Anti-Corruption Initiatives between Political Imperatives and Institutional Commitment

Hiba Mahmoud Sadiq Farid
Once the war has come to an end, Sudan’s challenge will extend beyond rebuilding the infrastructure, institutions and services destroyed by the conflict. It will also require rebuilding the state itself across all three branches of government and addressing the structural weaknesses that have undermined its ability to perform its functions and protect society. Alongside the physical and human devastation, the war has exposed deep institutional fragility, the dangers of concentrating power, the politicisation of state institutions, and weaknesses in oversight and accountability systems. These shortcomings make a return to previous patterns of governance particularly risky, as it could reproduce the very crises that undermined the state in the first place, even after its institutions resume operations.
This raises a fundamental question that goes beyond reconstruction to the very nature of the state Sudanese people aspire to build: will it be a state in which corruption, political empowerment and the recycling of influence persist, or a state governed by the rule of law, competence, transparency, accountability and equal opportunity? Answering this question requires placing government institutional reform at the heart of the national state-building project, recognising it as a foundation for stability, peace and development, and as a means of restoring public confidence in state institutions.
In this context, combating corruption is fundamental to rebuilding the state on integrity and redefining the relationship between authority, society, and public funds. This requires an integrated institutional system that can prevent corruption, expose corrupt practices, investigate them, and hold those responsible to account through fair, independent legal procedures. Such a system should include the judiciary, the public prosecution, and oversight bodies, along with civil service reform and greater transparency in managing public finances, government procurement, and appointments. Its importance lies in addressing the institutional conditions that allow power to be exploited for private political or economic gain, while ensuring that all officials are subject to the same legal rules.
Institutional reform, however, does not succeed merely through legislation or the creation of oversight bodies. The effectiveness of such measures depends on institutional independence and their ability to exercise their mandates free from political interference and personal influence. State-building therefore requires political will that respects the limits of power, a public culture committed to the common good, and administrative practices that make accountability a principle of governance rather than an instrument for settling scores with opponents. This cumulative process requires time and continuity because trust in institutions is built through the consistent application of the law, fair enforcement, and the ability to correct abuses without selectivity.
Building on this perspective, this paper argues that confronting corruption and political empowerment in Sudan requires addressing the institutional structures and rules that have enabled the concentration of power and the use of state resources to serve private political and economic interests. Against this background, it examines the experience of the Empowerment Removal Committee as a case study through which to understand the potential and limitations of exceptional interventions, analyse the legal, institutional and political challenges they encountered, and draw lessons for developing a more sustainable approach to preventing the state from being captured once again by political interests.
Post-war Sudan needs a national project for integrity and institutional reform that re-establishes rule-of-law governance, guarantees institutional independence, improves public administration efficiency, and subjects the exercise of power and the use of public resources to social and legal accountability. The deeper value of the empowerment removal experience lies in the lessons it offers for building an institutional system that prevents political empowerment from re-emerging, rather than merely addressing its manifestations after they occur. The future Sudan deserves is one in which rules are stricter than individuals, the law is the common point of reference for all, and the public interest provides the foundation for exercising authority and managing resources.
The Contradiction between the Exceptional and the Institutional
1. The dilemma of political expediency and the tendency to settle scores
The literature on transitional justice and institution-building (Elster, 2004; Huntington, 1991) suggests that ruling elites in transitional periods often resort to exceptional, ad hoc agencies and structures driven by political vindictiveness, immediate public pressure, and escalating political demands. Such practices are often justified as a way to bypass procedural complexities.
However, this approach carries serious structural and principled risks, as the literature on transparency and anti-corruption highlights (Pope, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). These risks are reflected in the politicisation of anti-corruption efforts, whereby bodies entrusted with upholding integrity are transformed into arenas for settling political scores, seizing property and expropriating assets without meeting the requirements of legal proof and procedural fairness.
2. The importance of applying Klitgaard’s equation to anti-corruption experiences and initiatives
Klitgaard’s model is among the most widely used theoretical frameworks for explaining the emergence of institutional corruption. It reduces the phenomenon to a well-known equation:
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability
This equation suggests that corruption is not merely an individual moral failing, but a direct consequence of an institutional structure that permits concentrated power and lacks effective checks and balances. The more an entity monopolises decision-making authority or control over resources and opportunities, and the greater its discretionary power to make decisions without clear standards or binding procedures, the more likely power is to be abused. The situation becomes more dangerous when transparency declines and oversight and accountability mechanisms weaken, whether legal, institutional, or societal.
From this perspective, corruption emerges when three elements coincide: a monopoly over decision-making, extensive discretionary authority, and weak oversight and accountability. Institutions with exceptional powers or broad mandates can achieve positive, effective results if they face rigorous oversight, transparency, and legal challenge. However, when such powers are granted without adequate safeguards, they create an environment that encourages abuse of influence and prioritises private, political, or factional interests over the public good.
