Critiquing the Manufactured State and the Labyrinth of Elites: Towards a Structural Reading of Sudan’s Crisis

Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yousif
The Sudanese political mind has long been preoccupied with dissecting the symptoms of failure rather than examining the nature of the disease itself. In the ongoing and intense intellectual debate surrounding Sudan’s transition, fundamental questions have emerged—initially raised by the journalist Al-Obaid Marouh and subsequently enriched by wide-ranging critical perspectives. These perspectives argue that the problem lies not in who governs, but in how and why this state came into being in the first place. They attempt, through a different methodology, to confront the difficult questions related to state formation—questions whose time for answers has long since arrived. This has led to rich discussions that move beyond the superficial tendency to reduce the crisis to systems of governance rather than the structure of the state itself.
Thus, participants in this debate largely agree that the problem lies in the structure of the state that emerged in the country known as Sudan, though they differ on the causes and paths to resolution. This divergence has enriched the discussion and prompted me to contribute.
The common conflation between the state as a legal and historical entity and the government as an administrative apparatus has led us to overlook a crucial fact: we inherited a colonial structure that was never concerned with bringing disparate regions together under a shared social contract. Instead, it was designed to maximise military, political, and economic gains for its creators. As an entry point, we must ask: where does the failure truly lie? In the state itself—its land and people—or in the government, the administrative body that manages them?
First: The State as a Colonial Construction… The Absence of a Social Contract
The Sudanese state, within its pre-2011 borders and with its ethnic and geographic diversity, was not the result of voluntary integration or historical consensus. Rather, it was a colonial creation. It was handed over at independence as a solid block of disparate regions, with early political elites making only a half-hearted attempt to redefine a shared national bond.
The “part” (the central government) continued to shape the “whole” (the state), imprinting upon it the failures that characterised successive governments. Instead of being an inclusive umbrella, the state became an instrument wielded by ruling elites. As a result, national identity receded in favour of primary loyalties—tribal and regional.
Second: The Elites and the Machinery of Ignorance and Impoverishment
The tragedy lies in the fact that political elites—whether in traditional party forms or later progressive and Islamist iterations—did not dismantle this distorted structure. Instead, they invested in it and became part of it.
The two major parties that led the dawn of independence exploited ethnic and regional loyalties as tools for gaining power. The same pattern extended to ideological parties, which had been expected to transcend regional divisions through their ideas but instead reproduced the same dynamics.
It is worth recalling that both sides of the Islamist split in 1999 resorted to regional affiliations to strengthen their positions. The same applies to leftist ideological parties and regional movements. Leadership across these formations often emerged from specific geographic areas, reinforcing the conclusion that Sudan’s party experience neither resolved nor seriously attempted to address the problem of regional identity.
These elites engaged in a systematic appropriation of popular will by neglecting human development—educationally and socially—and by failing to invest in rural development. Some argue that this neglect was intentional: a deliberate strategy of impoverishment and disenfranchisement to maintain citizens in a state of dependency, thereby ensuring loyalty in elections or mobilisation in support of military coups.
Even when capable individuals emerged from within these communities, they were often absorbed into the same old machinery rather than becoming agents of transformative change.
Third: The Economy as the Root of the Problem… (Marginalisation Is Not Destiny)
Contrary to explanations that frame the conflict in terms of ethnicity, region, or religion, the underlying reality is fundamentally economic. The rebellions and wars in peripheral regions were not driven by a desire for conflict itself, but by the absence of development and the spread of poverty.
The relative stability in the north and centre was not the result of governmental ingenuity, but rather of migration patterns and proximity to wealthier neighbouring countries, which provided opportunities unavailable in western and southern regions.
Development is the true antidote to war and the foundation of belonging. A citizen with a dignified livelihood and productive opportunities has no incentive to take up arms. On the contrary, such a citizen becomes a first line of defence against instability.
Fourth: The Illusion of Cultural Diversity as an Abstract Value
The United States is often cited as an example of diversity as a source of strength. However, this comparison overlooks a critical fact: American unity around diversity emerged only after European migrants had built its economy through resource exploitation and capital accumulation.
It was knowledge and economic power that produced the legal frameworks protecting diversity—not the other way around. In Sudan, diversity has remained a liability because it lacks a solid economic foundation capable of transforming difference into an asset.
Fifth: An Emergency Exit… Redirecting Resources to the Periphery, Not the Centre
Breaking out of this vicious cycle requires a comprehensive development revolution—one that returns power to resources themselves. The primary beneficiaries of regional resources must be the inhabitants of those regions, thereby reducing the centralisation that has been at the heart of the problem.
This entails:
Mobilising vast national resources with awareness and determination, while resisting external pressures driven by global competition for those resources, and ensuring equitable distribution across all regions.
Building human capacity through education that liberates consciousness from tribal constraints and fosters enlightenment, enabling individuals to embrace a broader national identity rooted in productivity.
Finally
It is deeply regrettable that, more than seventy years after independence, we have yet to evolve from primary identities such as tribe into the broader space of the state—let alone the nation.
War will not end, nor will Sudan stabilise, so long as elites continue to feed on identity crises while avoiding difficult questions. The transition from a “rent-seeking state” to a “productive state”, in my view, constitutes the social contract capable of making belonging to Sudan outweigh tribal affiliation.
A new national project must begin in the neglected peripheries and culminate in the dominant centre—not the other way around. If the economy lies at the heart of the problem, then it must also be the entry point to the solution.

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