A Deconstructive Reading of the “Layers of War” in Yemen and the Terminology Surrounding Them

Areeb Al-Rantawi
Few crises have been distorted, reduced, oversimplified, and superficially treated as the Yemeni crisis. Nor has any other domestic or international conflict seen as much confusion and conflation of concepts and terminology in its language over more than two decades.
We say more than two decades because the war in Yemen, and the wars waged by others against it, did not begin recently, or even with the eight-year war. The roots of the conflict, with its multiple, overlapping layers, go back much further, to the era of the late Ali Abdullah Saleh and his shifting alliances with influential Gulf capitals. These alliances ebbed and flowed like the tides. As for the instruments of the war being fought today, its fuel, alliances and immediate and longer-term objectives, their manifestations had already emerged long ago, albeit with less intensity and a lower degree of open brazenness.
Deconstructing the Layers of War
There are competing narratives about what is happening in Yemen, each concealing a political and, at times, ideological bias.
Those who argue that this is essentially a Yemeni-on-Yemeni war overlook the role of external actors in fuelling the conflict, regionalising it and internationalising it. The Saudi narrative is particularly prominent here. The Kingdom insists that it is not a party to the conflict and that its intervention has always been undertaken in the context of mediation and efforts to broker an elusive peace between “brothers turned enemies”. It claims to have no ambitions or interests in Yemen. It presents its role as a response to Iran’s growing influence and encroachment on Yemeni affairs, invariably through its support for the “legitimate government”. The word “legitimate” is deliberately placed in quotation marks here; we shall return to its deconstruction before the end of this article. The Saudi narrative is, in effect, a condensed version of a broader Gulf narrative, backed by an unmistakably official Arab narrative.
Opposing it is the “Iranian narrative”, which rejects accusations of interference and attributes the conflict to its Yemeni dimension, while not forgetting to point the finger at Gulf and Arab states involved in Yemen’s wars and responsible for its instability. It accuses Gulf states of intervening with American and Western backing, and sometimes Israeli support. It goes so far as to maintain that all decisions concerning Yemeni affairs rest independently with Ansar Allah, without concealing the alliance and coordination between Sana’a and Tehran.
Exonerating oneself of the “false accusation” of interfering in Yemeni affairs while accusing one’s adversaries of blatant, brazen intervention is the greatest common denominator between these two narratives. It also grossly reduces what is happening in a country that ceased to be “Happy Arabia” long ago.
A second narrative magnifies the role of external forces in fuelling the war in Yemen and against it, stripping the conflict of its national motivations and underlying causes rooted in political and social divisions and the competing priorities and objectives of key Yemeni actors. It also strips the conflict of its ideological character, recasting it as a “proxy war” fought between Tehran on one side and its numerous regional adversaries on the other.
Geopolitics adds a decisive international dimension to these narratives by explaining the conflict’s origins and persistence, making it one of the region’s longest-running conflicts. The United States enters the picture as the sponsor of the “legitimate government” and its Arab and regional backers. China appears as a source of technology for Houthi drones and missiles, while Russia features as a rival to America in the struggle over the future of the emerging world order. We should also mention regional players outside the Arab sphere, such as Ethiopia and Türkiye, among others.
The truth is that the war in Yemen, and the war against it, has several overlapping layers.
Anyone who disregards the Yemeni-on-Yemeni dimension of this war first denies the fact that tribal, regional and geographical divisions among Yemenis have long been important drivers of war, conflict and rivalry.
Second, they deny the existence of a distinct southern agenda. Some call it “separatist”, although it did not emerge from a vacuum and has genuine underlying causes and motivations.
Third, they deny the existence of sectarian and religious divisions between the Houthi–Zaydi current, which has moved closer to Twelver Shiism, and the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements. These divisions have manifested themselves in political parties and armed groups that did not emerge today; their roots run deep in Yemen’s social and political landscape, stretching back years and decades.
Fourth, they deny the existence of divisions among Yemenis over the future of their country and the form of state and government they wish to establish. Competing visions range from an “Imamate” to a “Republic”, from those who favour “separation” to those who lean towards “federalism”, and others who remain committed to a “centralised state”.
