Between Khartoum and Tehran: When the Calculations of a Swift Strike Fail and War Expands into Open-Ended Conflict

Obaid A. Murawih
At first glance, there may appear to be little basis for comparison between the war that has erupted in the Middle East over the past two weeks, in which the United States and Israel have launched military strikes against Iran, and the war that has been raging in Sudan for nearly three years. Yet a deeper reflection on the broader trajectory of both conflicts—and on the statements made by the American and Israeli leadership following their decision to strike Iran, alongside the narrative adopted by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia when the war in Sudan erupted with support from what the author describes as Emirati coordination—reveals a number of similarities.
These parallels, the author argues, emerge clearly when examining the political rhetoric surrounding both conflicts.
Consider, for example, the statements made by the Israeli Prime Minister following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, as well as the number of visits he made to Washington. Similarly, review President Trump’s statements on the situation in the Middle East and the US Secretary of Defence’s comments on the war against Iran.
From these statements, the author suggests, one might infer that ideological narratives about a struggle against political Islam, combined with religious interpretations about the “end times,” alongside ambitions to expand geopolitical influence and control resources, have shaped the motivation behind the confrontation with Iran.
In this view, the ultimate objective is removing the current Iranian political system—the Islamic Republic—and replacing it with a secular government aligned with American and Israeli interests. Issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities, or regional alliances are portrayed as secondary justifications used to build international support for military action, even though these issues might theoretically have been addressed through diplomatic negotiations.
The decision regarding the timing of the initial strike against Iran, according to the author, was based on a mixture of strategic overconfidence and miscalculation.
The United States—possessing the world’s most powerful military—and Israel, aspiring to consolidate its position as a dominant regional power, deployed substantial military forces across the region in a show of strength. The expectation was that the Iranian leadership might either:
rush to accept political concessions under pressure, or
be destabilised by a decisive “decapitation strike” targeting senior political and military leadership.
According to this interpretation, the anticipated outcomes included either:
internal collapse within the Iranian leadership, or
popular unrest leading to political transformation, supported by external actors.
The author argues that similar assumptions shaped the planning of the 15 April 2023 events in Sudan, when the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF began.
In this narrative, external actors—particularly the United Arab Emirates, according to the article—were believed to support a rapid shift in the balance of power through RSF action. Diplomatic messaging at the time allegedly conveyed pressure on the leadership of the Sudanese Armed Forces to accept political arrangements that would elevate the RSF’s role within the state.
The RSF leadership itself reportedly predicted that Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan would be arrested or eliminated, and that the military leadership would quickly collapse.
According to the author’s account, the original operational plan in April 2023 centred on a rapid coup-style takeover that would unfold within hours.
The scenario envisioned:
arresting or eliminating senior military leaders, including Al-Burhan, Shams al-Din Kabashi, and Yasser al-Atta,
forcing the surrender of other army officers, and
issuing a coup statement in the name of a nominal military leadership, announcing the removal of obstacles to civilian rule.
Statements of support and recognition were allegedly expected from sympathetic capitals once the takeover succeeded.
When the attempt to capture or eliminate Al-Burhan failed during the first hours, an alternative plan reportedly involved seizing the General Command of the Armed Forces and taking control of other key military bases in Khartoum—including armoured, engineering, communications, and ammunition units.
This plan also failed to materialise.
Strategic Objectives in Both Conflicts
The author suggests that both the Sudanese and Iranian cases reflect a similar geopolitical logic:
attempts to reshape regional influence,
efforts to control strategic resources,
weakening or dismantling state institutions, and
installing governments aligned with external powers.
When such strategies fail, the alternative may be prolonged internal conflict or fragmentation.
When the Swift Strike Turns into Prolonged War
In Khartoum, the anticipated rapid victory did not occur. The Sudanese military leadership survived the initial attacks, and the army retained control over key military installations. The conflict subsequently escalated into a long and destructive war, drawing in foreign fighters, regional actors, and competing narratives about governance, marginalisation, and political legitimacy.
Similarly, in Iran, although the initial strike reportedly succeeded in killing senior officials, the expected immediate political collapse did not occur. Instead, the Iranian state has remained intact, and the conflict has begun expanding both militarily and economically.
The repercussions have extended beyond Iran itself, affecting regional stability and global economic conditions.
The author notes that the initial objectives of the conflict appear to be shifting. Issues such as Iran’s missile programme have been overshadowed by concerns over control of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy chokepoint.
Meanwhile, the US administration has begun seeking broader international support to weaken Iran’s influence over the strait—an approach that, if pursued, could significantly widen the scope of the confrontation.
As a result, the timeline for ending the conflict—once predicted by President Trump to last four to five weeks—now appears uncertain.
Instead of a short war, both conflicts demonstrate how miscalculations surrounding swift military victories can transform into open-ended wars with unpredictable consequences.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12137