Questions of Formation… and the Delayed History Explosion (1/2)

Adel Al-Baz

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From the outset, Ustaz Obaid Murawah, as is his wont, grasped the essence of his article with his characteristic insightful and astute approach when he addressed “The Sudanese Earthquake… Are We Approaching the Formation of a Larger Bloc?”

He delved into the depths of Sudanese history, exploring with penetrating insight the social foundations upon which the state was built from its earliest stages of formation, and clearly revealing its historical inability to achieve genuine integration. Sudanese groups have remained fragmented, a condition that persists to this day.

According to Murawah, what has happened and is happening in Sudan is not merely a political failure to establish a stable system of governance. Rather, we are facing something far deeper: a crisis of national formation that was never fully realized, and a state that is fracturing because it was founded, from the beginning, on fragile social structures that have not historically integrated.

He then states that “the political and social forces in Sudan have now reached a state of paralysis and intellectual and programmatic bankruptcy.”

After this key foundational introduction to the core arguments of the article, Obaid opened the door to major questions, and this is where we engage with the issue. These are the questions we will attempt to address in this article.

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I will recount here a story I had with the late Ustaz Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, may God have mercy on him, which sheds light on some aspects of the complexity of this problem. One evening, I went to ustaz Nuqud’s house, accompanied by my two mentors and friends, Dr. Abdullah Hamdallah and Dr. Al-Tijani Abdul Qadir. During our conversation, a question arose that seemed to be seeking an answer, so I said to him: “Ustaz, I have a question that needs an answer: Why did your generation, I mean the generation of independence, leave all the major issues as they are, without resolving or addressing any of them? Why did you leave us with the issues of unity, development, and identity, only for them to explode in our faces now?”

He looked at me intently and said: “Your question is valid, but you have posed it to the wrong person. You will not find an answer with me, and I advise you not to ask this question to anyone from the generation of independence, because they simply do not have an answer.” “You must seek the answer yourselves, and you will find the answer that will help you see the future.” Then he pointed at me, laughing, warning me not to direct the question to some of the other names.

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That answer, in its simplicity, was one of the most honest and bitter, because it reveals the magnitude of the dilemma with which independent Sudan was born. So, we are facing the same issues that Ustaz Obaid Murawah pointed out: a state that failed to forge the diverse Sudanese society into a single national identity, and failed to address the ills and diseases that independent Sudan inherited from the colonial era. The major questions remained unanswered until they exploded in the faces of subsequent generations. Why?

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The answer to these questions cannot come from a single perspective; the problem is too complex to be attributed to one cause or single factor. We need a multifaceted and multi-dimensional approach, because we are dealing with a complex issue, with intertwined layers, for which political, social, economic, or even cultural and identity-based explanations alone are insufficient.

If we wish to trace the impact of colonialism on the complexity of the Sudanese question, we must consider its legacy not as a completed historical phase, but as a structure whose effects continue to operate today.

Colonialism in Sudan did not establish a nation-state; rather, it imposed a colonial administration upon a diverse society that was denied the opportunity for natural development toward integration. It reshaped social entities by reinforcing some traditional structures while weakening others, and by linking local loyalties to the administration rather than to society itself. As a result, tribal and sectarian affiliations remained closer to the people than the state itself.

Culturally, the devastation was no less significant. Educational, administrative, and linguistic models were imposed that did not reflect the true diversity of society, creating a gap between the center and the periphery, and between official culture and local cultures. This weakened the unifying national narrative and diminished the shared sense of belonging.

Economically, colonialism did not build a balanced national economy, but rather a dependent economy that served its own needs, not those of Sudanese society. Production and infrastructure projects were concentrated in specific export-oriented regions, while vast areas were left outside the sphere of development. On the political level, Sudan inherited a state that was modern in form but not in its true essence. It inherited an administrative apparatus, governing institutions, and borders, but not a stable national contract that fairly defines who owns the state, in whose interest it operates, and how power is exercised within it. Since independence, politics has not become an instrument for building national consensus, but rather, on many occasions, a zero-sum game in which elites from the center and the periphery, the military and civilians, and various sects and ideologies clash.

On the social level, the problem was not diversity itself—diversity is inherently a source of richness, not resentment—but rather the failure of the state and its elites to transform that diversity into a genuine national partnership. For decades, Sudanese society remained divided between pre-state loyalties and loyalty to the state, between tribe and nation, between rural and urban areas, and between the center and the periphery.

Sufficient bridges were never built to integrate these formations into a comprehensive project where everyone felt a sense of fair participation and recognition. Therefore, when the state weakened, the primordial formations resurfaced, and many reverted to their old tribal loyalties instead of relying on national institutions.

On the economic level, the crisis was not merely widespread poverty, but, to a significant extent, a crisis of the unequal distribution of wealth, services, and opportunities. Development, investment, infrastructure, and modern state institutions were concentrated in specific areas, while vast regions were left to languish on the margins of the state, without a fair share of wealth, services, or power. Thus, the economic imbalance not only produced disparities in living standards but also a profound sense of injustice and marginalization.
When people feel that the state is not distributing wealth equitably and is not opening doors of opportunity equally, the economic crisis does not remain merely economic; it quickly transforms into a political and social crisis, and then into fuel for protest, rebellion, and division.

Next comes the cultural dimension, one of the most sensitive and complex, because Sudan has failed, since independence, to produce a comprehensive and balanced definition of itself. The elite has failed to formulate a national narrative that encompasses this diversity and gives it a unifying meaning. Instead of identity becoming a broad umbrella, it has often become an arena of conflict. When this happens, identity is no longer just a cultural issue, but becomes a political and social one.

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All these dimensions did not operate in isolation, but rather interacted in a way that made each one feed into the others. The political failure to build a just state deepened social divisions, and social divisions facilitated the exploitation of tribalism in political conflict. Economic instability fueled these divisions with further anger and bitterness, while the confusion surrounding identity made it difficult to build a solid national sentiment that transcends these fragments.

Thus, Sudan entered a complex cycle where each flaw reproduced another, until the crisis transformed from a problem of governance into a crisis of national foundation, the fundamental questions of which have remained unresolved since independence.

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The real question today is: How do we transition from a state that inherited a society it did not understand to a state that springs from a precise knowledge of its composition, grievances, and transformations? How do we build a nation based on mutual recognition, the equitable distribution of power and wealth, and the forging of a unifying identity? These are the questions we have long evaded, and now they return to us, not as intellectual luxuries, but as a prerequisite for survival.

To be continued

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12337