Post-War Sudan… Is This Not the Path Forward?

Tijani Abdel Qadir Hamed – 9 April 2025

(1) Now that the Sudanese have managed to rid themselves of much of the burden of the rebel militia, they may finally be able to clearly recognise that they have indeed faced, over the past two years, existential threats that nearly wiped them out entirely – as a state, a people, and a land. This was the first time in their modern history that they found their state besieged, their people pursued, and their land and homes occupied. It was also the first time they awoke to find that their armed forces – entrusted with protecting national security – had been completely encircled by one of its own armed militias, losing control over most of its sources of power: command centres, ammunition factories, fuel depots, military camps, and communication networks.

They looked right and left and found neither friend nor ally coming to their aid (and, to this day, we do not know what led to this disaster – treachery, conspiracy, or a failure in military competence). What saved the day was that the wounded armed forces – in an extraordinary and rare moment – turned to their popular base, calling upon the citizens to defend the nation. In a moment of great sacrifice and deep impact, the youth flocked to training camps and quickly set off to the battle of dignity, fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with the armed forces until victory was achieved.

(2) A Question of Existence:

The first and most vital lesson to be drawn from this bitter experience – in which hundreds of martyrs and injured fell – is that the issue of existence – of the people, the land, and the heritage – must take precedence over all other concerns, and every path leading to a similar catastrophe must be sealed off. In order to preserve this existence, the Sudanese must – in my view – confront three fundamental challenges and seek to reconcile them: national security, economic development, and political legitimacy. The discussion around these challenges has been, and will continue to be, long and contentious, and views may diverge on their details. Yet, if the Sudanese have learnt anything from this war, they must converge and unite around three key paths:

(a) Consolidating state sovereignty – ensuring a unified authority with strong military capability, able to protect lives, control territory, secure borders, and firmly manage Sudan’s national wealth – its gold, waters, and skies. The existential battle is not yet over; the aggressor and its allies continue their assault, launching drones and inciting neighbours.

(b) Investing in social capital – that is, mobilising societal and scientific energies towards a national project aimed at multiplying national productive capacity – in defence, food, and medicine alike. This requires a dual-track plan: on one hand, modernising the security and defence base, maximising its capabilities and readiness in anticipation of a second wave of aggression; on the other, protecting the local productive base from the shockwaves of global economic volatility – inflation, recession, and the manipulations of regional agents. This dual plan cannot succeed without a sustained and deepened mobilisation effort, whereby youth return to the front lines when called upon, and where army units – in peacetime – engage in construction, production, and manufacturing. In essence, the successful defensive partnership that led to victory in the battle of dignity must now evolve into a successful constructive partnership in the battle of production – in agriculture, industry, transport, communication, innovation, and recycling.

This could serve as a practical translation of the slogan “One Army, One People”, a motto chanted by the public throughout the war years – where the boundaries between the military trench, the scientific lab, and the factories of food, medicine, and munitions dissolve, giving rise to a grand developmental project. No one should find such a vision far-fetched. If they do, they should revisit the history of mega-projects that shaped nations – such as the Manhattan Project (1942) – where American academics, army teams, and industrialists united in wartime, securing America’s lasting superiority in science, technology, and military might – not to mention similar academic, civil, and industrial partnerships that propelled the rise of many other nations.

(c) Elevating grassroots and professional forces into decision-making circles – we must remember that these patient grassroots forces and the migrant (expatriate) professional classes are the true strength of Sudanese society. The recent war has been a real test of their capacity and resilience in the face of catastrophe. It is they who sheltered, fed, and treated thousands of families fleeing the horrors of war, and they who actively contributed to the battle of dignity, supporting the armed forces with funds and men. Let us also not forget that the militia and its regional allies did not merely seek to destroy the state, but deliberately targeted the sources of societal strength within Sudanese communities, aiming to drain the very lifeblood that sustains them. Wherever the militia entered, they destroyed water wells, electricity transformers, and transmission lines, disabled mills, looted pharmacies and hospitals, vandalised dialysis centres, and targeted local elders as much as they did doctors, pharmacists, and engineers.

