The Magic Recipe for the Sudanese Situation

By: Dr Abdelwahab El-Affendi

2 August 2025

My meetings with Western and African diplomats and officials have almost become tedious from how often I repeat an exceedingly simple demand during our repeated discussions about the Sudanese situation—and from the unhelpful, if not downright shameful, responses I receive, when I receive any at all.
If the diplomat is of ordinary rank, they nod, take notes, or ask a few questions. If they are of high rank, they offer responses I am embarrassed to repeat—usually related to a certain country in our region and the need to appease it because it is assisting them in the Gaza war.
The simple point I keep repeating requires neither a miracle nor a break with established norms; it is perfectly in line with these countries’ stated policies. It boils down to a simple request: to pressure the Rapid Support Forces militia to stop the constant violations and atrocities it commits against civilians—crimes followed by the destruction of public and private property, obstruction of relief efforts, and the dismantling of the foundations of life in the country.
I say to my interlocutor—often visiting me in my office, or meeting me at the hotel they are staying in, or at the ambassador’s residence—“Your Excellency, is it not absurd to ask for dialogue with an organisation that cannot stop committing violations that are, at the very least, war crimes? They kill without cause; they abduct children, girls, and women; and commit the vilest forms of rape and sexual assault. Their violations include destroying water stations and sources, razing farms, and what can be described as the razing of universities, schools, and hospitals, along with the looting and vandalism of pharmacies and markets, the destruction of power stations, and the sabotage and looting of transmission equipment—wires, poles, and transformers.”
My companion nods patiently and may state that they are aware of these abominations. Then it is my turn to ask: “Are such crimes not among the gravest offences prohibited under your laws and international law? And is committing them routinely, around the clock, everywhere this rogue group sets foot, not among the most heinous of crimes?” Another nod, perhaps followed by a declaration that their government has condemned them and maybe even imposed sanctions.
I then add my core point: condemnation—even sanctions—is not enough. I believe the most effective course is for the state concerned to send a direct message to this rogue faction: that it must stop these crimes wholly and immediately, and that doing so is the precondition for its acceptance anywhere in the world—let alone its inclusion in the government of any country. Would you accept dealing with gangs of this sort in your own countries or neighbourhoods (in Mexico, Colombia, or Haiti, for example)? At this point comes a moment of silence, followed by promises to “do something”. Most leave none the wiser. Some of their countries soon send someone else, especially if a new disaster strikes or a possible change in circumstances arises, to ask similar questions.
But the Sudanese themselves should be the first to take firm positions on such matters. The militia was misled and emboldened by a faction of Sudanese who fed it meaningless slogans such as “the State of ’56” and other nonsense, and false hopes that it was fighting for democracy. I will not waste time here discussing the “new government” the Janjaweed announced—it is a failed public relations stunt from the outset. Before this, they had created a “civil administration” consisting of one man in the Gezira region, which failed even in a PR role and could not produce a single statement absolving the Janjaweed of their atrocities.
Just a few days ago, I posted on “X” about those who deny the genocide in Gaza, saying: anyone who believes there is no genocide or famine in Gaza is devoid of understanding, and therefore unfit for any public responsibility, especially in universities. As for those who know about the genocide and famine but distort and deceive, they are devoid of morals and even less deserving of any responsibility. This applies equally to those who support the Janjaweed on the pretext that this rogue faction is engaged in a reform project in Sudan, and that its criminals are the most deserving champions of democracy in the country. If they are sincere, they are the most ignorant of fools; if they are lying, they are the vilest of villains. Some combine both vices.
In any case, there is still time for those with the bare minimum of decency to realise the impossibility of integrating this militia—under its current leadership and with its fighters steeped in these atrocities—into any part of the political process, or indeed into any aspect of life in Sudan. The overwhelming majority of Sudanese, having suffered the fire of its violations and seen their country destroyed—everything they knew and valued in their studies, work, homes, and social environment—will not accept this. That is the bare minimum for its acceptance in society.
As for the militia’s own proposal, and that of its zealous (or coerced) backers, that it should rule Sudan or even part of it, this is the first of impossibilities, not the third. Its areas of control in Darfur are still witnessing its worst atrocities—genocide, the destruction of life, and the criminal siege of El-Fasher that portends even greater crimes. Anyone applauding the militia for this planned crime and wishing it success deserves to bear its sin and share responsibility for past and future crimes and violations—each of which alone would merit the flames of Hell.
We return to the starting point: deterring the militia from its crimes and delusions by confronting it with a united voice condemning its plague-like devastation. It has not entered a single village without laying it waste. The devastation it has caused is without precedent anywhere—not even in the Mongol era or under colonialism. Every invading force or tyrannical government has allowed people to continue their livelihoods to benefit from them. But this Janjaweed plague has blocked roads, destroyed offices and workplaces, obstructed trade, industry, and agriculture, and imposed de facto house arrest on those remaining—without sparing them from violations.
In Gezira, for example, it looted household food supplies and, in its ignorance and absurdity, entered homes in broad daylight during Ramadan to take what families had prepared for breaking the fast, claiming they were more entitled to it—forgetting that abstaining from food is less important than abstaining from killing, looting, and violating the sanctity of believers. Worse, they looted seeds and farming tools, as well as all livestock, animals, cars, and tractors—making survival impossible through both lack of food and inability to farm. Those who returned to their villages after the army liberated them found grass covering the houses because the animals that had grazed on it were gone, along with the people who had cut it.
In a previous article in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, I wrote of my astonishment at the persistence of this aggression—even in Darfur areas, they consider their “base” and homeland. I heard one tribal leader, in a serious recorded statement (not in jest), condemn them for looting and fighting among themselves—which, he said, would land them in the depths of Hell—and urge them instead to loot other areas, like Khartoum. But contrary to this “charitable” advice, they carried out in Nyala and elsewhere their habitual looting, sexual assaults, and market burnings—adding the burning and destruction of the very buildings they looted, especially universities. This shows there is not a single rational man or leader with a shred of sense among them to restrain them, at least from destroying what they steal.
We hope (but do not expect) that among the “politicians” and “intellectuals” who support this rogue faction there are some wise enough to remind them that such destructive behaviour undermines civilisation and makes them unfit for acceptance in any society—past or present—let alone as the supposed path to democracy in Sudan or anywhere else. We hope they have some courage, from the safety of their distant exiles beyond the reach of these brigands, to warn their leaders that such conduct will destroy them before anyone else. Like locusts, they never settle in a field without ruining it, forcing them to move on to another field they leaving it barren constantly.
But I am not optimistic (unfortunately) about most of them coming to their senses. I read one of their leaders praising the militia, claiming it had provided “protection” to the “revolutionaries”—though he knows, as we all do and as the whole world knows, that it was the militia that broke up the sit-in, and that he and his clique negotiated with its leaders for immunity from prosecution for that crime if it sided with them against the army.
The only optimism comes from the fact that this brutal entity is self-destructive and will disappear—along with anyone who placed a political bet on it. We can already see that bankrupt political forces, devoid of both political and moral capital, have squandered what little credibility they had by siding with it—a stance they once denied when they still had a shred of shame and a dash of Machiavellianism. Their open embrace of this sin/scandal today is nothing but a suicide mission for those who have given up on all hope of good.
Given the apparent impossibility of this criminal militia cleansing itself of its sins, we are now witnessing a unified African and international (and perhaps Arab) trend towards eliminating it—regarded as the key to solving the Sudanese crisis. I hope that the collective message we have long called for will be sent to the militia (and its servants), urging them to abandon their self-destructive path that harms both them and the country, though their destruction, frankly, would not sadden me in the least.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=6937