The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (3-7)

 Hemeti-Burhan coup and the Russian role

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

Although General Hemeti and the leaders of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) were partners in the coalition government led by Hamdok, and even though the FFC leaders outwardly showed him obedience and loyalty, General Hemeti did not trust them or reciprocate their respect. Rather, he stated on more than one occasion that the leaders of the FFC do not have real popular support and do not have experience in running the state. He used to mock their management of the economy (especially the Ministry of Trade), saying about them – sarcastically – “A person who owns gold and yet he goes begging.” Then he threatens them and warns them, saying: “We don’t care anymore, we have nothing to do with them? What do we have to do with them? And again, we tell a one-eyed man that he has one eye.” Sometimes, he would even go so far as to say that they used to receive their salaries from foreign embassies. The disputes between the two partners escalated to a complete break, leading Hemeti (along with General Al-Burhan) to overthrow them on 25 October 2021, thereby ending the ruling coalition. It is no wonder that one of the first internal decisions made after the ousting of Hamdok’s government was the freezing of the investigation into the dispersal of the sit-in. Another decision that would have significant and far-reaching consequences was the shift away from the Group of Four and the move towards Russia. The question arises: did Russian intelligence know about the coup? And was General Hemeti coordinating with them, as some indications suggest?

The first sign of Russian involvement in the coup was the previous cooperation between the Wagner Group and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as the Russian leadership’s particular interest in Hemeti. President Putin had extended an invitation to him to visit Moscow. On 23 February 2022 (just three months after the 25 October 2021 coup and one day before the war in Ukraine), Hemeti, accompanied by a large delegation, including ministers of finance, agriculture, and mining, visited Russia. At that time, President Putin was preparing for his war against Ukraine (which began on 24 February 2022) and was seeking a foothold on the Red Sea to facilitate communication with his bases in the heart of Africa and ensure the flow of gold and minerals to offset the shortage of foreign currency due to sanctions on Russian exports. It was no secret to observers that Russia had been, and continues to be, determined to strengthen its influence across the African continent. It has various projects and security, military, and economic agreements, often carried out by the Wagner Group, which had previous ties with Hemeti’s RSF. Russia was also, and still is, eager to invest in Sudan’s mineral sector, a sector dominated by the RSF through companies like Al-Junaid. Understandably, Hemeti’s visit to Russia stirred considerable discontent among American and European circles.

However, Russia’s desire to establish a military base on the Red Sea was not new, stemming from previous understandings and agreements. Sudanese governments had long hesitated on this matter, leading the Russian government to seek a daring leadership figure, which they found in Hemeti, a figure they began to rely on for reasons similar to those that drew the attention of Sudan’s former president and the the Group of Four. Based on Wagner’s experience in Sudan, the Russian government viewed Hemeti as a ‘situational ‘ adventurer who could break away from the norm. In the context of this geo-economic struggle between Russia and Western countries, preparations were made for the October 25, 2021 coup. Western sources were quick to assert that Russia played a role in the coup, Despite official reports denying this and claiming that the visit was part of normal cooperation on regional and international issues.

Hemedti’s Coup Against Russia

However, less than six months after the October 2021 coup, General Hemeti took a contradictory stance to his initial positions. He began to distance himself from the coup and adopt the role of a democratic reformer. The rift between him and General Burhan widened as he grew closer to the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) leaders, whom he had recently criticized harshly. Hemeti then began praising the youth of the revolution and speaking about democratic transition. This raises questions: What happened to General Hemeti in the six months following the October 2021 coup? How can we explain his political shift away from his original military coup? Did he suddenly develop a conviction for democratic transformation? Did he begin to sense real security threats surrounding him? Was he subjected to pressure or threats? Was he subjected to some pressure and intimidation? Posing these questions and answering them can help us understand the sudden shift in Hemeti’s trajectory and the subsequent direction of Sudanese politics.

Many observers noted this major reversal in Hemeti’s positions after he visited Moscow and offered various interpretations. Some hasty journalists claimed that Hemeti’s statements were meaningless because they contradicted one another, reflecting a state of confusion, instability, and internal conflict that left him unable to decisively choose his stance or properly read the current political landscape and its future directions.  Others suggested that Hemeti might have experienced a ‘moral awakening,’ prompting him to reconsider his political positions and lean towards overthrowing the coup and handing power to civilian forces on a silver platter. In our view, these are far-fetched assumptions. Repenting of coups and embracing democratic transition are psychological and intellectual processes that do not happen overnight. If such a change had occurred, Hemeti should have resigned immediately rather than entrench himself in his ‘presidential’ position, which he used to orchestrate the coup, and certainly not pursue further militarization by increasing recruitment and acquiring more tanks, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles—as he was doing at the time. This leads us to prefer a third assumption, which we would like to substantiate in this article. The assumption is that General Hemeti was subjected to threats and blackmail from major powers opposed to Russia. But together with the threats, he was offered a ‘grand deal’ that aligned with his political ambitions (based on the familiar carrot-and-stick policy). Hemeti succumbed to the blackmail and accepted the deal. As a result, his positions shifted dramatically, reflected in carefully crafted statements stemming from that strategic ‘deal’ made with those powers. Since he was unable to disclose the details of the ‘deal’ (except to the inner circle of the Dagalo family), his statements might have seemed incoherent to some journalists. But the bitter grain of truth is that it was the journalists who were confused. So, what exactly was this ‘deal’? This is exactly what we are going to explore in the following section.