Evaluating the Legitimacy of Government During Foreign Invasion

By: Dr Mohamed Othman Awadallah

The term “foreign invasion” has been used by the United Nations Secretary-General, the United States Department of State Secretary of State, reports issued by UN panels of experts, and several international legislatures such as the United States Congress, the Parliament of Canada, and the Parliament of Australia to describe the war in Sudan.
The UN Secretary-General went further when he stated that the conflict was “being fuelled by a non-African state”.
The American Secretary of State was even more explicit when he identified that state directly, stating that “the UAE is involved in Sudan”, adding that these countries are participating in the war through their borders and airports by facilitating the transport of mercenaries and the smuggling of weapons.
Meanwhile, reports by UN panels of experts were more detailed and specific, identifying flight routes and logistical corridors originating from the United Arab Emirates and passing through Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, or Somaliland before reaching the militia forces inside Sudan.
International parliaments, meanwhile, adopted an even sharper approach through investigations, questioning ministers, and considering sanctions against the UAE, including proposals to halt arms sales to prevent their use in the Sudan war.
However, the only entities that have thus far imposed sanctions are the United States and the United Nations, targeting individuals and intermediaries involved in transporting weapons and in smuggling mercenaries financed by the UAE.
Thus, the prevailing international description of what Sudan is facing is that of a foreign invasion, even if the final step — transforming documented evidence and identification of aggressor states into direct legal sanctions against those states themselves — has not yet been fully completed.
The Early Phase of the Invasion
At the outset of this invasion, the militia succeeded in occupying the capital and a large number of Sudanese states, displacing approximately fourteen million citizens, seizing their homes, and committing hundreds of thousands of crimes, massacres, and acts of genocide.
There is a broad consensus among citizens, the government, the army, and the armed Darfur movements that the state’s foremost priorities are the protection of the national entity, the restoration of security, and the liberation of all occupied territory.
Yet Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alone broke from this national consensus.
Instead, it began questioning the legitimacy of the government, undermining support for the army, travelling internationally, visiting foreign parliaments, and conducting fierce media campaigns aimed at discouragement and incitement against state institutions, the armed forces, and Sudanese society itself.
Nor did it stop there. According to the author, the group consistently adopted positions supportive of the rebellion and of the foreign state backing it.
The author claims that hundreds of publicly available videos circulated on their own platforms document statements and positions by FFC leaders supportive of the militia and the UAE against the government and the Sudanese army.
Government Performance During the War
On the ground, however, the government succeeded in preserving state institutions and restoring their operations.
It liberated the capital and several other states, confined the rebellion largely to border regions adjacent to the countries described by the American Secretary of State as used for the transport of weapons and mercenaries, and facilitated the return of millions of displaced persons.
It also continued to provide security, education, healthcare, agriculture, the resumption of daily life, the reopening of markets, economic activity, reconstruction, strategic planning, and Sudan’s representation in international forums and activities.
Accordingly, the mere declaration by the FFC that it does not recognise the government’s legitimacy does not invalidate that legitimacy, neither legally nor practically.
The Real Issue, According to the Author
In reality, the author argues, the problem for the FFC is neither the foreign invasion itself nor the question of governmental legitimacy.
Rather, he contends that the group uses both the foreign invasion and the issue of legitimacy as instruments of pressure to achieve what he describes as its principal objective: returning to power exclusively.
According to the author, the FFC seeks control of power while compelling civilian and military political forces to surrender to its political project during the transitional period — a project centred on altering the political balance of power and restructuring state institutions before subsequently agreeing to general elections.
He summarises what he views as the FFC’s strategic vision as follows:
“Invasion, delegitimisation, seizure of power, alteration of balances, refounding the state, then elections.”
The author further argues that this vision has exhausted the movement morally and cost it its social standing, as many Sudanese citizens no longer perceive its conduct merely as political failure or discouragement, but as support for the invasion and the militia itself, thereby holding it morally responsible for the crimes committed.
He adds that Sudanese citizens confronted FFC representatives over these issues on multiple occasions in international capitals such as Paris, London, New York City, Geneva, and Amsterdam.
National and International Legitimacy
On the national level, the author argues that the government has consolidated both its national and popular legitimacy through fulfilling what he describes as its duties of liberation, preserving the state entity, facilitating the return of displaced persons, restoring public services, and resuming the work of state institutions — all accompanied by what he characterises as near-consensus popular support.
He further contends that the government has also strengthened its international legitimacy through continued international recognition and recognition by the United Nations and international institutions as the legitimate representative of the Sudanese state.
According to the author, this constitutes the legitimacy that truly matters.
Indeed, he concludes by arguing that under wartime conditions, such legitimacy may even be considered stronger than electoral legitimacy itself, even if temporary and conditioned by the circumstances of war.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=13912