Keep the Central Bank of Sudan Above Political Battles and Narrow Interests

Dr Mohamed Awad Mutawalli
Sudan’s banking and economic landscape is currently experiencing intense activity, characterised by heightened political debate and competing vested interests that too often overshadow the broader strategic vision required of institutions entrusted with safeguarding monetary sovereignty. The recent controversy surrounding the Central Bank of Sudan’s latest package of policy measures—particularly its decision requiring petroleum import companies to deposit no less than 200 kilograms of gold with the national refinery as a precondition for qualifying to import fuel—provides a striking example of the inability to view the national economy through a comprehensive strategic lens at a critical stage that demands discipline and coherence.
Some have interpreted the decision as granting import privileges exclusively to large, well-capitalised companies. In contrast, others have criticised it as a deliberate attempt to exclude emerging and smaller businesses that rely on this vital sector for their livelihoods. Yet a macroeconomic analysis reveals that such narrow interpretations fail to grasp the policy’s structural rationale. The Central Bank’s responsibility is to build robust strategic reserves capable of supporting the national currency and restoring macroeconomic balance by directing sovereign resources towards the interests of the state rather than those of individual market participants.
The Economic Logic Behind the Decision
The philosophy underpinning this measure is grounded in sound economic reasoning supported by facts and figures.
The monthly cost of importing petroleum products exceeds US$110 million. Against this backdrop, requiring importing companies to provide a gold-backed guarantee of 200 kilograms—currently valued at approximately US$14–15 million at international market prices—cannot reasonably be described as an excessive burden. Rather, it is an objective and appropriate measure of financial capacity designed to ensure that only genuinely capable and structurally sound companies participate in this strategically important sector.
Gold remains the ultimate store of value and the safest financial asset. By requiring petroleum importers to supply physical gold to the Central Bank’s refinery, the authorities are redirecting Sudanese gold away from smuggling networks, the parallel economy and speculative markets into official channels, thereby strengthening the Central Bank’s financial standing and enhancing its credibility in international markets.
An Issue of National Economic Security
The national security dimension must also be acknowledged openly.
According to UN Comtrade 2025 data, approximately 73 per cent of Sudan’s gold is smuggled through three principal regional routes. Every kilogram smuggled represents a direct loss of approximately US$62,000 in potential foreign exchange reserves and may also finance parallel networks that threaten both Sudan’s internal stability and regional security.
From this perspective, the 200-kilogram requirement is first and foremost a strategic national security measure rather than a financial regulation. It provides the Central Bank with sovereign protection against pressure from interests linked to the parallel market.
Addressing the Objections
The argument advanced by opposing companies—that the requirement effectively freezes their capital—reflects a misunderstanding of the mechanism involved.
The policy does not confiscate assets. Rather, it operates through a renewable credit-collateral mechanism, whereby the deposited gold secures an import authorisation and a credit facility. Once imported products are sold and revenue is realised, the cycle can begin again through the renewed acquisition of gold.
Those now objecting may reasonably be viewed as seeking to preserve exceptional profits generated through speculative access to foreign currency in the parallel market to finance imports. This practice places sustained pressure on the exchange rate and contributes to inflation, which exceeded 157 per cent in May 2026.
Establishing a quantitative threshold for participation, therefore, represents a corrective measure that makes financial strength and operational seriousness the primary criteria for engaging in a sector closely linked to Sudan’s national security.
The Cost of Inaction
The alternative would be far more costly.
Failure to implement the policy would result in:
An additional US$110 million monthly deficit in the balance of payments;
The loss of approximately 2.3 tonnes of gold every month through smuggling;
An estimated 9.7 per cent monthly increase in the parallel market exchange rate, according to World Bank regression models.
Under such circumstances, Sudan could face a comprehensive monetary collapse within eight months or even sooner.
Part of a Broader Reform Programme
The policy should not be viewed in isolation.
