From Cotton to Value: The Story of Sudan’s Textile Industry, from the Glory of the Past to the Economy of the Future (2–4)

Noaman Yousif Mohammed

From Cotton to Dollars: How Did Sudan Lose Out on Value-Added?

In the first article of this series, we revisited the beginnings: cotton, the Gezira Scheme, and the factories that sought to transform Sudan from a mere grower of cotton into a manufacturer of it. The vision was to turn land into crops, crops into industry, and industry into exports and added value.
The question today is: What happened to this chain?
How did Sudan shift from a country where cotton accounted for nearly 60% of export value in certain historic years, to an economy that exports resources in their raw state while importing manufactured goods—a significant portion of which could have been produced locally?
At its core, the problem is not that Sudan stopped producing cotton, but rather that it stopped capturing a large share of the value generated after the cotton stage.

Value Is Not Found in the Field Alone:
Once cotton leaves the field, it embarks on an economic journey far longer than the simple act of selling it. It transforms into fibers, then yarn, then fabric, and finally finished products; at every stage, skills, labor, energy, finance, transport, marketing, design, and trade come into play.
Consequently, selling raw cotton means selling a basic raw material, whereas transforming it into yarn, fabric, and clothing means selling a product that embodies accumulated value derived from labor, expertise, technology, design, and branding.
The real battle, then, is not merely over cotton production, but over what happens to the cotton after it leaves the field.
Sudan understood this equation early on. Spinning and weaving factories sprang up around cotton-producing regions—with initiatives emerging in Wad Madani, Al-Hasaheisa, Al-Managil, and elsewhere—and Sudanese investors attempted to establish advanced stages of industrial processing. However, this endeavor did not achieve the level of capacity and efficiency that was potentially within reach.

When the factory underperformed relative to the field:
Data from the Central Bank of Sudan reveals a significant gap between design capacity and actual production in the spinning and weaving industry in 2005. Annual design capacity stood at approximately 61,000 tons of yarn, 300 million yards of fabric, and 22.1 million ready-made garments; yet, actual production did not exceed 9,000 tons of yarn and 25 million yards of fabric, with no recorded production of ready-made garments that year.
In the textile sector specifically, actual production amounted to no more than 8% of design capacity.
These figures encapsulate a major part of the story of decline. The problem lay not merely in a lack of factories or a shortage of raw materials, but in the inability to operate the production chain efficiently and consistently.
A factory requires stable electricity, spare parts, financing, expertise, markets, transportation, and management. When one of these links weakens, the others begin to falter.

What did Sudan lose?
When Sudan exports raw cotton, it realizes value linked only to production and marketing. However, when it processes the cotton locally—transforming it into yarn, fabric, and garments—additional value is generated within the economy at every stage, spanning wages and profits to transportation, energy, maintenance, financing, packaging, and marketing. Consequently, the loss of the textile industry signifies more than just the missed opportunity to export garments; it entails the loss of jobs, markets for farmers, business for suppliers, state revenue, investment opportunities, and potential foreign currency earnings. It also increases the need to import products that could have been partially produced domestically.
While the closure of a single factory might appear to be a localized issue, the halting of an entire chain of factories and related activities transforms the loss into an economic problem that spans the entire spectrum from farmer to consumer.

When Cotton Leaves Sudan:
The paradox becomes even more evident when examining foreign trade. In 2023, the global import value of raw Sudanese cotton stood at approximately $246.7 million—with Egypt, China, Pakistan, and Turkey as key destinations—while Sudan’s total merchandise exports amounted to roughly $3.62 billion, according to WITS data.
These figures underscore the importance of cotton in generating foreign currency, yet they raise a deeper question: what happens after the cotton leaves Sudan?
Abroad, it can be transformed into yarn, then fabric, then garments, and finally a branded product that reaches the consumer at a price far exceeding the value of the raw material. Thus, it is not merely cotton that leaves Sudan; the higher stages of value addition leave with it.
This is where the issue becomes directly linked to the balance of payments. The state requires foreign currency to finance its imports; a competitive textile industry, however, can operate in two directions: generating foreign currency through exports and conserving foreign currency by producing domestic goods that substitute for a portion of imports. Thus, the textile industry is not an industrial issue isolated from the macroeconomy; it is part of Sudan’s struggle against foreign currency shortages and weak production and exports.

