Sudan and the UAE: Combating Political Islam or a Struggle for Sovereignty and Influence? (2–2)

Dr Ismail Sati
In the first part of this article, we examined the justifications advanced in the Emirati narrative for its position on Sudan, foremost among them the fight against political Islam. We questioned how consistent this justification was with the history of relations between the UAE and the Salvation Government, as well as with the principle of state sovereignty and the right of peoples to choose their own political systems. We also discussed the strategic and economic interests that make Sudan particularly important in regional calculations, raising questions that go beyond an exclusively ideological explanation.
The issue becomes considerably more serious when we move from political rhetoric to allegations concerning military and logistical support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). At this point, the matter is no longer simply a disagreement over the orientation of the Sudanese government or the future of its political system. It concerns direct allegations that an armed rebel force, waging war against the Sudanese Armed Forces and state institutions, is being supplied with weapons.
Since the outbreak of the war, the Sudanese government and the Armed Forces have consistently accused the UAE of providing military, logistical and financial support to the RSF, and of facilitating the delivery of weapons, ammunition and military equipment through regional routes, most notably via Chad, Libya, Ethiopia and South Sudan.
These allegations have not been confined to political and media statements. In a letter dated 10 June 2024, Sudan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations submitted to the President of the Security Council, the Sudanese government attached photographs and details of weapons and military equipment it said Sudanese authorities had seized on battlefields in Khartoum and Omdurman. The document, published in the Security Council records under reference S/2024/457, included a list of equipment comprising Nimr armoured vehicles, a Serbian-made drone equipped with 120mm projectiles, ammunition and other equipment. The Sudanese government claimed that some of these items had been manufactured specifically for the UAE Armed Forces or sold to them, only to end up in the hands of the RSF.
This document deserves particular attention. It is not merely a media account, but an official allegation submitted by the Sudanese government to the highest international body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, accompanied by photographs, serial numbers and details of the seized equipment. Sudan has every right, indeed an obligation, to demand an investigation into this evidence and to establish who was responsible for the equipment reaching the militia. The question that naturally arises is: why has the UN Security Council not taken concrete steps to investigate these allegations?
On the other hand, Human Rights Watch addressed these allegations in its September 2024 report. It also noted that the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, in its January 2024 report, considered allegations that the UAE was providing support to the RSF through Amdjarass Airport in Chad to be credible. The experts’ report referred to information about shipments of weapons and ammunition arriving at the airport and subsequently being transported by road to RSF-controlled areas in Darfur.
These findings place the allegations in a context that goes beyond political sparring, making them a serious matter requiring investigation and accountability.
Another dimension of this issue emerges from the testimony of several field commanders who defected from the RSF and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces.
On 8 May 2026, field commander Ali al-Tayeb Mohammed Musa, who belonged to the Noor Gubba faction that had broken away from the RSF, held a press conference in Khartoum, where he disclosed details of what he described as the external support the militia received. He maintained that most of this support came from the UAE and included drones, training and professional development programmes for officers, and medical treatment for wounded personnel. Perhaps the most significant part of his testimony was his claim that he personally attended training courses in the Emirati city of Al Ain. He also revealed supply and transportation routes passing through regional airports, including airports in Chad, Libya and Somalia.
This testimony merits particular attention. It comes not from an outside observer or political analyst, but from someone who was part of the RSF’s field structure and claims to have personally participated in the training programmes in question. Naturally, his testimony remains an account that requires independent verification. Nevertheless, it assumes particular significance when considered alongside other information concerning external supply and training networks.
Another field commander, Ali Abdullah Rizqallah, popularly known as Al-Safna, joined the Sudanese Armed Forces after defecting from the RSF in May 2026. At his press conference, he spoke of substantial flows of weapons reaching the RSF in Darfur and disclosed internal practices and violations within its ranks. His testimony forms part of a series of defections that have shed light on various aspects of the force, including its nature, internal structure, sources of strength and supply networks.
The significance of these defections is not merely military. They are also important because defectors may be able to provide information about sources of weapons, training and financing, as well as external communication networks. Such information needs to be properly documented and independently investigated.