The Central Bank is currently undergoing comprehensive institutional reform, reflected in recent circulars designed to strengthen banking governance and accelerate the digital transformation of financial operations. These measures aim to reduce the volume of cash circulating outside the formal banking system, which is estimated to exceed 80 per cent.
A particularly significant milestone has been the designation of the Electronic Banking Services Company (EBS) as an authorised agent for the SWIFT international financial messaging network within Sudan.
This represents a major step towards reconnecting the Sudanese economy with the international financial system.
Gold Reserves and Financial Reintegration
The strategic relationship between accumulating genuine gold reserves at the Central Bank refinery and restoring access to SWIFT creates new opportunities.
Together, they would enable Sudan to participate in international gold swap arrangements and secure direct financing lines from correspondent banks without relying upon expensive regional intermediaries.
The geopolitical implications are equally significant.
Sudan officially produces approximately 83 tonnes of gold annually, while unofficial estimates suggest an additional 120 tonnes produced outside formal channels, making the country the second-largest gold producer in Africa.
Accumulating just 10 tonnes of gold within the Central Bank’s refinery could, according to this analysis, raise Sudan’s sovereign credit rating from CCC to B- with Fitch within six months. It could also qualify the country for swap arrangements with the central banks of China, Russia and Gulf states worth more than US$1.8 billion, while strengthening Sudan’s integration into the Belt and Road Initiative and the BRICS economic framework.
Viewed from this perspective, the decision represents an international negotiating instrument rather than merely a domestic regulatory measure.
Shielding Monetary Policy from Political Pressure
Attempts to draw the Central Bank into political disputes and commercial lobbying campaigns under slogans of preferential treatment reflect a lack of national responsibility.
Legitimate demands for administrative improvements should instead be directed to executive institutions, such as the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, particularly regarding the efficiency of logistical distribution.
Monetary and credit policy must remain insulated from special interests.
From a strategic security perspective, those opposing the decision broadly fall into three categories:
Networks financing imports through the parallel foreign exchange market that stand to lose privileged access to dollars;
Front companies involved in cross-border money laundering operations;
Speculators trading in petroleum futures who benefit from pricing disorder.
Accurately identifying these threats is the first step towards neutralising them through legal and regulatory means.
Unregulated imports that contribute nothing to national reserves of gold or foreign currency merely accelerate the depletion of national wealth.
Through its recent policies, the Central Bank is limiting that depletion and sending a clear message: participation in strategic sectors entails an obligation to contribute to national monetary stability.
No economy can recover if monetary policy remains hostage to companies that consume scarce national resources without replenishing them through sustainable alternatives.
Towards a Doctrine of Sudanese Economic Security
A scientific and practical approach to analysing monetary policy requires moving beyond reactive criticism towards proactive strategic thinking.
Experience demonstrates that complete monetary neutrality is an illusion for developing countries whose resources are subject to organised extraction and illicit flows.
Accordingly, the requirement that petroleum importers provide a gold guarantee is not an isolated technical measure. It represents the first building block of what may be described as a Sudanese doctrine of economic security, founded upon three interconnected principles:
Sovereign control over finite strategic resources, foremost among them gold as the ultimate store of value;
Protection of monetary policy instruments from political pressures and rent-seeking networks through legal and institutional safeguards;
Reintegration of the Sudanese economy into the international financial system from a position of negotiating strength based upon tangible reserves rather than dependence on conditional borrowing.
Conclusion
Guiding the Sudanese economy towards stability requires safeguarding the independence of the Central Bank and supporting its strategic vision to strengthen state sovereignty over national resources.
Commercial organisations and business interests may change with time, but sovereign institutions and sound economic foundations endure, shaping the future and stability of nations.
Defending the Central Bank of Sudan today is, ultimately, a defence of future generations’ right to inherit a country that controls its own monetary policy, safeguards its gold resources and negotiates with confidence in a world that respects only those who possess genuine economic strength.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=15075