The Paradox: Exporting Raw Materials, Importing Finished Products
Perhaps the most painful irony is that Sudan possesses land suitable for cotton cultivation, accumulated agricultural expertise, a history of spinning and weaving industries, and a large domestic market—yet it has come to rely heavily on importing textiles and clothing.

Importing is not inherently wrong, nor does self-sufficiency mean producing everything regardless of cost. The problem arises when we export raw materials while simultaneously importing the finished products made from them, despite having a realistic opportunity to produce at least a portion of them efficiently and competitively within Sudan.

The question here is not “Why do we import?” but rather “Why do we export cotton while importing the value?”
Value-Added Does Not Mean Manufacturing at Any Cost
However, recapturing value-added does not mean reverting to a protected, uncompetitive industry. A factory does not become successful simply by running its machines; success comes when it can produce goods with competitive quality, cost, and speed.
This requires stable electricity, adequate financing, appropriate technology, and technical skills,competent management, stable supply chains, clear specifications, efficient transportation, and markets capable of absorbing the output.
Therefore, the goal in the “New Sudan” should not merely be adding value, but adding “competitive” value—value capable of withstanding domestic market pressures and reaching international markets.

– The War Has Deepened the Crisis
The textile crisis did not begin with the war; the sector was already struggling with weak production capacity, issues regarding electricity, spare parts, and financing, a decline in expertise and investment, competition from imports, and fluctuating cotton production.
However, the war struck a devastating blow to what remained of the value chain, affecting farms, factories, roads, electricity infrastructure, banks, markets, and supply chains.
With the Sudanese economy contracting by approximately 29.4% in 2023 and a further 14% in 2024—according to World Bank figures—discussing the reconstruction of the industry becomes part of the broader conversation about rebuilding the economy itself.
Sudan cannot emerge from its crisis by relying on consumption and imports; it must return to production, and that production must focus on value addition.

-From Textile Industry to Textile Economy
This requires a shift in mindset. Post-war recovery demands more than just restarting a factory here or there; it requires rebuilding the entire textile economy.
A textile economy implies that farmers, ginners, manufacturers, financiers, designers, workers, traders, and exporters all operate within an interconnected ecosystem. Farmers—acting through cooperatives or companies—can become partners in various stages of manufacturing, while investors develop processing industries, banks provide financing, universities and research centers contribute technology and skills, and the state supplies the necessary infrastructure, regulations, and incentives.

In this way, cotton transforms from a mere export crop into an economic engine, with an impact extending from the field to the factory, and from the factory to the market and export channels.

The true measure is not the quantity of cotton:
Perhaps it is time to change the economic question we ask. It is not enough to ask, “How many tons of cotton does Sudan produce?” Instead, we must ask, “How much value does Sudan add to each ton of cotton?”
How many jobs are created? How many imports are replaced? How many new exports are generated? And how much foreign currency can the economy retain, rather than seeing that value flow abroad?
In the past, cotton brought dollars into Sudan. The economy of the future, however, must rely on value-added products to generate revenue, shifting exports from raw materials to Sudanese products characterized by skill, design, quality, and branding.
This is where the true loss—and the lesson to be learned—lies. Sudan never lacked land, water, cotton, or expertise; rather, it failed to maintain the vital links between the stages of production. When the chain breaks, everyone suffers: the farmer, the worker, the manufacturer, the trader, the banker, and the state.
Therefore, rebuilding the textile industry is not merely an industrial project; it is an initiative to reconstruct a crucial part of Sudan’s economic cycle. Yet, beyond the figures and factories lies another story of equal importance: the story of the people who worked there, the families who relied on them for their livelihood, the cities that sprang up around them, and the skills that were accumulated—only to eventually fade away. Furthermore, industry has an impact on the environment and resources—a factor that cannot be overlooked in any future model.

– Former Banker – Organizational Development Consultant

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=18183