The report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, published in September 2026 under the title Fueling the Conflict in Sudan: Weapons, Fighters and External Support Networks, subsequently added important findings to this dossier. Drawing on verified evidence and testimony from individuals with direct knowledge, the mission concluded that a transnational network helped facilitate the RSF’s military operations, linking it to individuals and entities in the UAE, Chad, south-eastern Libya, and Puntland in Somalia. The report also found credible evidence linking UAE-registered entities to networks involved in recruiting, contracting and transporting foreign fighters to Sudan, particularly former Colombian military personnel. According to the independent information available to the mission, the number of such fighters may have approached 2,000.
Even more troubling, the Human Rights Watch report cited testimony from a former Colombian military contractor who said he received about 20 days of military training at a military facility in the town of Ghayathi, in the Al Dhafra region of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, between March and early April 2025. According to the report, the training covered the use of drones, artillery systems and air defence systems, before he moved on to participate in military operations in Sudan.
In paragraph 125 of the Fact-Finding Mission’s report, the mission concluded, following an assessment of the evidence as a whole, that individuals and entities operating from, registered in or linked to the UAE had played a significant role in networks for recruiting, financing, transporting and deploying foreign military contractors, as well as in providing support of a military nature from which the RSF had benefited.
This is an important development because it shifts the discussion beyond Sudanese allegations alone and towards the findings of an independent international investigation. Nevertheless, it is essential to distinguish between the responsibility of the individuals and entities whose links to these networks were documented in the report, and proof of the direct responsibility of the Emirati state itself or the existence of a final judicial ruling against it.
For its part, the UAE continues to deny providing any military, financial or logistical support to the RSF. It maintains that it has remained neutral and that its role is limited to humanitarian assistance and calls for a ceasefire and a political settlement. Despite this denial, the international mission’s findings cannot be disregarded. The mission considered the UAE’s response, yet still concluded that individuals and entities linked to the UAE had played a significant role in military support networks from which the RSF benefited. It called on Abu Dhabi to take stronger measures to prevent and investigate these activities and hold those responsible to account.
As for the case brought by the Sudanese government against the UAE before the International Court of Justice in March 2025, it is important to clarify that, on 5 May 2025, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because of the UAE’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and consequently removed the case from its list. The Court’s decision was not a judgement on the substance of Sudan’s allegations, nor did it determine whether they were valid or unfounded. It dealt solely with the question of jurisdiction. This distinction is essential. On the one hand, the Court’s decision cannot be presented as a conviction of the UAE; on the other, it cannot be portrayed as an exoneration from the allegations. The Court did not examine the underlying evidence or determine the question of responsibility.
From my perspective as a Sudanese citizen following the course of this war and supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces as the national institution entrusted with defending the country’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, this issue is not about a political dispute with any particular country. It is about Sudan’s right to defend itself and expose every form of foreign interference that contributes to prolonging the war and enabling the militia to continue its operations.
The Sudanese Army is under no obligation to remain silent in the face of what it regards as external support for its adversary. Nor is it acceptable to expect Sudan to treat these allegations as merely a diplomatic disagreement while the war continues and weapons and equipment of foreign origin are being used in the brutal attacks against Sudanese people and their infrastructure.
What is required is not simply an exchange of statements denying or making accusations, but a comprehensive exposure of the networks involved in supplying, financing and training the militia, the identification of those responsible, and accountability for everyone proven to have participated in arming the militia or enabling it to continue the war. The war in Sudan is not an isolated internal affair, detached from regional interference. Any attempt to ignore such interference effectively means overlooking one of the factors contributing to the continuation of the conflict.
In the midst of this tragedy, Sudanese people have every right to ask any country suspected of involvement in supporting the militia: Are your policies helping to end the war and protect civilians, or are they prolonging the conflict, deepening divisions and weakening the state?
Ultimately, we are not seeking to defend any particular political group or grant any political current immunity from criticism and accountability. Nor does respect for Sudan’s sovereignty mean endorsing everything its authorities do. Rather, we are defending a principle that transcends individuals, groups and governments: the right of the Sudanese people to decide for themselves who governs them, how they are governed, and what kind of state they wish to build.
Sudan does not need tutelage from the UAE or any other country. Nor should it be required to prove to any state that its political choices conform to that state’s ideological convictions in order to deserve respect for its sovereignty.
If sovereignty is a right enjoyed by states, then it is equally a right of Sudan. And if interference in the internal affairs of other countries is unacceptable when it concerns the UAE or any other state, it cannot suddenly become justifiable when Sudan is the country concerned.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=20175