Responding to Dr. M. J. Hashim: Does Conflict Enter a Second Phase When the Main Player Disappears?

By Hisham Yousif Abdelrahman
I found myself reflecting on the thesis published by Dr Mohamed Jalal Ahmed Hashim on his Facebook page on 3 July 2026, not because it provides definitive answers, but because it opens the door to a much broader discussion concerning one of the most significant questions in contemporary international relations: How are modern wars managed, and at what point do major powers move from conducting conflicts through proxies to other forms of engagement?
This is not a new question in strategic thought, nor is it unique to Sudan.
Entire schools of international relations have examined it, and modern history offers numerous examples demonstrating that major powers have frequently preferred to manage conflicts through graduated levels of proxy actors, logistical support, and political and economic pressure before reassessing the nature of their own involvement as the balance of power on the ground changes.
The value of the argument, therefore, lies not in the particular actors it identifies or omits, but in the deeper question it raises: How are contemporary wars actually conducted? Has proxy warfare become a structural feature of the international system, or is it merely an exception shaped by particular circumstances?
Answering this question cannot rely solely on political impressions or ideological positions. It requires a broader understanding of the evolution of strategic thought and the lessons of modern history, making the Sudanese case an entry point for analysing a phenomenon that extends well beyond Sudan itself.
This line of analysis finds considerable support in the international relations literature.
Stephen Walt argues that states do not act simply in response to raw power, but rather according to their perception of changing levels of threat.
John Mearsheimer maintains that great powers are driven less by moral considerations than by calculations of national interest and balances of power.
Edward Luttwak similarly contends that war is not a departure from politics but its continuation through different instruments, with methods evolving as the costs of direct involvement change.
Along similar lines, Andrew Mumford, in Proxy Warfare, argues that proxy conflicts have ceased to be exceptional and have instead become a preferred instrument through which major powers minimise political and military costs while preserving strategic influence.
From this perspective, the central question in Sudan should not focus primarily on the identities of proxy actors, but rather on understanding the structures that produce proxy warfare itself.
Proxies change. Mechanisms of external support evolve. Yet the underlying strategic objective remains constant: enabling external actors to shape the outcome of conflicts at the lowest possible cost.
When military realities shift, it is hardly surprising that the instruments of influence also evolve—whether through intensified indirect support, the redistribution of responsibilities, or the search for new methods of preserving influence.
Sudan’s own experience provides an instructive example.
Over many years, the country experienced successive stages of external pressure, beginning with economic sanctions, political isolation and diplomatic pressure. At one stage this escalated into direct military action, most notably the bombing of the Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory in 1998.
Yet the crisis did not end with sanctions or military force. It later evolved into a prolonged negotiating process over Southern Sudan, beginning in Abuja, continuing through Machakos, and culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Naivasha, which fundamentally reshaped Sudan’s political landscape and ultimately led to the independence of South Sudan.
The purpose of recalling this experience is not to suggest that today’s circumstances are identical. Every historical period possesses its own regional and international context.
Rather, it illustrates that the management of major crises often proceeds through successive phases, beginning with political and economic pressure, escalating where necessary to more coercive measures, and eventually returning to negotiation and the restructuring of political balances once direct coercive instruments have achieved their immediate objectives.
This pattern is by no means unique to Sudan. It appears repeatedly in international experience, where major powers have approached conflicts less as conventional military contests ending in clear victory or defeat than as prolonged processes of political re-engineering.
History also teaches another important lesson.
Although major powers frequently employ indirect methods of managing conflicts, the success of those methods is never guaranteed.
Numerous examples demonstrate that a state’s resilience depends not solely upon military superiority but also upon the strength of its institutions, the legitimacy of its governing authority, and the cohesion of its society.
However extensive external influence may be, it reaches natural limits when confronted with a state capable of maintaining internal consensus and institutions with at least a minimum level of effectiveness and continuity.
Indeed, Samuel Huntington was among the first to argue that the greatest threat facing states is not external intervention itself but institutional weakness.
Countries with robust institutions are better equipped to absorb external pressures, whereas weak states become fertile ground for competing centres of influence.
Similarly, Francis Fukuyama, in State-Building, argues that constructing effective state institutions is not a political luxury but the essential foundation for safeguarding sovereignty, since institutional vacuums inevitably invite external actors to fill them.
From another perspective, Charles Tilly reminds us that the state cannot be reduced merely to its monopoly over the instruments of coercion. Its enduring strength also depends upon its ability to build a sustainable relationship with society.
When that relationship deteriorates, opportunities emerge for external actors to exert influence—not necessarily because they have become more powerful, but because the domestic environment has become increasingly susceptible to external penetration.
Accordingly, the central issue in Sudan should not be reduced to identifying external actors or measuring the extent of their involvement.
Rather, it should focus upon a deeper question:
How can the Sudanese state reduce the vulnerability of its domestic arena to becoming a theatre in which external interests compete?
History consistently demonstrates that external influence, however sophisticated its instruments, encounters natural limits when confronted by resilient institutions, a cohesive society, and a national vision capable of generating internal consensus.
Conversely, when the domestic front fragments, external actors do not create crises from nothing; they merely exploit and redirect conditions that have already become susceptible to external manipulation.
Protecting the state, therefore, begins not at its borders but within its institutions.
It begins by strengthening governance, consolidating legitimacy, rebuilding trust between the state and society, and transforming diversity into a source of national strength rather than an entry point for external competition.
This is the lesson repeatedly confirmed by the experience of states across history.
It is also the point at which most contemporary schools of political thought converge, regardless of their differing theoretical perspectives: states endowed with strong institutions and cohesive societies are far less likely to become arenas in which other powers wage their conflicts.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=15571