An Analytical Reading of Import Ban Decision No. 74
Habib Allah Abdel Wahab
It is well understood among practitioners and observers of foreign trade that banning or restricting the import of certain goods is often a positive trade policy. In most cases, it aims to support domestic production, protect local industries from foreign competition, and curb consumption—particularly of luxury and non-essential goods.
From this perspective, whatever may be said about the Council of Ministers’ decision No. (74), issued on 12 April 2026 upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, it remains a positive step—provided that the banned items are indeed luxury and non-essential goods, regardless of their number or weight in the trade balance.
However, the decision explicitly states that its objective is to curb the depreciation of the local currency against foreign currencies. Here lies a fundamental issue: despite the media attention surrounding the decision, it deviates significantly from its stated objective.
A Limited Impact on the Trade Balance
The share of the targeted goods within the overall trade balance is relatively small:
2022: about 9%
2024: about 11%
2025: about 15%
Average (last 3 years): about 11%
This is a modest proportion, offering only a marginal contribution amid the severe pressure currently facing the Sudanese pound. In effect, the policy addresses a minor component while leaving the core problem largely untouched.
Ignoring the Real Shock: Collapse of Agricultural Exports
What is more striking is that the Ministry of Trade and Industry—and other relevant authorities—appear to have overlooked the far more significant shock affecting the trade balance: the collapse in agricultural exports due to the war.
Official figures indicate substantial losses:
2024: $507 million (27% decline)
2025: $899 million (47% decline)
These losses are measured against the average export performance of the four years preceding the war.
This raises a critical question:
Why is the government focusing on restricting imports representing less than 10–11% of trade, while ignoring export losses approaching half of agricultural output?
The imbalance in policy priorities is clear. Addressing export constraints should take precedence over marginal import restrictions.
Sorghum Exports: A Missed Opportunity
One of the most practical and effective policy options available to the Ministry is lifting the ban on sorghum exports.
For years, the Ministry has maintained this ban under the justification of preventing food shortages. While this concern was once valid, it has become outdated:
Many communities that depend on sorghum also produce it, making it unlikely they would export their subsistence supply.
Urban populations in sorghum-producing regions increasingly rely on wheat-based bread rather than sorghum.
Lifting the export ban may lead to temporary price increases, which is a normal market response. However, this short-term effect would likely generate longer-term benefits:
- Increased incentives for farmers and investors
- Expansion in production and productivity
- Eventual surplus supply covering domestic needs and export demand
Evidence from previous seasons suggests that sorghum, if integrated into the export structure, could potentially surpass the combined contribution of sesame and cotton to the trade balance.
Spillover Effects: Livestock and Meat Exports
- An increase in sorghum production would also generate an additional supply of animal feed, which could:
- Strengthen the livestock sector
- Boost meat exports
This creates a multiplier effect, enhancing the overall export base and improving the trade balance—an outcome of strategic importance.
The Gold Factor: A Neglected Pillar
Another puzzling aspect of current policy is the limited focus on gold revenues.
Gold has the potential to cover up to 82% of import needs, even if the government captures only 50% of production.
According to official figures:
Total gold production (2025): 70.15 tonnes
50% share: 35.08 tonnes
Estimated value: approximately $5.3 billion (based on recent global prices)
By comparison:
Total imports (2025): $6.5 billion
Even under conservative assumptions, gold alone could nearly finance imports. Yet, the government has failed to secure even half of the production revenues.
Conclusion: Rebalancing Economic Strategy
The key to restoring economic balance in Sudan lies in:
Prioritising export growth, especially in agriculture
Addressing war-related disruptions to export structures
Adopting a realistic export policy, particularly for gold
Ensuring the Central Bank captures full export proceeds
Such a policy must strike a balance between:
Legitimate profit incentives for exporters
National economic recovery objectives
This is not unprecedented—it was successfully achieved in 2020 and 2021.
Without such a strategic shift, the current approach risks remaining ineffective.
As the author bluntly concludes:
“Without this, one could fairly say that the government is operating outside the ring.”
Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=13344