Declaring Famine or Manufacturing Scarcity? The Economic Implications (1–2)

Adil Al-Rifai Abul-Hassan

On 18 November 2026, media outlets circulated a call by the Sudanese Communist Party for Sudan to be declared famine-stricken and for humanitarian corridors to be opened. The call was based on a statement issued by the party’s Political Bureau and published on the websites of Sudan Tribune and Darfur24.
Setting aside political positions and disagreements over the parties that issued the call, the issue deserves an objective discussion that goes beyond immediate reactions to examine its humanitarian and economic dimensions and assess the possible consequences.
There is no doubt that Sudan is facing a serious humanitarian and food crisis amid the war, declining economic activity and the disruption of livelihoods. However, declaring a famine is not simply a media description of the severity of suffering. It is a technical classification based on specific criteria relating to extreme food deprivation, acute malnutrition rates and mortality. It is therefore important to distinguish between famine as a condition established according to recognised standards, and food insecurity, the risk of famine, or food shortages in particular areas.
This distinction does not diminish the scale of suffering or detract from the need for humanitarian intervention. Rather, it helps identify the nature, scale and geographical extent of the problem, and determine the most appropriate response.
Sudan is a vast country, with climatic and productive conditions that vary from one region to another. Some areas may experience drought and desertification, as has happened in parts of North Kordofan, while crops in other areas may be damaged by agricultural pests, as occurred in Gezira. Such disruptions do not necessarily mean the entire country faces the same conditions, or that food shortages in one area automatically extend to the rest of the country.
If famine is confirmed in an area, or if that area is approaching the relevant threshold, the overriding priority must be to save lives, deliver aid and secure humanitarian corridors. However, the crisis must be addressed based on an accurate assessment of conditions on the ground. Generalisations and sweeping declarations made without specifying the circumstances could produce counterproductive results and make an already difficult situation even more complicated.
This raises an important question: has scarcity in Sudan become merely the result of exceptional circumstances, or have we begun to live with it as though it were normal?
The repeated crises involving shortages of goods, rising prices and disrupted supplies are not always attributable to a lack of resources. They may instead result from transport disruptions, poor distribution, supply-chain breakdowns, monopolistic practices and speculation, or a lack of planning and proactive intervention.
We have seen this in successive crises involving fuel, cooking gas, bread and other essential commodities. In some cases, the problem is not so much the absence of a commodity as the difficulty of getting it to consumers or disruptions in the flow of supplies to markets. In this context, the question of the ‘manufacture of scarcity’ is analytical, concerned with why these disruptions recur and why the capacity to manage them remains weak. It is not an accusation that any particular party is deliberately creating shortages.
One of Sudan’s advantages is that its geographical, agricultural and pastoral diversity offers several alternatives for addressing food shortages. Areas affected by poor rainfall, desertification, floods or war can benefit from surplus production in other regions, provided that transport and distribution facilities are available. Import procedures can also be expedited, with the necessary concessions and exemptions granted when required, to ensure that food reaches affected areas.
Conditions in some markets in central Sudanese production regions, where crops are available and prices sometimes fall, highlight the importance of linking production areas with consumption areas. The presence of food in one region does not necessarily mean that it will reach those in need elsewhere. Managing the movement of goods and facilitating their transport are therefore just as important as increasing production itself.
From this perspective, warnings about the risk of famine should be accompanied by practical alternatives. Calls to support agriculture and livestock, provide finance, fuel, seeds and agricultural inputs, and rehabilitate irrigation systems are all important. But they require implementable plans, clear priorities, and a precise allocation of responsibilities and resources.
Food security is not measured solely by the availability of food, but also by people’s ability to obtain it. The war has deprived many people of their sources of income, jobs and property, while prices have risen and purchasing power has declined. Addressing the crisis therefore requires us to consider production, supply, distribution and purchasing power as interconnected links in the same chain.
The state bears a fundamental responsibility in this regard. This includes securing essential commodities, monitoring markets, curbing monopolies and speculation, facilitating trade and transport, supporting farmers and pastoralists, ensuring that inputs reach production areas, and facilitating harvesting and the transportation of crops. It also requires establishing an early-warning system to monitor production, stocks, prices, and the movement of goods, enabling intervention before disruptions become more severe.
However, given a war that is draining its resources and weakening its institutions, the state cannot do all this alone. The responsibility is shared nationally, requiring the participation of political forces, economic institutions, native administrations, civil society organisations, business leaders, and community and charitable initiatives. Differences in political positions should not prevent cooperation on issues that directly affect people’s lives and food security.
The responsibility of political parties, therefore, should not stop at criticism or issuing warnings. It must extend to proposing practical alternatives, helping to mobilise resources and taking part in efforts to address the crisis. Opposition is a fundamental political right, but it is not incompatible with national responsibility. Equally, cooperating with state institutions in confronting challenges does not mean abandoning the right to criticise or disagree.
Sudan is going through an exceptional period, and the ongoing war has had consequences extending far beyond military confrontations. It has affected production, services, institutions and people’s livelihoods. Under such circumstances, safeguarding the state, its institutions and the basic conditions of life is a national interest that must take precedence over narrow calculations. What is needed is coordinated effort and a shared set of priorities centred on ending the war, restoring stability, protecting citizens and reviving productive activity.
Declaring a famine, if supported by clear evidence and sound technical criteria, can mobilise humanitarian assistance and secure an effective response. But it is not an end in itself, nor should it become a political achievement or a competition over how to describe the scale of the catastrophe. True success lies in preventing famine, or containing its effects, ensuring that food reaches those who need it, and restoring the capacity to produce.
Sudan has natural resources, diverse ecological environments and substantial productive potential. Its proximity to regional markets and production areas also offers several alternatives for addressing food crises. Yet these advantages will not automatically translate into practical benefits. They require forward-looking policies, sustained planning, effective institutional implementation, and continuous monitoring that goes beyond responding to a crisis after it occurs.
Food security is not a temporary measure to be introduced when a particular commodity becomes scarce or an agricultural season produces a poor harvest. It is an integrated system encompassing production, storage, transport, trade and purchasing power, and it requires constant preparedness to deal with seasonal fluctuations and exceptional circumstances.
Today’s challenge is not to compete in describing the catastrophe, but to prevent it, save lives, protect the country, restore production and secure food supplies. This is a shared national responsibility resting on the state and its institutions, political, social and economic forces, and citizens, both individually and collectively.
The resources and potential are there, and alternatives are available. But turning them into sustainable food security is the responsibility of all Sudanese: government, institutions and people, acting both collectively and individually.
However, addressing the economic dimension and securing food cannot be separated from another equally important question: how should humanitarian aid be managed in conditions of war? How can we ensure it reaches those for whom it is intended, without its routes or arrangements becoming a source of security or political risks that threaten the state and its sovereignty?
To be continued…

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