Postponing the Sudan Quartet: Insights from U.S. Envoy to Africa’s Statements

Sudanhorizon – Mohamed Osman Adam
In three consecutive posts on his X (formerly Twitter) account, the U.S. Presidential Envoy for African Affairs, Mr. Johnnie Carson (Musad Boulos), following meetings with officials from Egypt and Qatar, focused on three main points: preventing the escalation of war in Sudan, stopping its regional spread, and ensuring the resolution of crises in both Sudan and Libya.
These three statements (dated July 30, August 1, and August 2) came in the wake of the failure to convene a planned Quadrilateral Meeting in Washington, which was to bring together the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The primary agenda of that meeting was to advance peace efforts in Sudan.
While some reports attributed the postponement to poor coordination and the lack of thorough pre-meeting arrangements—hence the decision to delay the meeting for better preparation—other reports suggest a more critical reason: a new precondition put forth by the United Arab Emirates. According to these sources, the UAE demanded that both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) be excluded from any final political settlement.
These reports indicate that Egypt rejected this UAE proposal, which was expected to appear in the draft communiqué that the four nations were to issue on July 30, 2025.
Why Is the UAE Setting These Preconditions?
There is little doubt that any formula involving a strong presence or participation of the Sudanese Armed Forces in a future political arrangement is unlikely to be supported or welcomed by the UAE.
Sudan’s Armed Forces have publicly and unequivocally blamed the UAE for much of the suffering inflicted upon Sudanese civilians during the current war. They have accused the Emirates, with material evidence, of providing weapons, ammunition, logistical support, media backing, and diplomatic cover to the RSF rebel militia. Consequently, the UAE seems to seek the removal of the army — its main accuser — from the equation, or at the very least, the sidelining of its senior leadership as a “Plan B.”
At the same time, the RSF has become a political and moral burden for the UAE, particularly due to reputational risks in the international arena. Despite Abu Dhabi’s attempts to portray its role as humanitarian and in the service of the Sudanese people, its links to the RSF have significantly tarnished its image.
In Sudan, any entity associated with the RSF now struggles to gain public sympathy or moral legitimacy. It’s quicksand: the longer the conflict drags on, the deeper the RSF sinks into disrepute—dragging down its allies with it. Increasingly, the RSF is seen as a pariah militia, and any party closely aligned with it risks being morally and politically discredited. This is evidenced by the growing international and regional condemnations, as well as reports detailing the RSF’s atrocities and violations of local, regional, and international humanitarian and human rights laws.
Even the “Ta’ammud” (Samud) coalition, with its professed dedication to international law and human rights, could not ignore the RSF’s extensive record of crimes and abuses. The Sudanese government was not the only one raising these accusations; rather, Western governments, the UN, and the United States—some of whom now support Samud—had already documented them. The African Union further compounded the situation, rendering Samud’s position untenable. In short, the formation of a rival “transitional government” has become a convenient excuse for many actors to jump ship before it sinks.
Egypt’s Position
Egypt is simultaneously managing multiple national security threats in its regional environment—from the Israeli war on Gaza and its spillover effects, to the Haftar-RSF alliance in Libya, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) crisis with Ethiopia. In this context, preserving Sudan’s national statehood and institutions is a strategic component of Egypt’s national security.
Moreover, the RSF has committed serious provocations against Egypt. Early in the war, it captured Egyptian army officers and pilots in Merowe, humiliating them by forcing them to crawl on camera. RSF leaders, including Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and his brother Abdel Rahim, went on to slander Egypt in media statements. They further aggravated the situation by launching attacks near the border triangle and disrupting trade flows from Egypt to Sudan.
In this light, the three statements issued by the U.S. envoy appear aimed at reassuring Cairo that its interests will not be threatened, and that its concerns will be taken seriously.
Following his August 1 meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aaty, Musad Boulos stated:
“We focused on efforts to resolve crises in Sudan and Libya and other regional conflicts. We affirmed our sustainable partnership across a range of shared priorities.”
This suggests that Egypt received assurances that developments in Libya or Sudan would not undermine it, and that any resolution would be aligned with its strategic vision.
Coordinated Messaging: Egypt, Qatar, the U.S.
The same theme was echoed in Boulos’s meetings with Dr. Mohammed Al-Khulaifi, Qatar’s Minister of State, in Washington. He noted:
“We discussed the importance of lasting peace in the eastern DRC and efforts to address conflicts in Sudan, Libya, and the wider region.”
This message was further reinforced during the July 31 meeting between Senator Rubio, Minister Abdel Aaty, and Boulos, where Rubio reportedly said:
“These partnerships are essential as we work to prevent escalation and promote lasting solutions throughout the region.”
Rubio reiterated this message in a statement on July 30, 2025:
“I previously met with Egypt’s Foreign Minister Abdel Aaty to discuss Egypt’s important role in promoting peace and regional security. I thanked Egypt for its mediation in Gaza and its support for ending the conflict in Sudan.”
These are reassuring signals to Egypt — meant to affirm its pivotal role in any prospective settlement.
What Will Sudan Receive in Return?
While the date for the rescheduled Quadrilateral Meeting remains unknown, one thing is clear: any agreement reached without the full inclusion of the Sudanese people or their legitimate institutions—regardless of political views—will be a grave mistake, potentially setting the stage for a renewed cycle of conflict.
Ultimately, the real test lies in how Sudan will be treated in the process. The international and regional actors involved must not underestimate the Sudanese people, nor should they attempt to engineer backroom deals without full Sudanese participation—otherwise, they risk repackaging the crisis rather than resolving it.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=6800