When Narratives Precede Facts: From “The Port Sudan Government” to Targeting the State’s Core in Sudan

Mohand Awad Mahmoud
On 24 March 2026, the platform Africa Intelligence published an article titled “The Port Sudan Government Finds Itself in a Difficult Position with Its Allies”, written by Noé Michelon and Iyad Hicham. The platform describes both as journalists specialising in tracking political and military networks in Africa, with a particular focus on armed forces, weapons procurement, and regional alliances.
At face value, the article reports on a stalled arms deal. In substance, however, it attempts to reshape the image of the Sudanese state—not through verified facts, but through a layered narrative built on unspecified sources and broad conclusions that extend far beyond the available evidence.
One of the earliest indicators of this is the use of the term “Port Sudan government”. This term is no longer neutral or incidental; rather, it has been systematically used by identifiable political and media actors seeking to diminish the Sudanese state by reducing it to its temporary administrative seat, thereby implying that it is a constrained authority with limited legitimacy.
The reproduction of this terminology within what is ostensibly an analytical piece is, in itself, a signal that the text does not operate within a purely professional vacuum, but intersects with an established political discourse.
The article begins with the premise of a suspended arms deal with Pakistan, allegedly mediated by Saudi Arabia, and then leaps to sweeping conclusions: a crisis of trust with Riyadh, Egyptian unease, American pressure, and sensitivities in relations with Turkey. All of this is presented without verifiable documentation, relying instead on phrases such as “diplomatic sources” and “unspecified reasons”—a method insufficient for building a credible strategic assessment, but well suited to advancing narratives that are difficult to verify.
More concerning, however, is the deliberate linkage made between this alleged setback and the “continued presence of radical Islamists” among supporters of the army. This linkage is reinforced by referencing the arrest of Najee Abdullah as a supposed gesture of goodwill, while simultaneously introducing the element of American pressure to exclude Islamists—particularly in the context of a recent decision by the United States Department of State to designate the Islamic movement in Sudan as a terrorist entity.
This convergence between media framing and international political timing cannot be overlooked; rather, it strengthens the argument that the article forms part of a broader wave aimed at consolidating a specific perception of Sudan.
Accordingly, scepticism towards the article is not based solely on the weakness of its sources, but on its structural composition. It does not present facts so much as it rearranges disparate elements into a single narrative intended to suggest that the Sudanese state has yet to resolve a fundamental question: who controls the means of force, and who represents the state militarily.
This assessment can only be conclusively refuted if the alleged suspension of the arms deal is substantiated in a documented and transparent manner, with full details—thereby transforming speculation into fact. In the absence of such evidence, the article remains closer to directed—or even commissioned—analysis, reflecting the interests of actors seeking to redefine the Sudanese landscape.
Yet the greater mistake would be to dismiss the article outright. The real danger lies not in the text itself, but in the extent to which reality remains open to such interpretations. Whether accurate or not, the article forcefully argues that Sudan has yet to achieve the principle of a unified army and a monopoly over arms.
If this idea takes hold, it will inevitably become the basis for states’ policies towards Sudan.
This reading aligns with arguments previously advanced in my article “From the Illusion of Axes to the Moment of the State”, where I emphasised that the region has entered a phase in which parallel armed structures are no longer tolerated, and that any state failing to resolve this issue will remain vulnerable to external pressure and scepticism.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12371