Is Sudan’s Crisis Constitutional?

Advocate Dr. Abdel Azim Hassan

Many tend to reduce Sudan’s crisis to the failure to agree on a permanent constitution. Yet, the essence of the crisis lies in the absence of knowledge of the means and mechanisms that lead to stability – and it is stability that will necessarily produce a constitution. Since the crisis is linked to the constitution, a question arises: has the struggle over the constitution been one of the most significant causes and primary drivers of the crisis?

The answer is: yes. To deconstruct this reality, the three dimensions of the crisis must be considered: constitutional, political, and socio-economic.

The Constitutional Dimension of the Crisis

Since independence in 1956, the Sudanese have failed to agree on a permanent constitution, instead swinging between transitional charters. It began with the Self-Government Act of 1953, followed by the 1956 Transitional Constitution, which was suspended by Abboud’s coup d’état in 1958. As is well known, it was reinstated during the October 1964 Revolution but was abolished by Nimeiri’s 1969 coup, which introduced the so-called “Permanent” Constitution of 1973. After Nimeiri’s regime fell, the 1985 Transitional Constitution was enacted, only to be repealed by al-Bashir’s 1989 coup. In 1998, Turabi’s “Tawali” (community alliance) constitution was introduced, followed by the 2005 Constitution, a product of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which remained in effect until al-Bashir’s downfall in 2019. This gave rise to the “Constitutional Document”, later overthrown in the coups of October 2020 and 2021.

Every constitution or charter was tied to a specific regime of rule – and when that regime collapsed, its constitutional legitimacy collapsed with it.

Features of the Constitutional Crisis:

The absence of a consensual constitution has left state institutions as fragile structures without supreme legal protection.

The judiciary did not emerge naturally and remained subordinate to executive authority, rendering it incapable of fulfilling its oversight role.

Second: The Political Dimension of the Crisis

Political parties and civil society organisations viewed the constitution as a tool of struggle, rather than a supreme reference.

State institutions were used to obstruct the constitution, reducing it to formal texts.

The military establishment became the largest “political party” in Sudan.

Third: The Socio-Economic Dimension of the Crisis

The crisis was not confined to the constitutional and political spheres alone, but also encompassed:

Neglect of multiple identities and weak equitable representation.

Unequal development and marginalisation.

Pervasive corruption and the shrinking authority of the central state and local governments.

The Difference Between the Constitutional and Political Dimensions

The Constitutional Dimension relates to texts and legal references.

It is also embodied in the absence of a permanent constitution, repeated coups, weak institutions, and the lack of constitutional legitimacy.

The Political Dimension, on the other hand, revolves around the struggle for power between civilians and the military, the weakness of political parties and internal divisions, and the proliferation of armed movements, as well as a sense of marginalisation.

This is in addition to the de facto legitimacy of force and arms, culminating in the outbreak of the 2023 war.

As a result, the constitution in Sudan has always been the outcome of a political bargain; when the bargain collapses, the constitution collapses.

The Overlap Between the Constitutional and political dimensions is manifested by the fact that every constitution drafted in Sudan was the product of a fragile political consensus (1964, 1985, 2005, 2019). However,

In the absence of an all-embracing social contract, constitutional texts cannot endure.

Possible Solutions to the Compound Crisis

The crisis is neither purely constitutional (absence of a permanent constitution) nor purely political (struggle for power), but rather compound: a constitution without political consensus = disabled texts, and: politics without a constitution = chaos.

Six Foundations for Exiting the Crisis

Managing exceptional circumstances: In times of war or transition, ideological programmes or elections cannot be imposed; instead, agreement on a fair formula of representation is required.

Gradualism and avoiding haste: Transition needs emergency and flexible strategic plans leading to an elected parliament.

Entrusting the transition to non-partisan technocrats: To ensure objectivity and distance from party conflict.

Balancing security and freedoms: The Bill of Rights must account for the reality of widespread arms and security fluidity.

Early recourse to the ballot box: As the only guarantor for building genuine legitimacy.

Continuous communication with the public: Through media messaging that builds trust and awareness while addressing urgent crises.

Conclusion

Ending wars and managing transitional phases is not about solving all chronic problems but about creating an environment conducive to safe transition towards a consensual constitution and free, fair elections. The failure to manage transition has been the direct cause of renewed conflict and the eruption of wars. Today, there is no escape from absorbing these lessons to build a unified Sudanese state that embraces all its citizens.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=7358