Sudan’s Earthquake… Are We Approaching the Formation of the Largest Bloc? (2/2)

By: Obeid A. Murawih

Around 1986, during what has come to be known as the Third Democracy, my late friend Majid Youssef and I—both of us journalists at the beginning of our careers—went to get a statement from one of the leaders of the southern parties on a specific issue. We knew that his political stances were closer to the “rebel movement” led by the late John Garang. On the sidelines of the interview, we opened a discussion about the war raging in the south and the root causes of the problem. We told him that British colonialism had created the divide between northern and southern Sudan and deepened it when it enacted the Closed Districts Ordinance. We were expecting our host to back up this narrative, but he surprised us with a question we were unable to answer. He told us that: “Colonialism left Sudan thirty years ago, so what have the national governments done to remove the effects of colonialism and bridge the gap between southerners and northerners?”

I recalled that incident while drafting the second part of my article, “The Sudanese Earthquake.” In the first part, I used the analogy of geology to illustrate the situation in Sudan, both the state and society, since the establishment of the modern state in 1821 under what was known as Turkish rule. I argued that the regimes and governments that ruled the country for the past seventy years failed to forge a single national identity out of the diverse Sudanese society, but they have also failed to address the ills and problems inherited by independent Sudan from the colonial era, thus leading to our current predicament.

The idea behind this article, and the one before it, is not to dig up the past or cry over the spilled milk, but rather to try to look at our experiences in national governance from a perhaps different angle, to draw lessons and build upon those conclusions to anticipate the future, and to launch a path of recovery that may be long, but whose end is reachable if intentions are sincere. Because this issue is so multifaceted and complex that it is impossible to present it in an opinion piece or even a single study, I thought it appropriate to present it in the form of main ideas and conclusions, the aim of which is to pave the way for broader discussions that focus on the future, and I hope that I will succeed in what I will present in terms of conclusions, making use of the comments and observations spurred by the first part of the article.

The first conclusion is that we are a nation that combines two opposites: a country with an ancient civilization dating back to before Christ, which contributed to human civilization and was familiar with kingdoms and stable systems of government, but whose civilizational pattern was not continuous; and a country that has remained a home to successive migrations due to natural, human, or religious factors, where the values of stable governance and the peaceful transfer of power are still not firmly established within its inhabitants. The country’s geopolitical location and its sub-terrain and surface resources have played a prominent role in luring competition for it, and led to the instability that has marred its history. Vested external ambitions – from pre-Christ to the present day – have also played an active role.

Unfortunately, the experiences of national governance during the past seventy years have not succeeded in spreading cultural awareness among the components of this hybrid society and in unifying their sense of adhesion to one nation. Most of Sudanese peoples and tribes have remained self-absorbed, knowing little about their fellow citizens, and their fellow citizens knowing little about them! The second conclusion is that our current situation—without going into detail—is the harvest of experience and the result of accumulated errors of varying magnitudes made during seventy years of national rule. Some of these errors stemmed from overlooking problems inherited from colonialism, some were deliberate, and others were accidental. It is logical that every regime that ruled Sudan, and every elite that produced or participated in such a regime, bears a share of the consequences of those errors. Naturally, we should also hold each regime accountable for its share in proportion to the length of time it governed the affairs of the country and its people.

The third conclusion is that every political, trade union, or military force has played a part in governing Sudan, regardless of the extent of that participation, or conversely, in opposing the successive regimes. This applies to the independence parties, or what were known as the traditional parties, represented by the Umma and Unionist parties; to the leftist parties, both communist and nationalist; to the Islamist parties of various names; and to the regional advocacy movements from across Sudan, including those regions subject to the Closed Districts Ordinance. Therefore, those who ruled, those who opposed from abroad, or those who took up arms against the central authority all bear some responsibility for our current situation, commensurate with their participation or opposition.

Based on the conclusions above, the first step on the long road to recovery is for everyone to acknowledge that we are a diverse nation—culturally, ethnically, and even religiously—and that everyone bears some responsibility for our current situation, even if that responsibility stems from silence in face of mistakes. Everyone has a role to play in reviewing their path, engaging in self-criticism, and correcting those errors—not for the sake of self-flagellation or airing dirty laundry, but to pave the way for the future. The experiences of nations and peoples who have endured similar civil wars and divisions to ours are called “truth and transparency,” leading to reconciliation. These experiences have their own methodologies and approaches, and we can learn from them if we wish. Indeed, we can even establish our own unique experience, leaving our mark as a people, so that the Sudanese experience—should it come to fruition—will be added to the existing body of human experience.

Acknowledging the shared responsibility for the bitter harvest of governance and opposition experiences that have brought us to our current predicament necessitates a zero-sum equation. In this equation, all forces that have borne the brunt of this harvest must temporarily set aside their ambitions for power and engage in establishing a future path led by the youth. These are the young people who have been spared the burdens of the past and its nihilistic conflicts, and who risked their lives to defend the nation and its citizens against the onslaught that sought to uproot them from their land. They will now take the lead in a transitional phase, participating in shaping its features and rescuing Sudanese civil society from the state of subjugation it has endured for years. They can draw upon the remaining wisdom and lessons learned from past failures held by their elders. In this way, we will have allowed the political forces that have lost their luster to reinvent themselves and prepare to compete in the elections that will follow the transition.

The philosophy underpinning the current transition, which has been ongoing for seven years, is an exclusionary one, following the same paths of past failures and conflicts. It serves the agendas of division and perpetuates conflict, and therefore it should not continue. Its rightful place is in the wastebasket of history, today rather than tomorrow. The philosophy upon which we believe the new transition should be founded should be based on acknowledging shortcomings, admitting our contribution to past failures, and demonstrating a desire to rectify mistakes. With this approach, we will find that “everyone is involved,” except those who are obstinate. Our perspective will broaden to reveal that the Sudanese people, those not involved in the power struggles, are larger and more diverse than those who have monopolized political action, and that they have the greater right to choose their own leadership and take control of their own destiny.

As for how to move from the current situation to the transitional founding situation we are talking about, it can happen in one of two ways:
The first is that a group of insightful and opinionated people should come together, on their own initiative, to research and develop the idea and gather people around it. When the vision is complete, it should be discussed with the state leadership, and the necessary plan should be put in place to implement it.

The second is that the current state leadership, in its constitutional and military capacities, should take up the idea and research it seriously and with determination, and it will find among the sons of Sudan – who do not desire any gain, and they are many – those who will help it to put it into effect.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12285