Analysis of the British Draft Resolution

Ambassador Abdel Mahmoud Abdel Halim

On Monday morning in New York, the Russian Federation delegation to the UN Security Council used its veto to block a draft resolution submitted by Britain and Sierra Leone concerning the issue of “civilian protection” in Sudan. The resolution, which received approval from 14 other members, included 15 operative clauses and 8 preamble clauses. It focused specifically on arrangements related to civilian protection, unlike previous Council resolutions on Sudan that addressed various issues. The veto, the first of its kind concerning Sudan in a long time, brought to mind the double veto by Russia and China in 2008 against a Zimbabwe-related resolution.
Since Britain, as the Security Council president for November, was the main sponsor of the resolution, including Sierra Leone was likely intended to project an impression of African consensus on the matter. This was perhaps aimed at pressuring countries like Russia and China to avoid opposing it for fear of being seen as rejecting African unity. Notably, Britain had previously intervened militarily in Sierra Leone during its civil war in May 2000, and Sierra Leone served as a strategic location for British operations during the Falklands War. Historically, Sierra Leone also mediated tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia in the late 1970s.
The resolution seemed to revive the concept of building an “architectural framework” for civilian protection in Sudan following widespread international advocacy and high-profile statements, particularly from U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello, hinting at possible military intervention under a “Plan B.” Initiatives like the Geneva meeting on “Saving Lives,” the Human Rights Council’s fact-finding committee and high-level UNGA meetings in New York contributed to this momentum. However, UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s recent acknowledgement of the lack of conditions for deploying military forces tempered such efforts.
Several quieter approaches have since emerged, including a visit by the African Union Peace and Security Council, which stressed the importance of dialogue with Sudan and led to plans to reopen the AU office in Sudan to facilitate discussions. Sudan also received Djibouti’s foreign minister, who delivered a message from the IGAD chair about Sudan’s reintegration into the organization. Additionally, the African Presidential Committee, led by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, postponed its meeting.
These developments appeared to influence the tone and content of the British resolution, which adopted a more respectful approach toward Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council. It asked the UN Secretary-General to consult with the council on verification mechanisms, condemned the Rapid Support Forces, and called for an end to foreign interference and arms supplies to Darfur. The resolution also reiterated earlier demands for a ceasefire, de-escalation, and unhindered humanitarian access while commending Sudan’s decision to open the Adré border crossing.
The resolution aimed to create conditions conducive to deploying international forces, assigning the Secretary-General to report on these requirements. However, specific clauses, such as Operative Clause 15, raised concerns about legitimizing actions outside the Security Council framework, often called “coalitions of the willing.” With its acute sensitivity to external intervention, Russia highlighted these concerns and criticized Britain for its “neo-colonial” tendencies, disregard for Sudan’s sovereignty, and attempts to impose judicial mechanisms.
The Russian representative also linked the debate to broader geopolitical tensions, citing President Putin’s denunciation of Western support for Ukraine’s long-range missile use against Russia on the same day.
As diplomatic circles grapple with the implications of Russia’s veto and potential next steps, Sudan must harness its internal resources to protect its civilians. After all, no one can safeguard a nation’s citizens better than the nation itself.