This equation is particularly relevant during periods of political transition, when governments frequently establish exceptional institutions or committees to address transitional challenges. Expanding their powers may seem necessary to achieve political transformation quickly and effectively. Yet without adequate institutional safeguards, a commitment to integrity and transparency, and adherence to the rule of law, these measures may reproduce new forms of authoritarianism or abuse of power, even when the stated objectives are legitimate and well-intentioned.
Accordingly, the real challenge lies in designing a governance system that balances effectiveness with accountability. The more transparent the system, the more diverse the oversight mechanisms, the stronger the judiciary’s independence, and the more accessible the procedures for complaints, appeals, and review, the lower the risk of corruption and abuse of power—even in institutions with exceptional authority. Combating corruption, therefore, depends not simply on changing individuals or intentions, but fundamentally on building institutions capable of constraining power and subjecting it to continuous accountability.
Institutional Analysis of Sudan’s Empowerment Removal Committee: Key Findings
1. Institutional and procedural separation between dismantling political empowerment and combating corruption
The Empowerment Removal Committee’s experience reveals a key institutional challenge: a lack of clear separation between dismantling political empowerment and combating corruption and recovering public funds, despite their fundamental differences in nature, objectives, tools, and assessment criteria.
This distinction matters institutionally, since clearly defined mandates and limits on authority are essential to prevent overlapping responsibilities and the transformation of exceptional powers into broad, unconstrained discretion.
At its core, dismantling political empowerment is a transitional, exceptional process intended to address the legacy of the previous political regime’s penetration of state institutions, rebuild public institutions based on professionalism, neutrality, and competence, and curb the use of state institutions as instruments of political control. The principal measure of success is therefore the extent to which public institutions regain their neutrality, political control networks are dismantled, and fair rules are established for recruitment, promotion and the management of public resources.
By contrast, combating corruption and recovering assets serve a different function in legal and institutional terms. They require precisely identifying corrupt acts, investigating them in accordance with legal procedures, and establishing them through evidence sufficient to demonstrate individual or institutional responsibility. Any subsequent recovery of money or assets must then take place within the applicable legal and judicial frameworks.
Success in this area should not be measured primarily by the number of people removed from their positions or the value of assets seized. More appropriate indicators include the number of corruption cases investigated and substantiated, the proportion of funds finally recovered, the quality of legal procedures, the proportion of decisions upheld by the courts, and the effectiveness of systems designed to prevent future corruption.
Failure to distinguish between these two functions creates an institutional problem that goes beyond differences in terminology. Political affiliation or employment in senior positions under the previous regime may become implicit indicators of corruption, while allegations of financial misconduct may be treated as an extension of political empowerment. Political or occupational responsibility then becomes confused with individual legal liability, allowing previous affiliation or association with the former regime to influence decisions instead of making specific conduct and legally admissible evidence the basis of accountability.
From an institutional-design perspective, this problem could have been addressed by separating the two functions. A transitional body with a clearly defined mandate could have been responsible for dismantling political empowerment and restoring neutrality to state institutions, while suspected criminal and financial corruption cases could have been referred to independent, specialised justice institutions responsible for investigation, the establishment of evidence, prosecution and asset recovery.
The experience also revealed an institutional paradox: rather than merely dismantling the previous system of political empowerment, the transitional government reproduced a similar pattern in favour of the political forces participating in the transitional period.
This was particularly evident in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state institutions, where the government retired or removed experienced and qualified diplomats on the grounds of dismantling political empowerment. Some of these positions were later filled by individuals associated with political parties or forces involved in the transitional period, without open, competitive recruitment or clear, transparent professional criteria governing appointments.
The result was a shift from one form of political empowerment to another, rather than a transition toward neutral institutions grounded in competence, competition, and accountability.
Viewed through the lens of Klitgaard’s model, the institutional risk lies not only in who exercises power, but also in the system’s design, which permits decision-making to be monopolised and discretionary authority to expand without adequate oversight. The success of dismantling political empowerment should therefore be measured not by removing previous office-holders, but by how far the process breaks the underlying logic of political empowerment and establishes institutional rules that guarantee neutrality, competence, equal opportunity, and the rule of law.
2. Institutional and legal criticism of the Committee’s experience
A. Legislative weaknesses in the Committee’s governing law
The Empowerment Removal, Anti-Corruption and Recovery of Public Funds Committee, established under the 2019 law and its subsequent amendments, faced a range of legal and constitutional criticisms. These criticisms primarily concerned the breadth of powers granted to the Committee and the lack of clear boundaries between its administrative authority and functions that properly belong to the legal and judicial spheres.
The legal framework enabled the Committee to take measures with far-reaching consequences for property rights, public employment, contracts and financial transactions. These included confiscation, termination of employment and the cancellation of certain transactions and contracts, without all such measures necessarily being subject to prior and effective direct judicial oversight.
The institutional problem lies not only in the nature of the Committee’s decisions, but also in the procedural safeguards accompanying them. When an exceptional body is granted extensive powers to interfere with the rights and legal status of individuals and institutions, this must be matched by clear decision-making standards, an effective right to defend oneself and lodge complaints, independent review, and a genuine opportunity to challenge decisions before the courts.
