The Berlin Conference after the Joint Appeal: What Did the Quintet Actually Achieve?

Al-Wathiq Kameir

Perhaps the most important point to pause at following the Berlin Conference is not merely the issuance of a joint appeal, but what this reveals about the role of the “Quintet” entrusted with organising and managing the civilian political forum—the conference’s third track. From this perspective, it appears that the Quintet succeeded in arriving at a “shared textual formula” that provides the conference with a presentable political outcome. This was not even lost on some of the participants themselves, as the effort seemed primarily directed towards producing a joint appeal, rather than genuinely striving to build a broad political consensus among Sudanese stakeholders.

There is indeed a joint appeal from the participants. However, it is equally true that the draft of this appeal had been prepared in advance by the Quintet, discussed during the preparatory meeting in Addis Ababa prior to the conference, and then adopted in its final form in Berlin—without being signed by the participants. This does not, in itself, diminish the appeal’s value, but it does clarify its nature and limits. The appeal represents a minimum level of agreement on broad headings: ending the war, protecting civilians, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and advancing a Sudanese-owned political process. To overstate it as an indication of broader political convergence, however, is to read beyond what the actual context allows.

The core problem remains unchanged: the fundamental disagreements obstructing consensus have neither disappeared nor been resolved nor even sufficiently addressed. There is still a clear divergence of positions regarding the Rapid Support Forces, the army, the army’s leadership, Islamist actors, and the role of regional and international actors. These are not secondary disputes that a well-crafted appeal can overcome; rather, they are the “real fault lines” preventing the emergence of common ground.

Here lies the essence of the flaw in the Quintet’s approach. Like many international mediators, it tends to seek a “presentable formula” before seriously engaging with the crisis itself. In other words, it rushes to produce a unifying appeal or shared text before adequately working through the underlying disagreements that render such a consensus fragile or limited in effect. As a result, it may succeed in producing documents, but not to the same extent in creating the political conditions necessary to translate these documents into meaningful steps.

Accordingly, what is now required of the Quintet is not merely to build upon the Berlin appeal as a self-contained success, but to “reconsider the approach itself”. Instead of hastily searching for common ground, it would be more productive to adopt a calmer, deeper approach—one that begins by “identifying and unpacking the real points of contention” and placing them squarely on the table. In my view, the most effective entry point would be for the Quintet first to prepare a coherent concept note that clearly defines the objectives of the consultations, the nature of the issues to be addressed, and the proposed methodology for managing them. This document should then be shared in advance with the leadership of Sudanese political forces and blocs, to gather their observations and build a minimum level of understanding before proceeding to any meetings or workshops.

Following this, a series of “graduated dialogue sessions and thematic workshops” could be organised, involving the broadest possible spectrum of political, civil, and societal actors. Each workshop should focus on one of the five core contentious issues: the Rapid Support Forces, the army, the army’s leadership, Islamist actors, and the role of regional and international actors. The aim here should not be to reach quick, ready-made agreements, but rather to “understand and structure the disagreement”—to determine where convergence may begin and where it remains elusive.

In this regard, it is useful to build upon the experience of the Cairo Conference 2024, rather than replicate it wholesale. As noted, that conference was more broadly representative and more inclusive of Sudan’s political spectrum, with participation from party leaders and senior figures from major political blocs, including individuals associated with Islamist currents, directly or indirectly. Regardless of how its final communiqué was produced, its key lesson is that any serious political breakthrough requires the involvement of top-level leadership within political forces and blocs, rather than limited or partial representation.

From this perspective, coordination with Egypt is not a secondary suggestion but a practical option with clear justification. The willingness of senior leaders to accept invitations from the Egyptian government to attend the Cairo conference demonstrates that Egypt enjoys significant acceptance as a mediator or host for such consultations. Moreover, the Quintet itself—and its chair—conduct regular consultations in Cairo. The city also hosts the headquarters of the League of Arab States, one of the Quintet’s components, and has served as a venue for both in-person and virtual meetings with Sudanese political actors. Building on this track and coordinating with Egypt to leverage its proven ability to convene top-tier leadership appears more effective than starting from scratch with each new meeting.

On this basis, the most accurate characterisation of the Berlin Conference is that it provided a “supporting platform within a broader process”, and produced a joint appeal that can, in principle, be built upon. It did not, however, resolve the disagreements that continue to obstruct any serious political convergence among Sudanese actors.

It is also notable that the conference concluded with three parallel statements: one from the organisers, one from the Quintet, and one appeal from the participants. While multiple statements are not unusual in multi-track processes, in this case, they reflect differing levels of discourse and representation and indicate that the conference did not produce a single, clear, and coherent political outcome but rather a set of parallel formulations, each with its own function and limitations.

This impression is further reinforced by reports that the foreign ministers’ meeting—one of the conference’s three principal tracks—was itself expected to issue a joint statement, but faltered due to disagreements among participating states, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over references to Sudanese state institutions. This point is significant because it shows that divergence was not confined to Sudanese political actors but also extended to external stakeholders. Thus, the Berlin Conference revealed not only the limits of consensus among Sudanese parties but also the limits of understanding among certain regional and international actors regarding the war and its possible outcomes.

Conclusion:

The Berlin Conference produced what the Quintet and its organisers sought: a joint appeal that lends the conference a degree of political and moral value that cannot be denied. However, the true value of any subsequent effort will not be determined by the Quintet’s ability to produce new texts, but by its capacity to “change its approach” to Sudan’s divisions. At this moment, Sudan needs not more general formulations, but rather patient, structured engagement with the core disagreements that hinder consensus. If the Quintet wishes to build meaningfully on what was achieved in Berlin, the next step should not be a rush towards another appeal, but a move towards broader, more representative, and methodologically clearer consultations—placing the five contentious issues at the centre of discussion and treating them as the essential entry point for any serious and meaningful Sudanese dialogue.

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