(3) The Constraints of Reality:

This call to rally around these proposed paths did not emerge from a realm of fantasy – it was born of stark reality. There is no doubt that Sudan faces, particularly after the devastation of the recent war, dire humanitarian and social conditions, and a deteriorating economic reality. What makes the situation even more precarious is a frightening leadership vacuum. The political elite – both those who preceded the December 2018 uprising and those who emerged from it – are mired in internal divisions and mutual animosity, rendering them unable to confront the existential threats looming over Sudan, nor the calamities that have befallen its society – from institutional collapse and squandering of wealth to the destruction of youth’s futures. These divisions also prevent them from seizing the opportunities that Sudan’s natural resources, vast arable lands, precious minerals, and strategic location might otherwise offer. As for the major international powers (the US and Europe), they are currently consumed by their own internal crises and fierce trade wars – and under such conditions, it is unrealistic to expect them to open their coffers to aid Sudan or any other country.

Hence, it would be unwise to stake Sudan’s future on its political parties or to place too much hope in the current political elite. These elites, regrettably, do more harm than good. Some suffer from flawed origins, while others suffer from political senility. None possess a grand idea to inspire the public, nor towering leaders to generate ideas or rally the people. It is, therefore, better to leave these parties to quietly resolve their internal problems, mend relationships, and revise their programmes and goals. Meanwhile, alternative social blocs, actors, and solidarities – comprising researchers, experts, local community forces, farmers, entrepreneurs, industrialists, and dynamic youth who have a genuine stake in development – should be formed to carry the task of Sudan’s reconstruction in this critical phase. The political parties can catch up with the national movement at a later stage – once they have recovered.

If we accept this, then many consequences follow – the most important being a reassessment of our current economic and political direction.

First: The Economic Model

We must first acknowledge that we are suffering from terrifying levels of unemployment, an equally alarming cost of living, an abysmal decline in local production, the collapse of infrastructure and institutions, and escalating problems in both the health and education sectors. But we must also avoid deluding ourselves with dreams of foreign aid or the promises of donors and reconstruction funds. We need to reassess our economic thinking model and replace it with one based on the premise that recovery from this major catastrophe begins with the establishment of a strong and prudent state – one that first ensures security, then mobilises energies and sharpens determination toward a central strategic national goal: stimulating production, increasing its rates, and using the proceeds to meet citizens’ basic needs (security, health, and education). We must look to the examples of rising nations – like China, which paved its roads and built its bridges with the hands and backs of its own children, drawing inspiration from their ancestors who moved mountains and performed miracles – rather than relying on gifted equipment and imported mechanisms.

A powerful illustration of this comes from a thoughtful thinker who once said that if a massive earthquake were to destroy New York City, the United States could not simply buy a new city even with all its material resources. However, relying on its social capital could rebuild hundreds of cities like New York. It is social capital – not material wealth – that determines the fate of nations. In the same spirit, it is entirely possible for three to five million determined, well-trained young Sudanese to rebuild Sudan – if given the chance – and to contribute to its renaissance just as they helped build other nations that were once barely known.

Second: The Political Model

We Sudanese must revise our political thinking. For now, we must stop chasing after political workshops, foreign conferences, draft constitutions, and charters – for we have tried these before and reaped nothing but ashes. We must also stop chasing a utopian political model for which we currently lack the logistical, security, and economic prerequisites. At this stage – the stage of consolidating existence – we need to begin with a minimum programme of democracy, one that includes justice and the rule of law, geographical popular representation, and consultation with experts. From there, we can gradually progress toward a more complete democracy. Insisting that we must immediately have a full-blown competitive party democracy – like that of the stable and prosperous Western capitalist nations – is misplaced. Even those Western nations did not reach their current democratic systems (flawed as they may be) in a single leap. Many societies in Africa and beyond have had to progress step-by-step – from autocratic systems that ensured basic security to hybrid regimes and then to more mature and just governance.

Third: What Should We Expect?

If the developmental economic model outlined earlier succeeds, it will not only help repel aggression, maintain security, and raise living standards. It will also help bridge the gap between military personnel, academics, and business leaders, reduce dependency on foreign aid, and lower the political temperature among rival political groups. It may also help restore the balance between marginalised groups and dominant urban centres – as continued injustices and grievances only breed societal environments hostile to democracy and receptive to dictatorship (as happened in some neighbouring societies following the famed Arab Spring uprisings).

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=5020