When these safeguards are weak, the risks of administrative error, arbitrariness and selective enforcement increase. Courts may also later annul or invalidate the institution’s decisions, undermining the durability of the results achieved.
B. The overlap of judicial and security functions and the crisis of separation of powers
The institutional problem became more pronounced when several functions that, in a sound legal system, should be distributed among independent but complementary bodies became intertwined in the empowerment removal process. These included gathering information and conducting preliminary investigations, adopting precautionary measures, bringing charges, issuing decisions affecting rights, and enforcing them.
Implementing some Committee decisions also involved police, security, and other uniformed agencies. This created considerable scope for the transitional political function to overlap with law-enforcement responsibilities. The danger of such arrangements lies in their potential to concentrate political, administrative, executive and security powers within a single system, weakening the separation and balance of powers and diminishing the independence of institutions responsible for justice and law enforcement.
Furthermore, shifting aspects of anti-corruption work and dismantling political empowerment into a security or quasi-security framework increased the risk of politicising law enforcement, particularly where independent, effective judicial oversight of searches, arrests, and the freezing or seizure of funds and assets was lacking.
From an institutional-analysis perspective, the fundamental problem was not simply that exceptional powers existed in a transitional context, but that the institutional safeguards governing how those powers were exercised, who reviewed them and how they could be challenged were inadequate.
Under Klitgaard’s model, extensive authority, a monopoly over decision-making, and broad discretion, without commensurate oversight and accountability, increase the risk of abuse of power—even when the stated objective is to combat corruption or dismantle political empowerment.
The institutional lesson from Sudan’s experience is therefore that the effectiveness of transitional institutions should not be measured by the breadth of their powers, but by their ability to exercise those powers within clearly defined limits, under independent oversight and with procedural safeguards and institutional separation sufficient to prevent anti-corruption efforts from becoming another instrument for creating or politically redistributing power.
C. The politicisation of accountability, the pursuit of critics and restrictions on press freedom: practical examples
One of the most serious signs of declining institutional commitment during the Committee’s experience was its intolerance of criticism and its pursuit of opposing or critical voices over its procedures. According to the article, this involved using the Committee’s authority and laws on rumours and obstruction of state activities. Such practices contradict the principles of transparency and public accountability on which any national integrity system must be founded.
Among the most notable examples cited are:
1. Targeting critical journalists and media professionals. The Committee detained and prosecuted several journalists and media figures who criticised its procedural shortcomings or questioned the legality of its confiscation decisions. This included the summoning and pursuit of prominent media professionals through complaints brought under provisions relating to “obstructing the work of the Committee” or “dismantling the regime”, reportedly in response to journalistic investigations criticising the conduct of some of its members.
2. Legal action against legal experts. The Committee initiated proceedings against lawyers and legal practitioners who questioned the constitutionality of the Committee’s law or challenged the lack of an independent appeal stage. In some of the Committee’s literature and media statements, such criticism was characterised as “defending political empowerment and figures from the former regime”.
3. Precautionary decisions and restrictions on media organisations. The issuance of decisions to suspend or freeze the assets of certain press and media institutions and media companies because they were affiliated with figures from the former regime, reportedly without prior judicial authorisation. These measures affected press freedom and media pluralism during the transitional period.
From the Lessons of Experience to Institutional Reform
The significance of Sudan’s Empowerment Removal Committee does not lie solely in judging it a success or a failure. It lies in the lessons that should be drawn from its experience. The Committee emerged in a specific political context and responded to public political pressure. At the same time, however, its experience exposed the risks of concentrating powers, inadequate institutional safeguards, the overlap of political, judicial and executive functions, and the possibility that dismantling one form of political empowerment could lead to its reproduction in another form.
The priority today should be to study the experience and learn from it so that the same mistakes are not repeated in any future phase. A state seeking to overcome the legacy of political empowerment cannot build its future using the very tools that contributed to its crisis. Genuine reform also cannot merely replace some individuals with others or shift influence from one group to another. Real reform begins with changing the rules and institutions that make political, economic and administrative empowerment possible in the first place.
The most important lesson for Sudan, therefore, is that institutional reform must become an integral part of the transition and state-building project, rather than an outcome deferred until later. This includes reforming the civil service based on competence, neutrality and equal opportunity; strengthening the independence of the judiciary and public prosecution; establishing an integrated national system for integrity and anti-corruption; adopting transparent rules for managing public finances, appointments and resources; and ensuring that civilian and military institutions alike are subject to the law and to oversight and accountability mechanisms.
The greatest contribution we can make to Sudan’s future is to build a state and institutions on firm foundations that make corruption and the re-emergence of political empowerment more difficult, while ensuring that power remains subject to the law and accountability, regardless of who exercises it.
The lesson of past experiences lies in translating their findings into sustainable institutional reforms that move Sudan away from managing crises through committees and exceptional measures, towards consolidating permanent and capable institutions that protect the state and society, safeguard justice, and prevent state institutions from once again being subordinated to the interests of those in power.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=18813