This is only a glimpse of the many internal divisions that fuel and perpetuate the conflict, creating major breaches in the walls of sovereignty and national unity and undermining social cohesion. These fractures allow anyone seeking to manipulate Yemen to infiltrate its affairs. At times, they become gateways for foreign intervention, the recruitment of local proxies and mercenaries, and other practices we have long known and witnessed.
Talk of the regionalisation and internationalisation of the Yemeni conflict would not be possible without regional and international interest networks, driven by ambitions to secure a foothold in Yemen’s geography, territorial waters, airspace, and natural wealth. These interests range from shipping lanes and maritime routes to the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and include the country’s resources, which Yemenis have never had a real opportunity to explore, extract, or benefit from.
Some actors do not want Yemen to be united, stable, and developing, and, above all, “democratic and pluralistic”, for fear the contagion might spread to their own societies.
There are also those prepared to spare no expense in pursuing political Islam, in all its schools of thought, to the farthest reaches of the planet. Yemen has long been a breeding ground for various forms of political and militant Islam. These range from the Al-Qaeda presence in Aden and Abyan, which has been a particular source of concern for the West, to the Salafi schools that Ali Abdullah Saleh supported and helped spread in a deliberate effort to spite and confront the Houthis, with clear Arab and Gulf backing. Then there is the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, known as Islah, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, with its considerable social base in important regions and communities across the country. Finally, there are the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, whose movement moved increasingly closer to Twelver Shiism following the six wars Ali Abdullah Saleh waged against them.
Meanwhile, Gulf and other regional states remain focused on Yemen’s strategically important islands, its thousands of kilometres of coastline, and its strait and ports. This interest is part of a broader geopolitical vision of expansion and presence, both in investment and strategic terms.
For these reasons, the war in Yemen, and against it, has multiple layers. The first is national, involving conflict among Yemenis themselves. The second is regional, involving states coveting Yemen’s territory and subsoil resources, its waters, coastlines, islands, ports and maritime passages. The third is international, touching the heart of maritime security, trade, supply chains, and the “fight against piracy and terrorism” off the Horn of Africa.
To reduce the costs of their hegemonic ambitions and efforts to establish footholds in this strategically sensitive geography, various parties have sought to recruit “proxies” and “allies” from among the Yemenis themselves. Unfortunately, most regional actors, particularly Arab states, have found it relatively easy to obtain what they want. Yemenis themselves have allowed their country to become an “open arena” for anyone wishing to play games and wreak havoc. They have also invited successive foreign interventions. Recent history shows that the practice of “switching sides” or “shifting one’s rifle from one shoulder to the other” has become more widespread in Yemen than in almost any other arena of protracted conflict.
We may therefore conclude that deconstructing the layers of the war in Yemen and against it is important not only for understanding and diagnosing the conflict, but also as a prerequisite for devising solutions and initiatives. Any initiative or mediation effort that fails to recognise these layers and build upon them will remain incomplete and will, in turn, sow the seeds of new rounds of Yemen’s seemingly endless cycle of war.
To escape the “vicious circle of the game and its players”, we must identify which links in the chain of conflict are central and which are less important and can be assigned secondary or tertiary priority. This assessment changes as Yemen’s circumstances evolve and as successive waves of war, de-escalation and brief periods of peace come and go.
Today, I believe the central axis of these conflicts lies between Sana’a and Riyadh, taking precedence over the other links and circles. If a comprehensive settlement between the two sides can be reached, after helping them climb down from their entrenched positions, it will then be possible to begin disentangling the other conflicts, with greater ease and better prospects of success.
Among other things, this requires opening a direct dialogue channel between the two warring capitals, along with another between Riyadh and Tehran, drawing on a broad range of mediators and wise intermediaries, beginning with Muscat and extending to Ankara, Islamabad, Cairo and Doha.
If developments proceed positively along these two tracks, many of the knots and suspicions that divide Yemenis themselves could begin to unravel, even though some Yemeni actors do not, in any case, have the final say over their own decisions. Saudi–Emirati rivalry in southern Yemen and over its future could be contained, and relations between the two shores of the Arabian Gulf could shift from competition over Yemen to cooperation in addressing its crises. This could pave the way to contain the wider conflict among the Gulf’s bordering capitals.
Areeb Al-Rantawi is a political analyst and founder of the Al-Quds Centre for Political Studies.

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