Who Pays for the “Drinks”? The Gulf and the Cost of the American-Iranian War

Dr Al-Haitham Al-Kindi Yousif
The war between the American-Israeli axis on one side and Iran on the other has finally come to an end. With the signing of the Declaration of Principles—one of whose fourteen provisions provides for the reconstruction of war-damaged Iran—US Vice President Vance emerged with a clear message: the Gulf Arab states should foot the bill. According to his statement, they are expected to shoulder an estimated US$300 billion required to rebuild Iran’s infrastructure.
This American demand comes as a fresh shock to Gulf states whose wounds have yet to heal. Is it reasonable that Gulf countries should be compelled to pay for a war they were never consulted about in the first place?
Such a proposition ignores the severe hardship endured by the region throughout the conflict—from Iranian strikes on Gulf cities to the paralysis of vital economic arteries following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The closure deprived Gulf economies of revenue from millions of barrels of oil exported daily. At the same time, stock markets suffered sharp declines, air traffic was brought to an almost standstill, investors retreated, and development projects came under intense pressure.
Nor is the matter likely to end with the US$300 billion reconstruction bill. Current indications suggest that Washington may seek additional compensation for its military expenditures under the banner of the cost of protection. Yet this supposed protection was exposed during the war as largely illusory, while missiles and drones fell upon Gulf cities and strategic facilities without effective deterrence. Such events reinforce the long-standing political conviction that “those who shelter beneath America’s protection stand exposed”.
The post-war Middle East will not be the same as it was before. Just as Europe has begun distancing itself from Its dependence on America and pursuing greater strategic autonomy, this crisis is pushing Gulf states to seriously consider shedding the mantle of what many now perceive as unreliable American protection.
The options before them range from pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with neighbouring Iran and dismantling the narrative of perpetual external threats upon which Washington has relied for decades, to forging strategic security and military partnerships with China, which has long awaited such an opportunity to expand its influence in the Middle East and may now find it offered on a silver platter.
One of the most important lessons of this war—beyond the shortcomings of reliance on the American security umbrella—is that military hardware and technological superiority are not the sole determinants of victory. Resolve, conviction, and steadfastness in principle remain among the most powerful instruments of success.
Many observers view the outcome as a political and strategic victory for Iran, arguing that the United States failed to achieve any of its publicly stated objectives.
The conflict also demonstrated that preserving statehood may justify the use of all legitimate means available to deter aggression.
Another lesson is that the West cannot provide protection where it lacks the tools to do so, particularly as warfare evolves from conventional confrontation to what is increasingly described as “smart warfare”. Ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles have proven extraordinarily difficult to neutralise through traditional defence systems, suggesting that no country is immune from the destruction and suffering brought by war.
We have also learned that Western powers often place little weight on others’ interests and may sacrifice relationships or abandon allies whenever doing so serves broader strategic objectives.
Similarly, the conflict has highlighted how the United States often structures its relationships—even with those it describes as friends—on a patron-client basis rather than a genuine partnership. There is no consultation before launching wars within the vital sphere of its allies, nor are those allies given meaningful choice when called upon to bear the costs of conflict or finance reconstruction arrangements resulting from settlements negotiated without them.
These are profound lessons indeed, and one hopes they will also be considered locally as Sudan continues its own War of Dignity in defence of its sovereignty and national resources.
Finally, concern remains regarding Israel’s future conduct. There are fears that Tel Aviv may seek to obstruct the implementation of any final agreement. A comprehensive de-escalation would necessarily require Israel to refrain from further military action against Lebanon and against Hezbollah, Iran’s most trusted and influential regional ally.
Such a development could reduce tensions within Lebanon and across the wider region. At the same time, however, it would collide with Israeli demands—and broader international calls—for Hezbollah’s disarmament, leaving the region’s fragile stability vulnerable to becoming the catalyst for a new phase in the struggle for regional influence.

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