, the article argues that Riyadh cannot realistically ignore a threat located only kilometres from its coastline.
Sudan: Strategic Encirclement
As for Sudan, already exhausted by more than three years of externally backed aggression — including Ethiopian participation — the completion of such a deal would deepen its strategic isolation.
This time, the pressure would come even from Eritrea, which has remained a strong ally of Khartoum throughout the conflict. Sudan would therefore face a form of maritime encirclement, losing the strategic depth that Eritrea has long represented.
Egypt and the Nile Equation
Egypt would also face complex consequences from any Ethiopian presence at the southern gateway of the Red Sea.
Such a development could undermine Cairo’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa while affecting maritime trade and supply routes. The American-sponsored agreement between Asmara and Addis Ababa would also weaken Egypt’s reliance on alliances with Eritrea and Somalia as part of its broader strategy to contain Ethiopian ambitions.
Moreover, it would deprive Cairo of the closest potential strategic pressure point it had hoped to leverage in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute. An Ethiopian military presence on the eastern coast, under American protection, would give Addis Ababa greater confidence in dealing with Egypt.
Somalia and Djibouti: Rising Risks
In Somalia, the risks of fragmentation into entities such as Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland would intensify once Ethiopia establishes a naval base and expands its capacity to project power over Mogadishu by land, air, and sea.
Recognition of Somaliland by Ethiopia could also serve as a gateway to recognising the independence of other Somali regions with separatist tendencies.
Meanwhile, Djibouti would suffer economically and strategically. It currently handles around 90 per cent of Ethiopia’s foreign trade, generating more than $1 billion annually. Ethiopian access to alternative ports would transform Djibouti’s ports from indispensable transit routes into secondary options, dealing a severe blow to its port-dependent economy and fragile social and security structures.
Turkey and the “Second Ottoman” Project
The implications would not stop at Arab national security. They would also extend to Turkey, and its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, as well as the broader geopolitical project sometimes referred to as the “Second Ottoman” vision, which Ankara has pursued for nearly two decades.
The establishment of an Ethiopian naval base and port under American and Israeli sponsorship would represent a direct challenge to this project, with its cultural, economic, social, and military dimensions.
Neighbouring Ports and the Ethiopian Dream
Ethiopia is one of sixteen landlocked countries in Africa. Historically, such states have relied on neighbouring ports without attempting to redraw borders.
The exception, according to the article, has been Ethiopia — driven by imperial ambitions and deep Western alliances.
Sudan and Djibouti provided viable economic solutions for Ethiopian trade access. Yet Addis Ababa, seeking sovereign access to the sea, turned first to Somalia in pursuit of control over Berbera Port, before openly speaking about what it termed the “recovery” of Massawa from Eritrea.
The real objective, the article argues, has never been purely commercial, but rather the establishment of a naval military presence.
The war involving Iran subsequently restored Eritrean ports to strategic prominence. American and Israeli fears of a wider regional war accelerated efforts to help Ethiopia realise its maritime ambitions through political and diplomatic means — leaving military force as a secondary option.
Ethiopia’s Naval Ambitions: The 2018 Law and the 2019 Agreement
In December 2018, the Ethiopian parliament approved legislation re-establishing naval forces that had disappeared following the fall of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime.
Three months later, Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop a naval fleet and train new Ethiopian naval officers. Cooperation between Addis Ababa and Paris has continued ever since.
According to the article, this military project reflects a five-way alignment involving:
Ethiopia as the ambitious regional actor
The United States as sponsor
Israel as the anticipated beneficiary
France as provider of technical support
The UAE as financier
Together, they seek to utilise Ethiopia’s historical legacy, demographic weight, and strategic location to reshape the Horn of Africa in ways that reinforce the broader Western-Israeli geopolitical project.
Isaias Afwerki: Submission or Strategic Manoeuvre?
The American-backed project to secure Ethiopia’s access to the sea emerges amid severe economic and political pressures on Eritrea.
The Eritrean government has mobilised its limited demographic and military capabilities to resist Ethiopian ambitions and prevent Addis Ababa from imposing sovereignty over any Eritrean land or waters.
As Ethiopian rhetoric increasingly framed sea access as a matter of “life or death”, Eritrea initiated military preparations along the border, with President Isaias Afwerki appearing to prepare for the worst.
Although the balance of power heavily favours Ethiopia — with a population exceeding 130 million compared to fewer than four million Eritreans, alongside vastly superior economic and military capabilities and broad Western and regional support — the article asks whether Afwerki will ultimately yield and accept a costly strategic compromise.
The answer, it argues, is not straightforward.
Afwerki is portrayed as a hardened fighter possessing strategic patience, a keen understanding of power balances, and a capacity for manoeuvre. At the same time, he recognises the need to build broader regional and international partnerships involving Beijing, Moscow, Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara to establish new balances capable of protecting Eritrea’s sovereignty.
Simultaneously, Eritrea may attempt to exploit Ethiopia’s internal ethnic conflicts and political instability in order to limit Addis Ababa’s ability to advance towards the Eritrean coast.
A Call for Collective Arab Action
For all these reasons, the article concludes that Arab states must collectively recognise the dangers of this project and avoid being misled by its superficial appearance as a mere reconciliation between two neighbouring states.
Ethiopian access to the Red Sea — under American and Israeli sponsorship, Emirati financing, and French expertise — would fundamentally restructure the western Arabian Sea, southern Red Sea, and Bab el-Mandeb region.
The ultimate loser, the article warns, would be the geopolitical balance in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin.
In confronting this threat, unilateral Arab responses would be ineffective. What is required instead is collective vigilance, proactive and unconventional diplomacy, counterbalancing regional alliances, and the mobilisation of every available pressure mechanism before the project becomes an irreversible reality affecting the core of Arab national security and Turkish strategic interests alike.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=14176