Who Is Responsible for Squandering $10 Billion?

Adel Al-Baz
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The one responsible is Mr Kamil Idris… is he not the government? Indeed, he is. And before I substantiate my accusation against the government, let me tell you the story of the South Sudanese delegation.
A high-level delegation from South Sudan, led by Pagan Amum, travelled to Britain in search of funding after the southern state had shut down oil pipelines amid its dispute with the government in the North. A British official told them: “You are like someone who cut off his right hand and then went begging with the left.” This is precisely the condition of our state: it squanders the resources at its disposal through poor management, then seeks external resources and finds none.
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All credible local and international reports confirm that annual gold production—at a minimum—reaches seventy tonnes. At today’s prices, this could generate around $10.6 billion in foreign currency revenues. Just two weeks ago, that same output could have yielded as much as $12.6 billion—an increase of nearly $2 billion.
If we were to bring this production under control, we could achieve the following:
First: close the balance-of-payments gap, which central bank data show has widened to around $5 billion.
Second: stabilise the exchange rate and halt its decline.
Third: contain inflation, as imports would be financed at more competitive prices.
If these three objectives can be achieved simply by controlling gold production and exports—and they are goals sufficient to revive the economy significantly—what more could any government hope to accomplish? Governments around the world prioritise precisely these three outcomes.
I do not believe the state is unwilling or incapable. On the contrary, it knows exactly how to achieve them. What is lacking is competence, sound management, and legal firmness. Yes, it knows the path—but it does not act. Why?
There is only one answer: mismanagement—nothing else.
So what can the state do?
In truth, it already knows what to do, as evidenced by recent steps in the right direction. It has issued a decision obliging state-owned companies to sell their gold purchases to the Central Bank of Sudan. It has also begun directing revenues—previously channelled elsewhere—into designated accounts to support the war effort. Furthermore, it has started reviewing profit-sharing agreements and contracts with concession companies—files full of stories to be revisited later.
Yes, all of this has been done. But much remains—much that is serious. The state still appears hesitant and uncertain. But what is it afraid of? I do not know. The gold mafia? Internal corruption networks? Who is holding it back?
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Let us take Tanzania as an example. There, minerals belong to the state, which holds them in trust for the people. Companies do not own the gold; they merely receive extraction rights under state conditions.
Tanzania moved swiftly to regulate artisanal mining through policies and laws. It established registries of miners and their operational areas, provided services, and organised traders, intermediaries, and exporters. Crucially, it encouraged cooperatives, extended bank financing for equipment, facilitated technology adoption, and established local refineries and exchanges.
As a result, the Bank of Tanzania accumulated gold reserves exceeding $1.3 billion by the end of 2025. In the same year, it purchased more than 5 tonnes of pure gold, valued at over $554 million. By September 2025, gold exports had reached $4.43 billion. Tanzania’s annual production ranges between 55 and 60 tonnes, with a record of around 60 tonnes in 2025.
Sudan produces at least 70 tonnes—ten tonnes more than Tanzania—yet its returns in 2025 did not exceed $1.5 billion. Consider also Egypt, which produces only 18 tonnes annually but generated $7.6 billion in gold export revenues last year. Meanwhile, Sudan, with 70 tonnes, achieves just $1.5 billion.
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Tanzania began where real decision-making starts: price and accessibility. It established an official market aligned with global prices, ensured prompt payment, and simplified procedures. Over time, miners no longer needed to risk smuggling to find better prices or faster liquidity. Behaviour changed—not out of fear of punishment, but in response to clear economic incentives.
It then deployed technology, digitising the entire gold cycle so that every gram could be traced: from the mine to the purchasing centre, to the refinery, to export or to central bank vaults. Tanzania understood that gold is not merely a mining issue—it is a matter of financial sovereignty. It linked law to market, market to the central bank, and the central bank to reserves.
At the same time, the state did not wait for gold at the borders—it went to the source. It established official buying centres within production zones, and monitored and recorded every transaction. Oversight shifted from costly pursuit to direct supervision at the point of exchange.
Most importantly, the miner himself became part of the system—not its adversary. He was licensed, supported, and integrated into the formal economy, gradually shrinking the space for smuggling.
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Tanzania also tightened its laws, classifying smuggling as a crime against state security—not merely an economic offence. It imposed strict penalties, including confiscation, fines, and imprisonment. Smuggling thus became an unviable option, while the official route proved faster, easier, and more profitable. In effect, the market itself redirected gold back to the state.
The essence of Tanzania’s experience lies in recognising that controlling gold requires an integrated system: one that begins by treating producers as partners through fair pricing and services, is regulated through firm laws and digital tracking, and is secured by directly linking all of this to the central bank to reinforce financial sovereignty. Success lies not in banning, but in building an attractive formal alternative that outcompetes smuggling.
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O “government of hope”, may Tanzania’s experience in the gold sector inspire you to transform your management of this vital resource, which requires comprehensive reform—organisational, legal, and policy-based. Believe me, there is no greater service you can offer the people at this moment than gaining control over your most important resource. If you fail to do so, you will find no alternative source to finance your programmes—no development, nothing—and all promises will dissolve into empty words.
My advice to you: leave everything else and focus solely on reclaiming the $10 billion that is within reach—from smugglers, brokers, and corrupt actors. Only then can gold shift from a raw resource into the backbone of the national economy, instead of forcing you to extend your hand to others—and eroding what little hope remains in your government… the government of hope.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=13662