Where is Sudan’s Place in The New Horn of Africa Project
By Mahmoud Hussein Serri
Sudan’s new Foreign Minister, Mohieddin Salem, takes charge of the country’s foreign relations at a most critical juncture in its history. He began his tenure with press statements reflecting the complex regional and international environment, declaring after taking the oath of office that Sudan is open to all—except those who conspire against its sovereignty and unity, for such actors will ultimately lose.
The minister added that the world and the region are undergoing major transformations, which necessitate that Sudan adapt its approach and methods accordingly. He stressed that Sudan’s shift in conduct must be guided by reason and open-mindedness to achieve the aspirations of the Sudanese people. He further affirmed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to defend Sudan in regional and international forums, pointing out that conspiracies against Sudan did not begin with the present war, but have been ongoing for years. He concluded by asserting that Sudan will prevail, no matter how numerous its enemies.
The minister’s words are accurate and reflect the awareness within Sudan’s security, diplomatic and military institutions that the country has been thrust into a vortex of an international conspiracy designed to divide it into mini-states, should it refuse to submit and yield to the blueprint drawn up by the “Board of Directors” of the New World Order. Yet while Sudanese institutions are alert to these plots and the manoeuvrings of regional intermediaries, the political class, the wider public, and collective consciousness remain largely unaware of the true scale of this international conspiracy.
The conspiracy against Sudan became apparent in the 1990s, when the country was internationally isolated and subjected to sanctions due to genuine mistakes by the previous regime in openly antagonising the international community. This culminated in Sudan’s partition into North and South. The secession cost Sudan the oil of South Sudan, crippled its economy, and undermined its currency and financial position. Political fragility grew in parallel with economic decline and rampant corruption, leading to a wave of protests and upheaval—the so-called “Arab Spring”.
Sudan then entered a second phase of transformation and conspiracy. After the collapse of the Islamic regime in the North and the loss of the South with its oil, a new stage of change was launched. This came through the Framework Agreement engineered by Volker Perthes, head of the UN mission in Sudan, which was adopted by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s bloc, the Forces of Freedom and Change, activists, and civil society groups. They believed it would eliminate what remained of the Islamist movement. When the plan was interrupted by the military’s intervention on 25 October 2021, halting Sudan’s rapid descent, the country entered a third stage: violent change, beginning with the Rapid Support Forces’ coup against the Sudanese army on 15 April 2023, in an attempt to enforce the framework agreement through war, backed by political forces intent on implementing it.
This cycle of Sudan’s transformation forms part of a wider regional redesign encompassing not only Sudan, but the entire Arab world and the Horn of Africa. Day by day, it becomes clearer that this scheme is orchestrated by European and American decision-making centres, coordinated closely among Western powers—even when appearances suggest otherwise.
The project began by fostering new, rising regional powers in the Gulf and beyond, designed to rival old centres of influence and carry out the international agenda. In Sudan’s case, the UAE stands out for its role in fuelling the conflict, acting as an instrument of external powers executing their designs in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Sudan.
This engineered regional transformation also involves recognition of and cooperation with Israel, and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause. This was evident in the Gaza war, attempts to displace Palestinians into Jordan and Egypt, the imposition of the Abraham Accords, and attempts by the international community to rope Sudan into them through reciprocal visits with Israel after the fall of the previous regime.
The project likewise incorporates the Arab Spring, aimed at transforming political and social systems. Its true purpose was to turn legitimate demands of the region’s peoples for justice and protest into “creative chaos”—a contradictory strategy combining destruction and instability with reconstruction, thereby fragmenting states into mini-states and cantons to allow for control over oil, water and financial assets. The results are plain: every state hit by the earthquake of protest and the Arab Spring—Syria, Libya, Yemen, Sudan—entered a spiral of division, disintegration and violence. Only Tunisia and Egypt survived relatively intact, thanks to public awareness, the patriotism of their armed forces, and the resilience of national institutions.
A further dimension of this “change project” is the New Horn of Africa Project, the focus of this article. The Horn of Africa is a strategic region long plagued by internal and regional conflicts and contested by external actors. Its reconfiguration is now being advanced through six main features:
Elimination of traditional powers—as seen in Sudan’s partition into North and South, and the deliberate curtailment of Arab and Islamic influence.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam—creating perpetual tension between upstream and downstream Nile Basin states, to contain Egypt and Sudan.
Control of the Red Sea and its ports by Gulf states—driven by competition for influence.
The rise of new regional powers as proxies—Ethiopia, the African Union, Djibouti, IGAD and Kenya, which hosts a large cluster of Western embassies and organisations.
Economic restructuring—anchored in IMF and World Bank financing, deliberately excluding Chinese and Russian influence.
Military transformation—building regional military power to secure Western interests across North, Central and Southern Africa, expanding the notion of the “small Horn of Africa” to a “greater Horn of Africa” encompassing North and East Africa, from Egypt to South Africa.
The danger of the New Horn of Africa Project is that it has moved beyond theory, studies, workshops and media statements. It is now operational. Western countries have established specific departments for the Horn of Africa, with envoys dedicated to advancing these objectives. The project is active, ongoing and being implemented.
Sudan’s involvement in this grave file requires that its political forces and national institutions avoid falling into the trap of executing these finely drawn schemes. Sudan must act urgently through several key measures, which can be summarised in seven points:
End the war, which aims to divide Sudan into two states with capitals in Khartoum and Nyala, and reject all regional and international attempts to preserve the RSF or other armed groups after the war, lest they remain a constant threat to the army.
Reject recognition of Horn of Africa envoys, scrutinise their requests and interventions, and treat their initiatives with vigilance.
Break Sudan’s international isolation, reject sanctions, and move quickly via constitutional procedures towards elections once the war ends.
Deepen cooperation with Egypt to find a swift, legal solution—backed by Arab, African and international partners—to avert a regional water war.
Diversify Sudan’s military and economic partnerships, avoid being drawn into regional blocs, and bring in counterbalancing powers such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil and non-hostile Western states.
Avoid treating the West as a monolith; divisions and fractures exist, as illustrated by disputes over Ukraine, which Sudan can tactically exploit.
Safeguard Sudan’s unique identity as a bridge between Arab, African, Islamic and Christian civilisations, by creating a strong, inclusive political model capable of managing diversity. A strong, united Sudan will be resilient against external manipulation and will not pose a threat to its neighbours.
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