The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (1-7)

Last updated Aug 26, 2024

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

Introduction:

There is no doubt that the ongoing war (15 April 2023–), which has claimed the lives of thousands of innocent Sudanese civilians, displaced millions from their homes, robbed them of their belongings, and violated their sanctities, will raise burning questions for each of them. These questions extend beyond political loyalties and household lootings; they pertain to the individual’s existence on the map of time and the nation’s existence on the map of place. Since this war caught many by surprise, they found themselves like the owners of a hijacked ship, asking each other: Who are these pirates, and what do they want? Did they infiltrate the cockpit through their independent cunning, or do they have “allies” among us? Do they intend to repair the ship or seize it? Are they acting on their own, or are there “bigger pirates” behind them who seize every ship by force? Should we flee and leave the ship for them, fight them over it, or “coexist” with them or what should we do?

These questions are interconnected, and they require answers. However, the answers—whatever they may be—do not solve the problem but pave the way for understanding it. Unless the issue is properly understood and its components and its network of relationships are identified, proposed solutions and hasty initiatives may only alleviate current pains without addressing the underlying disease causing those pains. In this article, we attempt to present our “understanding” of the events based on the information available to us. We will conclude with what might seem to us as “conclusions” in light of that understanding. From the outset, we must note that we do not claim to have discovered new information or documents unknown to the reader. All we aim to do is to logically connect the available information and documents and present these facts in a new light. In other words, we seek to offer an “interpretative vision” that organizes scattered information, provides appropriate answers to many lingering questions and possibly leads to potential solutions. Although the article is lengthy and of an academic nature, we preferred to publish for the general reader out of respect for our friends who follow our writings.

The central thesis of the article consists of two parts. First, most of the organized Sudanese forces (political and economic) have lost their influence, being replaced by some influential actors (in the regional and international spheres) who have been sharing the Sudan file since the last years of the Al-Ingaz regime (National Salvation Revolution). However, the presence of these forces intensified with the events of the popular revolution that overthrew the government. The second part: These external forces are not working to restore a lost democratic system, build solid civilian or military institutions, or collaborate with prominent national figures. All they aim for is to put the state’s leadership in post-revolution Sudan into the hands of what is known in social psychology as “situational personalities” that can be controlled by major actors to achieve their interests. In this view, a situational personality does not act according to internal solid convictions or a coherent intellectual vision but instead adopts the “role” imposed on him by the surrounding circumstances, making decisions or abandoning them according to the constraints of the surrounding environment. (It is worth noting that in 1972, researchers in social psychology conducted a scientific experiment to verify the validity of this concept,which became known as the Stanford Prison Experiment. A group of ordinary people was selected to volunteer to play the role of prisoners, while others were asked to play the role of guards. It was observed that after just two weeks, the “guards” had become harsh, with each playing the real role of a jailer, abusing authority, overusing force, and completely departing from the scenario. This led the supervising professor to lose control over the volunteers, requiring the police to be called in to break up the clashes. The conclusion that can be drawn from this experiment is that there are ordinary individuals who, when placed under specific conditions and forced to play certain roles, may overdo it, eventually turning into a situational personality and sometimes going off-script and out of control).

However, we should distinguish between the “pragmatic” personality, which possesses its own vision and abilities but is heavily influenced by external environmental factors, sometimes yielding to them reluctantly and at other times mastering them. This creates a vast difference between and the situational individuals who only have nothing but an exceptional ability to play roles. They adopt the assigned role and performs it impeccably, only to take on the opposite role under different circumstances. These hollow personalities confuse the political scene, making it difficult for observers to determine whether the positions and scenarios unfolding before their eyes are genuine or mere acts. Are those in the driver’s seat pragmatic leaders struggling with circumstances, or are they “situational ” leaders playing assigned roles, moved by strings from outside the stage? Will they continue acting or go off script, making it challenging to control them?

It is no exaggeration to say that situational leaders have dominated contemporary Sudanese politics before and after the war. This description applies to the three main figures (Ibn Auf, Burhan, and Hemedti), as well as to their civilian counterparts. In this article, however, we intend to focus further on only one of these personalities, Lieutenant General Hemedti, not only because (firstly) he has reached a level of role-playing and event manipulation that others have not achieved—despite his seemingly simple, rural, and ignorant demeanour—but also (secondly) because external forces (both regional and international) have found in him the ideal “situational ” personality capable of manipulating secondary characters within the country and being manipulated by external forces without embarrassment. Therefore, in this article, we aim to closely examine the role these forces have played in manipulating Lieutenant General Hemedti for their purposes, as well as the role Hemedti himself has played in influencing Sudanese politics over the past five years (from the fall of the Al-Ingaz regime in December 2019 to the outbreak of the current war in April 2023). Our goal is not to dwell on this or that particular event but to look for connections between them and identify the general direction in which they are heading. Our methodology consists of questioning, hypothesizing, and verifying; that is, we will pose questions that we consider necessary, propose logical answers, and then attempt to verify whether the available facts support or contradict our hypotheses. After careful consideration, we have managed to formulate the following ten questions:

Did the “Group of Four” (the United States, the United Kingdom, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia) managed to elevate Lieutenant General Hemedti to the second most powerful man in the Sovereignty Council?
Was Hemedti lured—or deceived—into playing a role (along with his forces) in dispersing the sit-in at the General Command?
Has the dispersal of the sit-in become a pressure point used by the “Forces of Freedom and Change” (FFC) and regional and international forces (the Group of Four) to threaten and blackmail Hemedti?
Was the threat of the sit-in file one of the reasons that led Hemedti to break off his partnership with the FFC and orchestrate the coup of October 25, 2021?
Was the coup planned in light of “understandings” with some international powers (such as the Russian government)?
Was Hemedti’s rapprochement with Russia (and visiting it at the invitation of President Putin), along with his distancing from the Group of Four, the reason that promted the Group of Four to show him the “red card” and used the sit-in file to threaten and blackmail him for the second time?
Did Hemedti, under threat and enticement, agree to enter into a new deal with the Group of Four and their allies within the country (the FFC)?
What was the nature of that deal—if it existed? Did it involve a final break from Russia and its regional allies (Iran, China, Turkey)? Did it include, in return, a firm promise to close the sit-in file and hand over the top military authority in Sudan to Hemedti and his forces, while political power would go to the FFC?
After the catastrophic war that the Rapid Support Forces became embroiled in and the diminished role that Hemedti could play (politically and militarily), has the Group of Four’s strategy changed accordingly, and is there a growing tendency towards a “gradual disengagement” from Hemedti and his forces?
Finally, what are the most possible conclusions that could provide entry points for a solution?

* For further details about the experience see. F. Neil Brady and Jeanne M. Logsdon, Simbardo’s “Stanford Prison Experiment” and the Relevance of Social Psychology for Teaching Business Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics,Sep.,1988,vol.,9 (Sep.,1988),pp.703-710

* Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Thought at Ibn-Khaldoun Center, Qatar University. He writes intensively on Sudan politics, movements of protest and reform in the Muslim societies, and on issues of political economy. This article was originally written in Arabic.