A New Global Landscape is Shaping Around Sudan, what are the Outcomes?

Dr. Mohammed Othman Awadallah
The global condemnation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has moved from media reports aimed at influencing public opinion to pressuring governments through institutions to take a stance on the link between the UAE and the RSF’s crimes.
In this article, we will mention several of these institutions and discuss this development and the potential consequences:
The first and most prominent institution is the U.S. Congress, where formal proceedings have proven the allegations against the UAE. This was voiced by both U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Molly Phee and the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Mr. Tom Perriello. Several senators have sent signed letters to both the U.S. President and the President and Foreign Minister of the UAE regarding the support provided to the RSF. Additionally, members of Congress introduced a bill to ban the sale of American weapons to the UAE due to their use in crimes in Darfur by the RSF. The U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan mentioned that an official American committee is investigating this matter.
The second institution is the European Union, which sent a critical letter by its ambassador in Sudan detailing to EU countries all forms of UAE support for the RSF, with specific numbers and dates.
The third institution is the United Nations Security Council. While Sudan presented the evidence to the Council through a formal complaint, members discussed and shared it, positively commenting on its merits, documentation, and supporting evidence. It has now become an official reference document, categorized and backed by all the necessary information and materials.
The fourth institution is The New York Times and its recent report. Its significance stems from its role as an unofficial spokesperson for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The report was detailed, citing specific numbers and dates.
The fifth institution is the International Red Cross, which condemned the UAE’s use of its emblem, accusing the UAE of hiding behind the Red Cross and Red Crescent symbols to support the RSF.
We will only mention others, such as news agency reports, satellite channels, and influential individuals; let’s focus on these official institutions. However, we will highlight former U.S. diplomat Cameron Hudson, who has consistently documented the RSF’s crimes and the UAE’s responsibility while defending Sudan’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of its institutions.
The U.S. government will not be able to ignore the growing pressure from the officials and the public to take a clear stance on the violations committed by the UAE. Nor can it disregard the solid and verified information and evidence linking UAE support to the crimes of the militias.
Thus, it is inevitable that the U.S. government will move towards taking a position on the UAE. To draw a comparison, we can recall the British government’s response when Sudan submitted its formal complaint against the UAE. The UAE pressured Great Britain, which ultimately manipulated the Security Council session requested by Sudan, turning it into a closed meeting to avoid exposing the UAE. They also delayed the session, hoping that time would lead to its cancellation. The lesson from this comparison is that significant powers prioritize their interests over any principles they claim to uphold on paper and will find ways to present a public facade.
Now, let’s address the following question: What options and alternatives could the U.S. government pursue regarding the UAE? Several scenarios can be summarized as follows:
First: A politically mediated settlement between Sudan and the UAE, supervised by the U.S. This would involve the UAE being included in the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the militias under the guise of contributing financially. This would effectively ‘clean’ the UAE’s hands of the bloodshed by making it a part of the peace negotiations. The U.S. had even set up the Geneva platform for this purpose. However, Sudan’s refusal to participate in the Geneva talks or to accept the UAE’s involvement has thwarted this option.
Second: The U.S. government could publicly acknowledge three specific mistakes by the UAE: its connection to the crimes of the militias, its violation of the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Darfur, and its role in supplying the militias with American weapons. However, the U.S. might use these errors to blackmail the UAE, demanding financial compensation for U.S. political protection against Sudanese escalation. While this option may benefit both the U.S. and the UAE, it faces challenges from congressional pressure, public outcry, and the ongoing cries of victims, which could tarnish the U.S.’s reputation by associating it with protecting the Janjaweed and their heinous crimes.
Third: The U.S. might seek a middle-ground solution that balances three conflicting interests: securing its financial interests through blackmailing the UAE, ensuring the UAE halts its support for the militias to stop further crimes, and addressing public pressure to claim some achievement.
The Sudanese government must carefully analyze this situation and develop a well-crafted plan to navigate it. It must form a skilled and capable negotiating team equipped with the vision, willpower, and strength to move forward in these turbulent waters despite the risk of encountering ‘sharks.’ The team should be supported by strong popular will and a unified internal front.