The Freezing of the Rebellion
Rashid Abdelrahim
In recent days, the rebellion’s efforts to form a so-called Tasis (foundation) government have stalled. Only a very limited number of ministerial appointments have been announced, none of which has begun any clear work to organise or administer its affairs in Nyala, which the rebels have designated as their capital.
The rebellion has failed to organise its state-level administration in Darfur and has also ceased to arrange the functioning of the localities. Nyala is suffering from various forms of incapacity; security operations dominate the city, while looting and theft against residents are widespread.
At present, the rebels have no judicial system. No courts have been announced. Prisons are now run by armed men and are overcrowded with detainees; prisoners of war are held without any specified release dates and without procedures that could bring their sentences to an end. Assassinations are carried out with ease, and the life of an ordinary citizen there has no value.
On the military front, rebel operations have become confined to limited areas, repeatedly carried out without achieving clear victories or any tangible progress on the ground.
The activities of the Khawarij’s allies have also stalled, and political support from Somoud and from the tribes that constitute or sustain the rebellion has ceased. The voices of the nazirs and umdas of the Rizeigat, Misseriya, Habbaniya, Salamat, and all the other groups that form and support the rebellion have fallen silent.
Externally, following strong shifts in international positions against the UAE by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere, and after Egypt warned against any threat to its neighbouring security and declared its determination to apply the Joint Defence Agreement with Sudan, Emirati forces were weakened and evacuated from strategic sites in Yemen—removed within hours, not days.
Conversely, the Sudanese state and the armed forces have been able to move positively by strengthening and consolidating relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt, all of which have announced clear support for Sudan.
On the ground, the armed forces have not stopped clearing areas in Kordofan, mobilising supplies, and preparing for a comprehensive decisive operation in Darfur, so that the country may be fully cleansed of the Rapid Support Forces.
Yesterday, the Prime Minister inspected operations at Khartoum International Airport and announced that air traffic would resume within a few days. This will mark the beginning of the relocation of embassies and international organisations back to Khartoum and will stimulate the return of citizens from abroad.
The return of the government, which began last week, will be completed with the transfer of the remaining government institutions from Port Sudan to Khartoum.
The wide-ranging internal and external developments in Sudan have been reflected in the rebels’ media, from which leadership voices have disappeared. The public has not heard a speech by Hemedti for some time, nor by his deputy, Abdel Rahim Dagalo, nor by the various mouthpieces—from Al-Basha Tabeeg to Abdel Moneim Al-Rabie and others. Some of these voices have been killed, such as the rebel captain Sufyan, while others have fled, such as Ibrahim Baqqal. Nothing remains but hollow threats and the dissemination of lies about imaginary advances.
Mobilisation and recruitment from the tribes and from mercenaries—from Colombia, Chad, and other African countries—have weakened.
The military arena now awaits an advance against what remains of the rebellion and its sweeping from Kordofan and Darfur. We are confident this will happen soon, as our army has accustomed us to action following thorough preparation and careful, deliberate movement.
Tomorrow, Sudan will be declared free of rebellion and will return strong and victorious, God willing.
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